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At the limits of state governance. Territory,
property and state making in Lenje 
Chiefdom, rural Zambia
Abstract
African state property regimes – embedded in a racialized structure of land ownership that
stretches back centuries – are at the center of contemporary land struggles. At present, the
Zambian government is appropriating ‘traditional land’, controlled by chiefs and headmen
molded through colonial rule, in an effort to bring it into the fold of ‘modernity’. On paper
this process appears as a powerful state-building project. Yet on the ground it is riddled with
legal contingency, with land survey beacons appearing unexpectedly on people’s doorsteps,
and chiefs finding themselves torn between asserting their sovereignty and maintaining
recognition by the state.
This thesis examines the material and conceptual remaking of chiefly lands as
constitutive of new forms of exclusion and political authority. Yet, instead of focusing on
the ‘achievements’ of state power, analytical attention is placed on the creative ways state
governance is subverted by chiefly obstruction, insubordinate peoples and unruly nature.
Drawing on long-term fieldwork and archival research, the thesis argues that the process of
‘state making’ and its effects are inseparable from the myriad material practices that thwart
state power. A conceptualization of ‘boundaries’ is developed to capture how relations of
stately and chiefly power operate on an unstable political landscape. The analysis knits
together insights from legal pluralism, political ecology, critical geography, anthropology and
postcolonial theory in a grounded reading of everyday forms of state formation that captures
how colonial histories and spatialities intertwine with present-day politics.
Building on this analytical foundation, the thesis links up four case studies of ‘state
making’: (I) the colonial racialization and sedentarization of African bodies, and their
refusals to conform to colonial territoriality, (II) the government enclosure of a forest
repeatedly reoccupied by chiefly authority (III) the emplacement of survey beacons on 
village land, and their demolition by local inhabitants, and (IV) the promotion of state-
sanctioned title deeds on customary land, and their reinvention as implements of chiefly
control. Each case makes visible the fissures of state power and how creative people exploit
indeterminacies to resist eviction and reassert their claims to home and land. Through a
recognition of ‘ordinary people’ as political protagonists, fully capable of contestation and
critique, the thesis shows how marginalized people continuously test the limits of state
governance, and how such practices are not ‘irregularities’ to otherwise effective
performances of governance, but crucial political enactments that constitute new forms of
property, territory and an uneven and variable state.
Keywords: state making, boundaries, land struggles, resistance, property, territory,
chieftainship, Zambia
Author’s address: Linus Rosén, SLU, Dept. of Urban and Rural Development, P.O. Box 
7012, 750 07 Uppsala, Sweden.
  
 
     
            
     
  




          
 
 
   
   
   
        
 
 
     
        
  
          
 
    
   
           
 
   
 
       
   
     
      
  





At the limits of state governance. Territory,
property and state making in Lenje 
Chiefdom, rural Zambia
Abstract
Den statliga styrningen av markägande i södra Afrika – vars system är präglat av sekelgamla
rasstrukturer – står i centrum för dagens politiska strider över mark och rättmätigt ledarskap.
Den zambiska regeringen exproprierar s.k. ’traditionell’ mark, förvaltad av lokala kungar och
byäldstar, i syfte att inlemma marken i ’moderniteten’. På papperet är det ett effektivt verktyg
för statsbildning. Men i praktiken genomsyras processen av rättslig ambivalens, med nya
gränsmarkörer som dyker upp utanför byinvånares dörrar, och med kungar som balanserar
mellan att hävda sin förvaltningsrätt och bli erkända av staten som legitima politiska aktörer.
Den här avhandlingen undersöker den materiella och konceptuella omdaningen av 
mark kontrollerad av kungadömet Lenje i centrala Zambia, och hur den skapar nya former
av exkludering och politiska auktoriteter. Men snarare än att fokusera på vad statlig 
maktutövning ’uppnår’ läggs analytiskt fokus på hur det statliga styret ständigt utmanas av 
kungadömet, lokala småbrukare och oregerlig natur. Med utgångspunkt i arkivforskning
och deltagande observation argumenterar avhandlingen för att processen ’statsbildning’ är
oskiljbar från den myriad av kreativa praktiker som utmanar statlig maktutövning.
Analysen bygger på en konceptualisering av ’gränser’ för att förstå hur statligt och kungligt
maktutövande yttrar sig på ett politiskt instabilt landskap. Undersökningen väver samman 
insikter från politisk ekologi, rättspluralism, kritisk geografi, antropologi och postkolonial
teori, vilket lägger grund för en analys av vardagliga former av statsbildning som också
fångar hur koloniala historier och geografier sammanflätas med samtida politik.
Avhandlingen kopplar samman fyra fallstudier av statsbildning: (I) den koloniala
rasifieringen och sedentariseringen av afrikanska kroppar, och deras vägran att fogas in i
den koloniala geografin, (II) den statliga exproprieringen av ett skogsområde som 
upprepade gånger återockuperas av kungadömet, (III) statens utmätning och utplacering av 
gränsmarkörer på bybors mark, och hur lokala invånare demolerar dem, och (IV) statligt
främjande av nationella lagfartsbevis på mark som regleras av lokala normsystem, och hur
lagfarter omtolkas av lokala byäldstar till politiska verktyg för sin egen maktutövning.
Varje fallstudie synliggör sprickorna i den statliga styrningen, och hur kreativa människor
utnyttjar politiska ovissheter för att motsätta sig vräkningar och återartikulera sina
rättigheter. Avhandlingen visar hur marginaliserade människor kontinuerligt testar
gränserna för statligt styre, och hur sådana praktiker är betydelsefulla politiska handlingar
som konstituerar en ombytlig och föränderlig stat.
Nyckelord: statsbildning, marktvister, motstånd, egendom, territorium, kolonialism,
kungadömen, Zambia
Författarens adress: Linus Rosén, SLU, Inst. för stad och land, Box 7012, 750 07 Uppsala,
Sverige.
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  1. Introduction 
Mulonga village, Lenje Chiefdom, autumn 2016
It was early morning when the survey vehicle rolled in. It was ornamented
with the coat of arms of the ‘The Republic of Zambia’ with the text ‘One
Zambia – One Nation’ enfolded within, and carried five men and all the
devices needed to carve up the land in modular units and inscribe them on
the landscape: charts, prism poles, spades, rebar, cement. Their mandate and
the reactions of the people they encountered on the ground is emblematic of
the central concern of this thesis; namely, the detailed ways material land
works both as a conduit for state authority and a potent terrain for resistance,
sabotage and insubordination.
According to the map the surveyors carried, the land was ‘empty’, yet the 
landscape was dotted with farmsteads, fields, fallows, pastures and orchards,
telling of a space already inhabited. Among the inhabitants, the arrival of the
survey vehicle incited confusion. ‘I don’t know what is happening’, Chipepo
said, ‘I think they are government people’. ‘You haven’t talked to them?’ I
queried. ‘No’, he replied quietly, ‘they just came and started to put those
beacons in the ground.’ Rumors of the sudden appearance of the surveyors
traveled rapidly across the village lands, and that same evening people
gathered at the village pub to air their concerns: ‘What if they return
tomorrow? Where will they put those beacons then? … I don’t like this, we
have to keep our eyes open’, someone remarked. ‘Yes, if that vehicle enters
our land, things will be very bad’, someone else commented. It was not long, 
however, before people discovered cement survey beacons implanted in
fields and farmlands, uncomfortably juxtaposed with the cairns, trees and
streams delineating their customary rights. In the wake of the survey vehicle,








   
  
      
   
  
   
          
      













    
   
    
   
     
        
 
rendering in concrete emergent relations of state authority and new
spatialities of exclusion.
That the survey vehicle entering Mulonga that day was marked with the
text ‘One Zambia – One Nation’ was symbolic of a wider context; the slogan 
was coined by Zambia’s founding father and first president, Kenneth
Kaunda, in 1964, to thwart tribalist revolt and sub-national divisiveness and
secessionism among Zambia’s seventy or so ethnolinguistic groups – what 
colonial administrators called ‘tribes’ – and to instead foster a feeling of
national cohesion. The slogan has lingered on as a powerful national axiom,
and seen here on a government vehicle, it mirrors its material-historical
ramifications: by mapping, surveying and beaconing the land, it is brought
within the fold of the nation. At the same time, however, the rural poor are
edited out of the land on which they depend. Such events have been observed
and retold in extensive scholarship on state making and land reform. Yet
what happened in Mulonga over the following weeks troubles such
narratives. In the wake of the survey vehicle, villagers repeatedly tested the 
limits of state governance: some demolished cement beacons and buried the
remains in the bush or piled them up at the roadside as an open spectacle.
Others built sturdier houses, replaced thatch with iron sheets and transplanted
fruit trees to more strategic locations, all to reinforce their presence on the
land. Instead of an effective performance of authority, the demarcation of
Mulonga evolved into a localized conflict between a creative citizenry
rearranging the landscape and picking apart boundary stones and a
bureaucracy struggling to make them perform the political work assigned to
them. Somewhat ironically, people resisted eviction by turning the tools of
state governance against itself.
1.1 Arguments and objectives
Agrarian reforms toward private property have been rolled out across the
African continent, reordering rights to land and changing the ways crucial
resources can be held, accessed and controlled (Boone 2019; Chimhowu 
2019). The Zambian government is among those that are in the midst of
appropriating ‘traditional land’ – governed by chiefs and headmen molded 
through the colonial technologies of tribal rule – in an effort to bring it into
the fold of ‘modernity.’ These lands have become powerful vectors for






         
      
  




   
   
            
    
         
  
 
   
      
 
  
       
  
   
 
   
 
  
     
  






material emplacement means that people on the ground usually have some
say, if not through institutional arrangements then through acts of
subversion, non-compliance or force (Li 2004). This thesis is about those
acts. I examine the material and conceptual remaking of chiefly land –
physically reconfiguring, politically relabeling, discursively reimaging – as
constitutive of new forms of exclusion, orderings of power and political
authority. Yet, rather than focusing on the ‘achievements’ of state power, I
shift analytical attention to the myriad ways state governance is refused,
challenged and unsettled by chiefly obstruction, insubordinate peoples and 
unruly natures. My ambition is to rescale ‘state making’ into the messy
geographies of everyday life, where we can take seriously the insistent 
materiality of physical land and its more-than-passive presence in our lives,
and the ingenuity, makeshift creativity and experience of local peoples.
Scholars writing on the political ecology of land have spent a great deal
of effort analyzing land’s constitution as ‘territory’, ‘governable space’ or
‘space of contestation’, and how efforts to control land and other resources
are intimately related to the reproduction and consolidation of the state, both
materially and symbolically (Peluso 2001; Neumann 2004; Harris 2012;
Lund and Boone 2013; Hoffmann and Vlassenroot 2014; Bridge 2014;
Nightingale 2018; Sud 2019). Their work shows how the relationship 
between land and the institutions that act upon it is co-constitutive, with the
very notion of stateness wrapped up with control over land and the people
who dwell on it. States ‘come into being’, as Neumann (2004: 185) famously
averred, through the ‘assertion of control over territory, resources, and
people’ (cf. Mitchell 1991).
This thesis builds on these insights, but I also push them forward by 
bringing into clearer view the hidden, invisible and ‘backstage’ work that
continuously thwarts state governance and reinjects elements of eventuality
and uncertainty into processes of ‘state making’: exclusionary property is
etched onto the land yet fences corrode and boundary stones are unearthed;
eviction troops are deployed but ancestral spirits command heavy rains that
thwart their travel; abstract property rights are inscribed onto title deeds in a 
faraway capital, but documents are lost or manipulated; huts are burned and
fields ploughed under to erase signs of human occupation and use, but people
repeatedly write themselves back into the landscape through tree planting or
chiefly sanction. Such contingencies certainly appear in critical scholarship
on the state. In particular, there has been a surge of writing that explores the 
17
 
   
  
   
   
 







   
  
      
   
  
 
       
  
   
   
  
       
   
 
  
        
  
  
   
     
  
       
 
‘negotiability’ of rights in land and legitimate authority to govern, offering
important insights into the indeterminate effects of state governance (Sud
2019; Hoffmann, Vlassenroot and Marchais 2017; Lund 2002). What has
received less attention, I contend, is how such indeterminacies are actively
produced by people on the ground in their efforts to stake claims to home
and land, and how material land works as a conduit for the subversion of
state power. 
My analysis brings into analytical view how people continually exploit
indeterminacies in the situation, or indeed generate such indeterminacies,
using whatever areas there are of inconsistency, contradiction and ambiguity 
(cf. Moore 1978). Once we rescale our analysis onto the ground, however,
we see how the rural poor are not alone in navigating these uncertainties.
State bureaucrats, surveyors and field officers also deploy surreptitious
tactics – sabotage, feigned ignorance, dissimulation – in order to manipulate
relations of governance (cf. Scott 1985). For example, when reports came in
about people uprooting boundary stones in Mulonga, the surveyors received 
orders to ‘plant beacons strategically, so people couldn’t tell the boundaries’,
as the chief surveyor hesitantly disclosed, suggesting that rendering visible
the intentions of government made it vulnerable to obstruction. As such,
analytical attention to the fissures, fractures and cracks of state power shows
how practices of subversion and state governance evolve together, with
seemingly ‘failed’ attempts to govern being constitutive of new enactments
of authority. In this thesis, I use such moments not to query some radical
reconfiguration of rule (cf. Lund 2016) but rather to probe how state
governance is, at every turn, troubled by unruly peoples and natures, and how
moments of contestation – however miniscule – are not anomalies to 
otherwise effective performances of government, but crucial conceptual
resources for our understanding of agrarian struggles as productive of the
state as a contested and variegated political authority. I use such moments to
think through the state and its colonial history, charting out the ways racial
exclusion, displacement and dispossession unfold (or not) in geographies of
everyday life.
There is a second aspect to my analysis. The thesis sits in productive tension
with literatures suggesting that customary lands across the African continent
have become the ‘new frontiers’ for capitalist expansion, leading to the
expungement of local rights and claims to land (Chimhowu 2019; Kelly and 













   
 
 
   
 
     
  




   
       
 
   








these narratives attribute to state governance a coherence that it does not have,
and hide from view the experience of marginalized peoples – those for whom
courtrooms are not viable terrains of struggle and those who constantly face
deferrals of legal-official resolution. This thesis, in contrast, shows how the
rural poor stake claims to home and land within the currents of structural
inequality. Some scholars have cautioned against privileging contingency and
negotiability, arguing that attention to ‘small acts’ might conceal structural
forms of oppression and inequality (Peters 2004). My argument is a different
one: the fact that local rights and claims to land are being eroded across
southern Africa makes it all the more urgent to probe how people resist and 
subvert change, what practices – even ‘miniscule’ and quotidian – manipulate
the mechanisms of dispossession, and, finally, what practices form the
counterpart of the processes that organize the establishment of new agrarian
orders. Ultimately, if we fail to recognize ‘small acts’ as legitimate political 
claims, we also fail to recognize some people as political protagonists, fully 
capable of contestation and critique, and to honor contestation and critique as
meaningful political action.
Consequently, this thesis shifts the analytical focus away from overall
strategies of government and toward the political toil – adjustments, 
deployments, readjustments, redeployments – that goes into making state
governance work (or not), and the opportunities for subversion, refusals and
insubordination that emerge within. By placing the analysis here, the state is
revealed as an uncertain achievement, with a crisscrossing of social relations
that draw its institutional bounds out into a world of ambiguous authority, 
diffident bureaucrats, insubordinate citizens, unclear jurisdictions and unruly
ecologies (Sud 2019). Thus, attending to the cracks, failures, fissures and
inadvertent outcomes of state governance is not to explore ‘state failure’ (see
Hagmann and Péclard 2010 for a critical review); rather, it mirrors an
analytical interest in the inability of state power to ‘block the contingencies 
of the world’ (Meehan 2013: 8), and how those contingencies provide
possibilities for people to resist eviction, reoccupy disputed lands and assert
their claims to a patch of ground. Attending to such moments, I shall argue, 
is not a distraction from our understanding of agrarian struggles; it is
fundamental to it. It is against this background that my overarching research
question should be read:




     
    
   
     
 
 




      
  
   
  
    
  
    
   
  




          
  
  
    
  
    
  
      
   
   
I operationalize my inquiry through two sub-questions:
I. How are new state territorializations shaped by the materiality of
landscapes and the people that inhabit and move across them?
II. What political work do artifacts of statutory land governance –
survey beacons, official uniforms, title deeds etc. – perform in the
opaque reality of the everyday?
With these questions, my aim is to further our understanding of how
everyday contingencies shape land struggles and state making in rural
Zambia. Ethnography and archival research orient my analysis, with a focus
on two particular field sites in Lenje Chiefdom, Central Province: Munyama
Forest in Chisamba District and Mulonga village in Chibombo District (see 
figure 3), but I also draw on fieldwork from Lenje Chiefdom as a whole. The
thesis links up four ‘agrarian events’ – corresponding to four empirical
chapters – from the past and present, each one focusing on a critical moment
of ‘state making’ that features a government attempt to remake chiefly land,
yet which leads to highly ‘unfixed’ outcomes. 
I begin my analysis in the 1890s to explore the colonial appropriation of
indigenous lands and the concomitant displacement of racialized bodies onto 
marginal geographies. Instead of exploring the ‘achievements’ of colonial
state power, however, I shift analytical attention to the bodies that refused or
ignored the appellation assigned to them to probe how boundaries of race, 
gender and tribe were repeatedly challenged by bodies moving across the
landscape. Subsequently, I explore the government enclosure of a forest
claimed by chiefly authority. I analyze the racialized history of the landscape,
going back to the 1940s, and examine how its ecological-spiritual layers and
the materiality of terrain trouble present-day state governance. I then move
on to explore the demarcation of village land, and how the material artifacts
of private property, survey beacons in particular, provide an opportunity for
villagers to engage in covert political struggles with the authorities of the 
state. Finally, I examine how the title deed, and its paper-y existence, become 
reappropriated by chiefly authority, opening up the tenets of exclusionary
property law for creative renegotiation.
Conceptually, I read these contestations as ‘boundary struggles’, with the
body, forest, beacon and title deed figuring as four ‘boundary objects’ located 
in the betweenness of stately and chiefly spaces of authority and control. Each
of these ‘objects’ foregrounds localized material practices through which
20
 
    
   




    




   
       
  
   
  
  
     
   





   
   
      
      
  
     
   
      
relations of rule work – the movement of bodies, the emplacement of boundary
stones, the circulation of documents – locating state power not at a fixed center
or within a systemic logic but in relational processes that are translocal yet
have highly localized effects. Taken together, my four case studies reveal how
the outcome of agrarian struggles remains crucially contingent upon how state 
governance becomes tangled up with colonial histories, the materiality of
things, spiritual ecologies, the flammability of paper, accidents and unforeseen
events. They reveal how land – at different scales – never becomes fully
exclusive but rather takes on liminal qualities through which a plurality of
political actors reinjects elements of indeterminacy, rendering absolute
orderings all the more impossible. By bringing these processes to the fore, this 
thesis contributes to a reimagining of (state) power and political authority in
rural Zambia, one that shows how material land is turned into an object of
political control in ways that authorize violent exclusions and reproduce social
hierarchies, but also how land, at the same time, is inhabited, labored on and
creatively navigated in efforts to subvert repressive power and authority.
1.2 Conceptual delineations
1.2.1 Land, power, meaning
On the cover of this thesis is an aerial photo of one of my field sites, Mooya
village in Lenje Chiefdom. It shows a seemingly clear line separating out
neat parcels of cadastral property from the meshwork of rights on chiefly
land – a geography organized by statutory law, on one side, and a chiefly 
topography, on the other. Yet the aerial view is misleading insofar as it
creates a conception of chiefly lands as somehow located ‘outside’ the 
ordering power of state institutions. The boundary between stately and 
chiefly authority emerged out of the formation of the colonial settler state,
which was founded upon the displacement of the African population onto 
marginal geographies and the concomitant inauguration of indirect rule
(Mamdani 1996). Acknowledging these relations negates conceptions of
contemporary state governance as expanding ‘outwards’ and ‘into’ places
and fields not previously regulated by state power (Chimhowu 2009; cf.
Scott 1985, 1998). Instead, what we see in the aerial view is the political life 
of ‘imperial debris’ (Stoler 2008: 193), that is, an ‘evasive space of imperial














     
   
    
          
           
  
 
    
         
        
   
   
   
     
   
        
    
 
   
  
 
        
 
    
      
         
people are forced to reckon with features of those formations in which they
remain vividly and imperceptibly bound.’
In this research, I account for the spatial, ecological and temporal texture 
of these relations, articulating how current forms of subjection to state rule are 
molded on the back of a colonial past, recurring in a ‘colonial presence’ (Stoler
2016). My analysis captures that which is ‘past but not over’ and how ‘colonial
relations are disparately and partially absorbed into social relations…’ (ibid:
25). In this optic, Zambian land is what Donald Moore (2005) has called an
‘entangled landscape’: a space where state power mingles with chiefly
authority, where colonial histories and spatialities intertwine with the politics
of the present, where people become subjected to multiple matrices of power.
Consequently, this thesis tacks between past and present to situate the
analysis in a wider field of historical and cultural practices and imaginaries
– and relations of power – through which land and its users have been
invested with multiple layers of cultural and political meaning. This is also
to suggest that lands people inhabit and cultivate do not lie external to culture
and history, but are themselves artifactual: objects made, materially and
conceptually, through many different historical and spatial practices. On the 
most fundamental level, the notion that land is made (and subject to state
making), rather than existing as a pure identity external to social and political
processes, forces us to take responsibility for how this making of land occurs,
in whose interest and with what consequences for the rural poor (Braun
2002). Rather than probing a linear change toward the capitalization of land, 
this thesis highlights the continuation of the many lives – a postcolonial
plurality, or socially intertwined trajectories – of land. 
This departs from most treatments of contemporary land politics in Zambia,
which see conflicts over the land in terms of competing interests and diverging
beliefs about how it should be used, held or developed (per de Soto 2000). In
these accounts, land is self-evident and exists in a space outside politics; it is
simply the object over which politics happens. This thesis, in contrast, probes
how something called ‘land’ is made visible, how it enters history as an object
of social and political control, and emerges as a site of material, emotional and
libidinal struggle. In this analytic, land is a category of power; there is no place
‘outside’ social and material relations and practices from which land can be
objectively known – it is simultaneously epistemic, cultural, material and
political. The same chunk of land or group of trees might be valued as an















      
   
  
   




       
 
 
     
 
     
        
  
    
   
   
    
  
    
        
  
security of the household; a place of work; a marker of historical settlement; a 
resource to be accumulated and sold for economic gain; a place of social
memory and ancestral worship or one that provides a cool, shady spot for
spirits to reside (see Li 2014). Land can be claimed through birth rights, first
settlement, conquest, residence, cultivation, habitual grazing, tree plantation,
spiritual sanction or bureaucratic allocation (Shipton 1994: 348). These ways
of valuing and claiming land are not commensurable with each other, and are
indeed the subject of ongoing negotiations and debate in local social and
political life. Even when our relation to land seems most immediate, it is
profoundly shaped by histories, knowledges and practices that enable
experience (Derrida 1976). As Rouse (1987: 173, 182) notes, ‘what things are, 
and what characteristics they can have, depends in part upon the practical
configuration within which they become manifest. There are no essences
independent of this configuration of practices and the language invoked within 
it. … We encounter “nature” through our practices, as it fits in and is revealed
intelligibly in that context’.
My intention is not only to move away from talking about land in the
singular, but also to move away from the notion that landscapes can be
understood as discrete, bounded places. In and between the chapters of this
thesis, place emerges at the nexus of multiple material-semiotic practices.
These do not coalesce to form a stable entity, nor do they respond to a single
logic. There is no one spatiality or temporality in Lenje Chiefdom. Places are
inherently rhizomatic, the effect of spatial linkages and temporal rhythms
that operate at different speeds (Massey 1994; 2005). This does not empty
place of its meaning; rather, it suggests the opposite. Drawing on a phrase
used by Kathleen Stewart (1996), all places are ‘occupied places’, at once
subject to the occupation of external forces, yet occupied – experienced,
lived, hoped for – in their own right. Indeed, land is not a spatial container
for the implementation of state rule (Moore 2005). State making occurs on 
and through land crosscut with meanings irreducible to a singular logic of
power, a view that refuses modernist ideas of non-human nature being some
object of ‘state capture’ (Parenti 2014). Instead, land becomes the material
and social fabric through which the state emerges.
Analytically, this translates into an attention to how state governance
unfolds in encounters with rural subjects already embedded in relations with
the land, relations that extend into a colonial history and entangle with land’s
geophysical substance. Practices of government that remake land in rural
23
 
     
   
 






   
  
 
    
 
 
    
    
 
       
  
      





      
   
        
    
 
       
   
    
Zambia, I maintain, do not institute a new regime of rule, erasing, eclipsing
or occluding previous power, but rather reconfigure the relations though 
which power works. In this analytic, land emerges as a current of power and
resistance, with the aim of displacing state power from structural dictates and
specters of bureaucratic rationality. My work rescales the analysis of state 
making onto the land and onto rural subjects, and conceptually inserts state 
making into spaces of everyday life.
My thinking is informed by a long tradition of research that has sought to 
unsettle conceptualizations of the state as a singular, rational and stable
entity, and instead has centered the analysis on the state’s conditional 
emergence, elevation, endurance or erosion (Foucault 1980; Taussig 1992;
Nettle 1986; Abrams 1988; Mitchell 1991; Bourdieu 1994; Ferguson and
Gupta 2002). The fundamental argument emerging from this body of thought
is that the state is a product of practice, an effect, a provisional achievement,
and that its durability is contingent upon its constant renewal, effectively
relocating the analysis of the state from structural dictates to process and
attempts at stabilization, successful or not.
Foucault (1980, 1995), in particular, has been an important theorist in this
regard, stressing the constitutive effects of power and how its exercise 
materializes into different assemblages of rule (see also Li 2007). Instead of
analyzing some apparatus from which power proceeds (i.e. some localizable,
expansionist, repressive and legal institution), Foucault (1995) analyzed the
‘miniscule’ technical procedures acting on and with details, comprising the
means of a generalized ‘discipline’. ‘Discipline fixes’, Foucault (1995: 219)
contended, because ‘it arrests movement; it clears up confusion; it dissipates
compact groupings of individuals wandering about in the country in
unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions.’ My analysis
poses questions both similar and contrary to those of Foucault: similar, in 
that my goal is to bring into view ‘ordinary’ practices that endure within
social and territorial productions and deflect their functioning by means of a
multitude of ‘tactics’ articulated in the details of everyday life; contrary, in 
that my goal is not to make clearer how the violence of order is transmuted
into some disciplinary technology, but rather to bring to light the
surreptitious forms taken by the dispersed, tactical and makeshift creativity
of people already caught in the nets of ‘discipline’ (colonialism, modernity, 
land law reform etc.). Pushed to their limits, these procedures and ruses
24
 




     
   
    




   
 
 
   






      
   
 
 
   





    
    
  
 
compose ‘anti-disciplines’. In my writing, however, they feature as acts of
resistance or subversion. 
From this theoretical vantage point, we escape the isomorphism among 
state, force and territory that locates power both spatially and institutionally
inside a unitary state with functional desires and an inherent tendency to 
expand through its own dynamics. Instead, by focusing on the practices of 
government – surveying, fencing, enclosing, reclassification – political
authority becomes visible as unfolding, never fully constructed but always
under construction, materially and symbolically, and our analytical attention
is drawn not to where power proceeds from, but to the lands on and through 
which it is exercised (Hansen and Stepputat 2001). It is here that I place the
analysis, in moments and places where state authority tries to inscribe new
governing relationships, yet which lead to uncertain, unfixed or awkwardly
overlapping outcomes.
Thus ‘the state’ is not some actor-like entity, although it sometimes
appears like one (Mitchell 1991). Chiwala, a headman in Munyama Forest,
told me that ‘the state is a camel’. We were sitting at his homestead in
Munyama Forest, a stretch of land nestled within a mystique of sovereign
ambiguity (see Chapter 6). Once a ‘Protected Forest Area’ policed by rangers 
in colonial costume, Munyama is now occupied by a peasant population 
governed by a group of village headmen subservient to Chief Liteta IV of
Lenje Chiefdom. State authorities have repeatedly tried to reclaim control
over the forest lands, issuing eviction letters, ordering the arrest of unruly 
forest cultivators, burning huts and ploughing fields under. State incursion, 
however, has been met with resistance, both human and more-than-human.
Government vehicles entering the forest have been stoned and at other times 
impeded by heavy rains, summoned, some aver, by an ancestral spirit. Fields
have been replanted and homesteads rebuilt, often with ash-tainted remains.
‘Yes, a camel, you know, like in the story’, Chiwala continued when noticing
my bewilderment. I had stayed with him for some time and had grown used
to his wit, but a camel? Chiwala ran inside his house and collected one of his 
son’s school books, and started to read:
One day an Arab and a camel crossed a desert. At nightfall the Arab raised
his tent and went inside. It was not long before the camel put his nose under
the flap. ‘Master’, he said, ‘it’s very cold out here, can I just put my nose in
your tent?’ ‘By all means’, said the Arab, and went back to sleep. Soon the 
Arab awoke again. This time the camel asked if he could put his forelegs into
25
 
     
     
  
     
  
      
 





   












   
   
 
  
     
     
  
    
   
the tent. ‘Yes, you may put your forelegs within,’ said the Arab, moving a
little to make room for the camel. A little while later the camel woke the Arab
up again: ‘may I not stand wholly inside?’ ‘Yes, yes,’ said the Arab, ‘come
inside. Perhaps it will be better for both of us.’ So the camel crowded in. The
Arab, now crammed to the corner of the small tent, again went to sleep. When
he woke up the next time, he was outside in the cold and the camel had the
tent to himself.
Listening to Chiwala tell this story was something like an extended ethno-
graphic pre-sneeze sensation that infused new life into my conceptual world. 
The camel embodies many of the enigmatic attributes of the state as depicted
in anthropological writing (Spencer 2007; Hansen and Stepputat 2001;
Aretxaga 2003). It shadows its subjects, at once diligently and aloofly. It is
inimical, yet provides comfort. It is seemingly possessed of an ‘autonomous 
organicity’ (Laszczkowski and Reeves 2015), able to powerfully affect its
subjects in ways both denigrating and cunning. And all the same, ‘the state’,
like the camel, remains just an imaginary, a construct that can be critiqued and
chased away, sometimes by hurling rocks at its material incarnations. Above
all, the state is inseparable from the socionatural relations it is embedded
within (Nightingale 2018), with both colonial and postcolonial rule inter-
twining in legacies of conquest, dispossession and radical inequalities of rights.
1.2.2 Colonial connectivities
Even the most localized and momentary struggles over land reflect wider
histories and geographies of power (see Boone 2014). Zambia is a bifurcated
nation, with lines of social division sedimented over a long history of
colonial rule. In 1924, the first British governor in Northern Rhodesia, Sir
Herbert Stanley, proclaimed that Northern Rhodesia should be developed
into a ‘white man’s country’ (see Roberts 1976: 183). Consequently, the
most attractive and accessible land was named Crown Land, vested in the
governor of Northern Rhodesia and set aside for white settlers, while
Africans were forcibly relocated to more remote lands, Native Reserves, and
incorporated into regimes of indirect rule, with chiefs and headmen policing
infringements of domestic order, procuring taxes and labor while providing
conduits for colonial administration (see Gould 1995; 1997). Colonial spatial
segregation was founded upon constructs of racial, cultural and legal
difference – a colonizing bourgeoisie holding land as private property and a






















   
  
 
   
  








   
 
   
types reified as historical facts mapped onto discrete geographical and
institutional sites (Mamdani 1996). As such, colonial spatial rule animated a
‘sedentarist metaphysics’ (Malkki 1992), pinning people to place; a
‘raciology of statecraft’ (Gilroy 2000) that spatialized racial categories,
inscribed them on the landscape, effectively territorializing relations of
colonial domination (but see Chapter 5 for an analysis of the limits of
colonial rule).
At national independence in 1964 the first Zambian government, fronted
by Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP),
inherited a divided nation-space, torn along racial, political and spatial lines.
Liberation from the command of colonial spatiality did not occlude previous
power, but reworked it; Crown Land was relabeled State Land and Native
Reserve land was renamed customary land, or, in everyday speech, traditional
land, with chiefs and headmen reconstituted as situated sovereigns of rural
lands. Indeed, as colonial spatialities of power remain consequential even as 
they became reworked, the divide between State Land and chiefly territory
remains not only a spatio-tenurial division, but a politically significant
boundary between social blocks (Sitko and Chamberlin 2016). People still
navigate this landscape of historical refusals and permissions predicated on
various forms of colonial land categories: Protected Forest Areas, Crown
Land, Native Reserve, Proper Villages – spaces whose categorical definitions
continue to define the people and practices within. 
To some extent, then, these two blocks represent two different realms of
law, bureaucracy and modes of relating to the land. In chiefly territory,
property is governed by the idea that rights are a progressive result of human 
labor on the land; on State Land, property rights are understood as resulting 
from legal recognition in an abstract code. However, while the neatness of
this distinction might hold in legal argumentation, empirical investigations, 
of course, reveal a more complicated picture. Different forms of written
contracts and legal agreements shape use and access also on customary lands,
ranging from notes scrawled on pages torn from spiral notebooks to more
detailed accords transcribed onto documents using a typewriter. The title
deed might be the epitome of a market signal, but in its absence, people look 
for other markers than can stand in for it (a cairn, a score on a trunk or a field
of maize). Yet huts, trees and manioc gardens do not signal possession as
successfully as brick buildings and fields of wheat planted in straight rows. 





   
   
      
 
 
   
   
   
  
   
       
  
    
   
 
   
  
  
        
  
       
   
       
   
     
 
   
        
   
 
         
as strong as the attempts of title holders and that, more often than not, their
possession markers are disqualified simply because they made them
themselves (see Chapter 8 for a critique and a more detailed discussion of
the relation between the material and abstract rights). Thus the land itself –
its location, occupation and material imprints – becomes a site for political
contestation. 
Contestation over what constitutes legitimate claim to land speaks, at least
in part, to a long-standing tension in liberal thinking about the relationships
between and among property, law, and citizenship, going back to one of the
founding liberal narratives of private property, that of John Locke. Locke
(1963[1772]) believed that ‘in the beginning’ and on new frontiers, men 
could reasonably appropriate those elements of nature that they improved
with their own labor. He saw as a principle of natural law that property
followed from the extension of the one’s body into the land on which he
worked (see Radin 1993). But Locke saw this form of appropriation as
ultimately limited and likely to generate conflict as people multiplied and 
resources became scarce. Conflict was the reason for the invention of land
titles. Once land titles came into effect, labor in itself was not enough to 
justify appropriation of a resource, and property moved into the realm of 
abstract rights tacitly agreed on by members of society.
The narrative that grounds the Lockean understanding of property tells a
tale of the birth of civilization in the moment of the founding of a consensual
abstraction (cf. Rose 1994). Locke’s story pivots on a radical historical break
between a moment when human relations were governed by their relations
with material things through labor and the moment when relations came to 
be governed by the higher order of the social contract (Blomley 2003). The
Lockean narrative reemerges constantly throughout proposals both for and
against land reform in Zambia, with proponents arguing that for Zambia to 
‘modernize’, it must create institutions that supersede the material and allow
for governance to be conducted at the level of nationally recognized
representations of ownership rights (titles), all to unlock ‘dead capital’, as de 
Soto (2000: 55) put it. Within the state bureaucracy, those obstructing
‘modernization’, such as the people in Mulonga and Munyama, are seen as
troublesome reminders of rural Zambia’s not-quite modernity. Much like
Locke (1963[1772]: 341) holds, some land uses are still tantamount to
‘waste’, because the inhabitants of those lands have not acceded to the





   
 
  
   
  
   
  
 





        
  
    












property frontier in 1995, which I elaborate on in Chapter 2, had as its goal
the founding of a new modern nation. Yet it is not difficult to see that
project’s exclusions, which are similar to those implicit in the Lockean view
of the ‘empty’ American frontier. 
This thesis imbues those spaces with meaning, matter and substance, and,
in so doing, brings to the fore the political animated by those who ‘obstruct’
projects of state modernization. I want to stress that I do not posit a domain of 
cultural and political life that somehow remains protected from the incursions
of colonial modernity, and find in these spaces resources for anticolonial
politics (Scott 1985; Chatterjee 1993). While previous work along these lines
has reminded us that colonialisms – and their spatial and discursive formations 
– were uneven in effect and extent, such studies often assumed the existence 
of separate spaces (colonial/precolonial, modern/premodern) between which 
subjects consciously moved, taking on different identities at different sites. Not
only did this rely on questionable assumptions about the integrity of these
spaces and a consciousness subjects who moved between them, it also revealed
a somewhat disabling nostalgia for a ‘pure’ subject of resistance who, in the
name of authenticity, speaks from a position ‘outside’ colonial modernity (see
Braun 2002). There are no ‘pure’ spaces in rural Zambia. As I demonstrate in 
this thesis, efforts to contest colonial spatialities never do so from positions
‘outside’ colonialism’s discursive and political fields, but rather by turning the
terms and tools of colonial power against itself. Attending to the limits of state
governance is crucial in this regard; here, practices of government become
tangled up in other ways of being and moving with material land, and the 
legitimacy of colonial power is not given, but must be continually reasserted,
and in its assertion lies the risk of failure. At the limits of state governance, the 
regimes of truth that provide the basis for repressive authority might be
rearticulated otherwise. My ambition is to give ethnographic and historical
texture to these processes, empirically grounding the analysis of how state 
authority comes into political existence on lands that are multiple in meaning 
and materiality, what possibilities for alternative articulations of rights and
politics emerge, and how people navigate these possibilities for rightful




       
    
  
      
 




   
        
   






     
  
   
   
  
   
   
    
 
 
   
    
   











   
 
 
1.3 Outline of empirical chapters
To structure the analysis, the thesis is divided into four empirical chapters,
each featuring a government attempt to remake land yet leading to highly
‘unfixed’ outcomes. These four empirical chapters form the core of this
thesis and are intended as individual ‘cuts’ into Zambian land politics, past
and present, which inform a historically and empirically grounded
exploration of state authority as a nascent and contested field of power in 
spaces of everyday life. Each chapter builds on a methodology that works to 
summon up a theoretical imperative to make visible the cracks, failures and
fissures of state governance, and shows how room for resistance and non-
compliance emerges within. This methodology – developed in Chapter 3 –
is structured around four ‘boundary objects’ that sit in between spaces of
chiefly and stately control, where different orders of power coincide: the 
body, the forest, the beacon and the title deed.
The thesis as a whole connects a number of conceptual points, drawn from
a wide body of theoretical literature: legal pluralism, political ecology,
critical geography, anthropology and postcolonial theory, each providing
different insights into the indeterminate effects of state power. In each case
study chapter, I lift some of these to the fore while holding others in tension,
yet there is a myriad of recursive links between each of them. Consequently,
they should be read as interwoven case studies, which, taken together, build 
a larger case of state formation; they are instances in and through which 
relationships between state, land and subject are reordered amid struggles
over land and legitimate authority.
In and between the chapters that follow, the reader will also find a number
of ‘text boxes’ in which I explicate and elaborate on themes arising from my
argument, but which fall outside the scope of my narrative. These include
colonial connectivities that show how past struggles recur in the present and 
empirical elaborations that serve to situate the analysis, yet that would
disrupt the narrative if embedded in the main text.
Table 1. Outline of empirical chapters
THE BODY CORPOREAL THE FOREST THE SURVEY BEACON THE TITLE DEED
Race, gender, territory: State, chiefdom and Property becoming Fickle abstractions: the 
how ‘out of place bodies’ the forest in between: otherwise: state, material politics of land
made (a) difference in the reinvention of affect and materiality titling in Lenje 




   




   
     
    
  
  
    
   





   
  
 
    
 
  
     








1.3.1 Empirical Chapter I: The body corporeal
The formations of power I try to understand are embedded historically and
materially by specific political, social and cultural structures. The first
empirical chapter locates contemporary formations in the histories and 
geographies of their colonial context, starting with the appropriation of
indigenous lands by British South Africa Company (BSAC) in the 1890s, 
and the subsequent inscription of ‘proper villages’ and ‘tribal homelands’ on
the rural landscape. Yet rather than probing the ‘achievements’ of the
colonial administration (per Mamdani 2006), I take the body corporeal as the
point of departure, showing how myriad colonial boundaries were displaced 
onto people’s bodies and naturalized, negated and negotiated through bodily
practice, movement and encounter. The body itself – raced, sexed, placed –
became a site of territorial inscription through which the construction and
contestations of the colony and its boundaries took place.
The chapter builds on feminist geography and postcolonial theory,
showing how bodies are places where discourse and power relations are
simultaneously mapped, embodied and resisted (Grosz 1993; Nightingale
2011, 2013; Valdivia 2009; Longhurst 1997, 2001; Gatens 1996; Butler
1993; McClintock 1995). This literature has been eloquent in showing how
bodies are written upon, marked, tagged and scarred, and how these ‘scripts’
are not only corporeal but extend into spaces of everyday life. In following 
this analytical path, I set out to ‘read’ colonial territory not as exclusive
space, not as something drawn up on maps, but as experienced and disputed
by those who moved across the landscape. At its core, by rescaling the spatial
architecture of colonial rule onto the body we escape narratives of colonial 
state territorialization as an expanding imperial frontier, seeing instead the
limits of colonial control, and how bodies territorialized onto marginal
geographies were not pacified bodies, but potent bodies, carrying the ability 
to unsettle spaces ordered by colonial power. The chapter shows that while
social and corporeal particularization was an important resource with which 
the colonial administrators constructed the settler state, conceptions of race,
gender and territory were repeatedly challenged by the stubbornness and
unruliness of the very bodies (and lands) that they defined.
31
 
   
 
    
  
  
     
 
     
    
    
  
    
     
 
  




      
    
     
  
  




   
   
    
   
    
1.3.2 Empirical Chapter II: The forest
To understand the ‘limits’ of state governance vis-à-vis chiefly assertions of
rule in today’s Zambia, I make an analytical move from the body corporeal
to a forest claimed by both customary and statutory authority: Munyama
Forest. The analysis draws on scholarship that probes chiefly authority as a
product of historical struggle, practices of rule and negotiation over authority
to govern (Hoffmann et al. 2020; Lund 2006). I couple these insights with
political-ecology work on nature and state making (Nightingale 2018, Peluso 
2011; Paasi 1996; Harris 2012), arguing that we must take seriously the
forest not simply as an ecological configuration over which politics happen, 
but as an ‘unruly’ space, existing simultaneously in multiple registers of
political, spiritual and ecological life. The chapter maps out the layers of
ecological, political and spiritual meaning with which the forest has been 
invested over the past seventy or so years; at least since the 1940s, the forest
has been iteratively classified, enclosed, used as a hiding place, reclassified,
occupied, spirited, burnt and replanted – with each of these configurations
constitutive of new natures, exclusions and enactments of stately and chiefly
authority. What emerges from this analysis is a complex landscape, layered
with buried epistemologies and subjugated histories and riddled with state
decree, chiefly power, remnants of burnt homesteads, spiritual dwellings and
innovative land users navigating material and historical terrain.
Making visible these layers marks the forest as not one place, but multiple 
places, ‘entwined’, to paraphrase Haraway (2016: 1), ‘in myriad unfinished 
configurations of places, times, matters, meanings.’ The forest is, in short, 
not some predefined ‘nature’ stuck between ‘state’ and ‘chiefdom’, but a
layered landscape through which these categories are continually reinvented,
materially as well as conceptually. My hope is that the chapter will further
an understanding of state-chiefdom relations that captures the interplay 
between different natures, histories and attempts to govern, and the forms of
inclusions and exclusions that emerge within these shifting configurations.
1.3.3 Empirical Chapter III: The survey beacon
As becomes evident throughout this thesis, private property is a major route
of state power. In this research it figures as a heuristic rubric concerned with 
how access to, use of and control over ‘things’ and resources are organized
in society. The third empirical chapter examines the political work performed 





   
  
 
      
 
   
























   
particular. Building on recent scholarship in geography and political ecology,
in which materiality is taken seriously as a pivot for political inquiry 
(Ahlborg and Nightingale 2018; Meehan, 2014; Shaw and Meehan, 2013;
Valdivia 2008), I show how the emplacement of survey beacons are 
fundamentally imbricated in the ways state-chiefdom boundaries are mapped 
onto the landscape – not as a secure achievement, but as a critical moment
of political contestation. Once state artifacts are exposed to a creative
citizenry, they become susceptible to alteration and alternative interpretation.
The analysis sits in productive tension with previous scholarship on the co-
constitution of property and authority (e.g. Bridge 2014; Lund 2016; Sikor and 
Lund 2009; Vandekerckhove 2011); while this work has opened up a prolific
field of analysis, most previous accounts privilege conceptions of state and 
property as socio-legal constructs. By bringing the ‘stuff of property’ into
critical view, my analysis shows how boundary stones themselves, rather than
the legal terms of their placement, become the terrain of struggle. These
processes are analyzed through a case study of property making in the village
of Mulonga. Returning to the vignette that opened this thesis, I explore how a
group of surveyors unexpectedly entered the village in order to demarcate the
land. Through an ethnography of material and bureaucratic encounters, I show
how villagers reappropriated the land structured by property’s exclusionary
logic, effectively reworking its outcome. Making this empirical shift away
from how private property is legally legitimated (which was largely invisible
to the inhabitants of Mulonga) and toward a more careful engagement with the
materiality of property troubles narratives of a passive citizenry, showing
instead how inventive and ingenious villagers redeploy state materialities, and
how an equally inventive and ingenious bureaucracy struggles to make them
perform the political work assigned to them. These iterative moments, I
conclude, are foundational for our understanding of how both state and citizen
co-constitute each other’s existence and capacities in a material field of
property politics.
1.3.4 Empirical Chapter IV: The title deed
The fourth and final empirical chapter explores more carefully how people
navigate the legal-tenurial divide between chiefly territory and State Land
through the written contract. The point of departure here is a piece of
legislation that allows for individual tenants within a chief’s jurisdiction to
convert their landholdings into private property. The legislation provides, in 
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other words, for individual landholders to become political agents in the
reformation of the tenure regime, working their way into the body politic and
the land market through the abstraction of their rights in the form of a state
sanctioned title deed (Brown 2005). While the procedures of conversion are
carefully codified in law, my research points to how the process is collapsed
into a myriad of personal and political relations that create a complex
landscape of legal and political overlaps on which people then maneuver for
rights in land. As Lund (2008: 155) writes, ‘laws, regulations and policies do 
not determine access and use of resources as such, but erect a structure of
opportunities for the negotiation of these rights.’
The chapter follows the title deed as it wends its way through headmen’s
homesteads, chiefs’ palaces, and both government and back offices, to
explore how, at each site, it becomes imbued with new meanings and 
associations. The analysis builds on anthropological work on the ‘shadows’
or ‘margins’ of the state (Harris-White 2003; Das and Poole 2004; Sud 2019)
to show how the title deed continuously escape its formalized scripts and
take on new meanings and associations once it becomes enmeshed within the 
social and material fabric of chiefly terrain – at the ‘limits’ of state law. Here,
the title deed is reappropriated by chiefs and headmen and is redeployed to
other effects, and its papery existence – bundled with fragility,
flammability, loseability and age – forms part of the document’s own
politics (cf. Hetherington 2009). As such, contrary to Lockean ideals 
of land’s abstraction from sociality, property law refuses reification of 
the materiality of land and paper; and rather than contributing to a change
toward some market-aligned form of land as commodity, land titling 
opens up new spaces of struggle, exclusion and a potential for the
reinvention of chiefly authority.
1.4 Analytical summary
Taken together, the juxtaposition of these chapters draws attention to the
simultaneity of many land politics, rather than just one, and points to the
various arenas and scales that critical scholarship on the state must engage.
Each case study chapter points to important dynamics at play, pointing to 
where and how the state emerges as a highly contested authority, from the body
corporeal, into material nature, onto material objects and through paper-work,















   
      
 
    





   
  
analysis, tracing out its flows and dwelling on moments where the spatialities
and temporalities of state power become enmeshed with sediments of
authority, the movement of bodies, materiality of milieu, chiefly authority and
rural subjects. By moving across various sites and levels of analysis, and by
drawing on different histories and practices, the analysis brings into sharper
view how state authority emerges and produces new forms of subjection that
redefine social and political possibilities in particular spatial and temporal
conjunctions, but always as highly uncertain achievements that are open to
contingencies, unruly lands and creative citizens. The thesis provides windows 
onto such unfolding processes, which help explicate and push forward 
theorizations of the relationship between projects of government and the
formation of new spaces of exclusion and state control, and the possibilities
for alternative articulations for politics that emerge within.
In the next chapter, I sketch out the historical and political contours of the
Zambian land regime in order to situate my analysis within a wider context.
I am not trying to excavate some origin story of Zambian land struggles here, 
but rather to make visible the forms of politics enabled (and indeed disabled) 
by the ‘leftovers’ of colonialism. This task is not simply descriptive. The
chapter traces out the continuities and discontinuities in state-chiefdom
relations since the advent of British colonization, with a particular attention
to the historical relations that make possible, but also obfuscate, the
conceptual separation of ‘state’ and ‘chiefdom’ in today’s Zambia. As such, 
Chapter 2 forms a historical backdrop against which I develop my conceptual







      
     
 
  
     
   
  
          
   
   
  





   
  
    






  2. Historical contours
2.1 Colonialism and the politics of difference
Prior to British colonization, Zambian lands were loosely bound up into what
anthropologists call ‘early African states’. Yet rather than being territorial
entities, the authority of African monarchs was expressed in terms of the 
number of followers, or subjects, that they could gather around them and the
amount of tribute and tribute labor that they could command. Wherever a
subject population dwelled, that was the territory over which she or he could
enact control (Ranger 1971). By extension, anywhere an African monarch
could form new ties represented a spatial expansion of his or her authority.
The principal political objective of African rulers was, therefore, to attract,
retain and expand their subject population, rather than to control the land
itself (see Moore and Vaughan 1994; also Herbts 2000). As such, the
spatiality of African political power was forever fractional, always in the
making, and in some cases eroded to the point of irrelevance, thus giving
way to new political-territorial formations (Crehan 1997a; Roberts 1976;
Chanock 1985; Meebelo 1971). 
It was into these lands that the British South Africa Company (BSAC)
arrived in the 1890s through commissioners venturing north of the Zambezi
river to make agreements between the BSAC and ‘tribal chiefs’. Exclusive 
rights to land and precious stone were exchanged for subsidies and promises
of prosperity and protection from neighboring tribes (Galbraith 1974). One
of the commissioners, sent north by Cecil Rhodes, was Frank Lochner. When 
he reached the Lozi in Barotseland (roughly corresponding to Western
Province in today’s Zambia) in 1890, he declared to Chief Lewanika that by
accepting a concession the Lozi would ‘grow rich, make progress, graze your





     
  
       
     
   
 
   
  
   
  
       
         
  
   
    
     
        
   
  
      
       
  





       
   
  





218). Lewanika gave his consent. Shortly thereafter, however, he claimed 
that he had been defrauded. Not only were the promises of riches, railroad
and postal service illusive, but in the Lozi translation of the contract, the
word ‘grant’ had become ‘borrow’ (Galbraith 1974: 218). Lewanika had 
unknowingly given his consent to an exclusive mineral concession over all
Barotseland (Caplan 1970: 54). With similar strategies, more land was vested
in the BSAC, until the whole area of what became Northern Rhodesia was
placed under BSAC administration in 1899.
Yet the BSAC administration soon discovered that the territorial
variability of chiefly authority and the frequent movement of the African 
population undermined collection of the hut tax (introduced in 1901) and
eroded the authority of African rulers, making their function as agents of
the BSAC administration falter. As the collection of tax demanded a known
and controllable population, the priority was to gain control over settlement
patterns and shape chieftaincies to the needs of orderly administration (see 
Moore and Vaughan 1994). Villagization efforts failed, however, and when 
administrators admonished that chiefs’ authority would corrode if they
allowed their subject populations to move over large tracts of land, chiefs
blandly responded that ‘the greater the number of villages, the greater the 
prestige of the chief’ (cited in Ranger 1971: 27). It was not until 1924, when 
Northern Rhodesia was proclaimed a protectorate of the United Kingdom, 
and its administration was taken over by a governor (Sir Herbert Stanley),
that more systematic efforts were made to bring African rulers into a spatial
logic of rule.
Underpinning this project was a vision of a settler colony. Sir Herbert
Stanley had previously served in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and
South Africa, and under his supervision the government sought to encourage
further European immigration. When he was installed, blocks of land set aside
for exclusive European use were identified and labeled Crown Land, covering 
the most attractive and accessible areas, around Fort Jameson (now Chipata)
in the east, around Abercorn (now Mbala) in the north, and along the rail line
running from Livingstone in the south to the Copperbelt in the north (Roberts
1976). This land was amalgamated under rubrics of civil law, with private
property (freehold tenure) being the guiding tenet of government. Yet African 
occupancy and movement repeatedly emerged as a ‘hindrance to the economic
development of land by settlers’ (Johnson et al. 1967: 17). The lack of clear











    








   
  
 
    
          
   
   






the key colonial target became, in short, to ‘recode’ chiefly authority so as to
establish a spatial organization of rule. 
This was achieved in a functionalist fit between anthropologists and admi-
nistrators, drawing out ‘tribal lines’ and chronicling ‘origin stories’ of different 
ethno-linguistic groupings, mapping the African population onto ‘tribal
homelands’, or, in an administrative verbiage, Native Reserves. Classification
became a science, that of taxonomy, derived ultimately from Linnaean botany 
but applied to space and population (Pels 1997). Dirks (2001) has described
this as ‘the ethnographic state’, which wielded the anthropological survey not
only as a way of acknowledging difference but also as a way of shaping, even
producing, difference (see also Chanock 1985; Sorrenson 1967; Hobsbawm
and Ranger 1983). Some 60 000 Africans were displaced in the process
(Roberts 1976: 183). The relocation of Africans onto Native Reserves corres-
ponded to the introduction of indirect rule, a political apparatus crafted by Sir
Henry Maine, and later developed by Lord Frederick Lugard along with Lord 
Donald Cameron in Nigeria (see Mamdani 2012). Architects of British
colonial rule such as Lord Frederick Lugard proclaimed that imperial states 
had the ‘grave responsibility of … “bringing forth” to a higher plan … the
backward races.’ Europeans were responsible for developing ‘the bounties
with which nature has so abundantly endowed the tropics’ because subject
races were ‘so pathetically dependent on their guidance’ (Lugard 1926: 66, 
68). The white man’s burden of colonial rule required administration of both
nature and natives; both were resources to be managed, improved and
developed for the benefits of metropole and colony.
In Zambia, as elsewhere in British Africa, the principle was that the 
conduct of the population could be controlled through a proxy of ‘tribal
leaders’, chiefs and their headmen, each mandated to govern a distinct ‘tribe’
in a distinct geographical space. In areas where there were too many chiefs 
for orderly administration, some were ‘retired’ or subsumed by other chiefs.
Where there were too few chiefs, new were appointed. In this way, chiefs
and headmen were absorbed into the colonial state apparatus, installed as
localized agents of government, instructed to police infringements of
domestic order and punish unruly cultivators, and were vested with
regulatory powers to hold local courts, collect tax and administer local land 
use (Gould 1995). These ‘customary’ decrees were represented as the official





         
        
 
 
   
  





       
    
  
   
  
       
  





       
 
   
 
   
    
   
  
   
 
which chiefs had always governed – consigning chiefs to a space ‘outside’
civil law and colonial modernity. 
Western notions of law and property are deeply imbricated in such a 
colonial geography, a white mythology in which the racialized figure of ‘the
savage’ plays a central role; imagined as incapable of an appreciation of legal
rights and duties, the savage is deemed both pre-political and pre-historical and 
thus set irrevocably apart from the civilized (Mafeje 1971). Indeed, the very 
creation of Native Reserves, and the displacement of Africans onto them, was
legitimized on the basis of offering protection of African ‘tradition’ from the
dangers of ‘modernity’, thus rendering racial segregation benign. 
The making of cultural difference here becomes visible as a political
technology that legitimized both intervention (such as the eradication of
witchcraft and swidden cultivation) and non-intervention (such as the
preservation of tradition and custom). It is against this background that
Mamdani (2012: 43–4) conceptualizes indirect rule as a form of govern-
mentality aimed at reproducing and governing cultural difference as custom,
rather than its eradication as savagery. Indirect rule was, in short, founded 
upon a regime of regulated difference that reproduced boundaries between
the modern and the traditional, the savage and the civilized. Difference did
not mark the limit of processes of control and regulation; on the contrary, 
difference enabled control and regulation.
These differences were spatialized with the fixing of territorial boun-
daries over which chiefs were made guardians, thus reinforcing the link
between political authority and authority over land (Iliffe 1987). In turn, the 
distinctions between peoples and property regimes were themselves 
dependent on deep-rooted differences between those forms of property that
lay within the frontier of colonial modernity and those that lay without
(Blomley 2003). Here it is imperative to revisit Western foundational
narratives that tell property’s story, which often begins from an a priori and 
usually violent world before property (e.g. Locke [1690] 1980; Blackstone
[1765] 1838). For Hobbes, this space behind the frontier of modernity was 
one where ‘there can be no propriety, no domination, no mine and thine
distinct; but only that to be every man’s that he can get, and for so long as he
can keep it’ (in Fitzpatrick 1992: 77). On these lands, the absence of
government and property, Hobbes ([1651] 1988: 186) argued, underpins a
life of ‘continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’ As Fitzpatrick (1992, 81) writes:
40
 
         
 
  







   







     




   
  
    
   
         
 
 
     
 
  
    
‘The sources of disorder must exist outside of law – in the eruptions and
disruptions of untamed nature or barely contained human passion against
which an ordering law is intrinsically set’. The effect was to create a
distinction such that law’s violence – rational, regulated, commonsensical –
was separated from and imagined as a counter to the ‘anomic or sectarian 
savagery beyond law’s boundaries’ (Sarat and Kearns 1992: 5). Without such
a division, the commonplace distinction between civility and barbarity would
break down (see Williams 1983: 329–31).
The spatialization of chiefly and stately power onto distinct geographies
came coupled with these imaginaries (Moore 2005). On the ground, however, 
colonial control was far from absolute. As Berry (1993: 29) incisively has
noted: ‘colonial regimes imposed themselves on societies already engaged in
struggles over power and the terms on which it would be exercised. By 
announcing their intention to uphold “traditional” norms and structures of
authority, colonial officials were, in effect, declaring their intention to build
colonial rule on a foundation of conflict and change’ (see also Mbembe 2000;
Chanock 1985; Gould 1995, 1997). In more theoretical terms, colonial
constructs of race and space are repeatedly challenged by the recalcitrance of
the bodies and groups they define – like all hegemonies, they have to
‘continually be renewed, recreated, defended and modified’ (Williams 1977:
112; see also Moore et al. 2003). The most radical rupture in this configuration
occurred at the time of national liberation in 1964.
2.2 National independence and the remodeling of
difference
The processes of crafting a settler colony differentiated chiefly and stately
power, both spatially and culturally (Iliffe 1987), and set the conditions under
which the postcolonial administration could practice land governance. At the
time of independence, the statutory administration sought to construct an
independent state polity as the singular source of government. Postcolonial
rule, however, emerged from sediments of political authority in the plural
(Sitko and Chamberlin 2016). 
National liberation resulted in that chiefs, who previously had been part
and parcel of the colonial state, now took on a more ambiguous position, 
sparking a debate over the political future of chieftainship. Images of chiefs




   




   










   
   
        
 
   
  
   
      
 





   
    
 
irrelevant in a context of modern government flourished. Kalenga Simwinga,
a lecturer at the University of Zambia in Lusaka, considered chiefs to be
obsolete now that the United National Independence Party (UNIP),
spearheaded by Kenneth Kaunda, had ‘captivated the allegiance of the rural
masses’ (Simwinga 1972). Simwinga noted the following:
In the implementation of development projects in a country like Zambia,
where political mobilisation of the masses though the party [UNIP] is so
strong and successful right down to the grass root level of society the need for
chiefs to solicit the support of rural folk does not arise. The party can easily
and effectively achieve this without the Government paying for a bit of
mystical support from the chiefs.
The political position occupied by chiefs had, Simwinga argued, lost it
function. Now was the time to liberate the Zambians from the unfreedoms as
serfs under chiefs. And it was not long before the judicial powers of the
chiefs, vested in them during colonialism, were taken away. Yet, Simwinga’s
portrayal of the Zambian chiefs was countered by images of chiefs as
guardians of rural land, morality, law and social order, fighting urban
unemployment by supporting ‘the return to the land’ of the young urban
unemployed (van Binsbergen 1987). Far from being relics of a colonial past,
chiefs had a role to play, it was argued. As noted by the Zambian historian 
Mr. B. Kakoma:
As paid servants of the Government, chiefs cannot afford to oppose the
Government and at the same time expect recognition … The base of the
chiefs’ political power lies in their local areas. In those areas where the 
institution of chieftainship is strong the selection of a new leader through
traditional procedures more or less serves as an automatic guarantee of his
popularity … It is for this reason that political parties seek to captivate local 
support through the chiefs because it is essential for winning both local and 
general elections … When the party promised reform the elders took this to 
mean restoration of power to the chiefs. Hence UNIP scored an overwhelming
victory in the 1964 election. However by 1968 when the next general election
came, the traditional leaders had been estranged by the Government’s
nationalist reforms which increased central government control. The price











     
  
   
      
   
 









   
  
 








    
Realizing the rallying function of chiefs, their powers were restored by 
UNIP. It was reasoned that with each chief ruling over only a small portion 
of the population of Zambia, the chiefs’ calling was defined as bringing their
respective sections within the fold of the nation (and the party) and to not
foster sub-national divisiveness, let alone, secessionism (van Binsbergen
1987: 166). As a result, chiefs were incorporated into the House of Chiefs, a
complementary institution to Parliament and the Central Committee of
UNIP, effectively becoming local cadres of the emerging one-party state.
Chiefs disloyal to UNIP were dismissed and spattered in the national press –
in many ways the postcolonial technologies of indirect rule. In 1971 the
enactment of the Village Registration and Development Act further stressed
the responsibilities of chiefs and headmen. Chiefs were allowed to propose
and initiate development projects, leading to chiefs clamoring for schools,
hospitals, roads, dams and agriculture cooperatives (van Binsbergen 1987:
164). In short, chiefs and headmen became important institutional sites in a
developmental state.
Thus, national independence did not mark an end to using chiefs and 
headmen as proxies of state authority. The chiefs’ subsidies are still powerful
instruments in the hands of the government to enforce chiefly conformity. Yet
the subsidy is but one element in a set of formal bureaucratic arrangements by
which the government seeks to capture the chiefs and bring them into the fold
of the state apparatus. A condition for subsidy, as stipulated in the Chiefs Act,
is that a chief, upon accession, be recognized by the President of the Republic
and gazetted as such in the Government Gazette. Only gazetted chiefs can get
subsidies and be part of representative bodies such as Rural Councils (in many
ways the postcolonial successors of the Native Authority), Provincial Council
of Chiefs and the national House of Chiefs (The Chiefs Act, The Laws of
Zambia, Ch. 287, Section 3). Thus, by turning the principles of indirect rule
into instruments of postcolonial government, postcolonial rule did not occlude, 
erase or eclipse historical sedimentations of authority; rather, a robust
recursivity among temporalities and spatialities intertwine with regimes of
rule, institutional sites and assem-blages of state power. Indeed, the legacy of
colonialism remains alive in today’s Zambia, offering uncanny echoes amid
administrative interventions into chiefly territory, where political life remains
shot through with state decree.
Thus, the conception that state and chiefdom constitute two separate 





       
         
   
        
        
  
   
 
    
  
   









     
 
 
   
   
 
  
    
       
    
  
nothing less than an illusion. A telling example is Princess Nakatindi, who,
during her political career, held political office as both chieftainess in
Sesheke Chiefdom and as District Governor in Sesheke District, and was a 
member of both UNIP Central Committee and the House of Chiefs. After her
death in 2012, she was celebrated as ‘Nakatindi the bridge’, linking old and 
new, neotraditional politics and state governance. Another instructive
example is Chief Mukuni, who sought the permission of the district governor
in Kalomo, Mr. J. Hamatwi, before enlisting the services of a witch-finder,
and only staged a rain ritual after the same official told him to do so. The 
same governor, keen to integrate the chief into his political performance,
later backed Mukuni’s plea for national registration to be conducted at the
chief’s palace rather than at the District Council (see van Binsbergen 1987).
It is in this context, stressing continuity rather than rupture between chiefly
and stately politics, that state officials can afford to recognize chiefs as political
protagonists. Yet officials of the state still stress a qualitative difference 
between ‘state’ and ‘chiefdom’. ‘Because of the essential distinction between
neo-traditional and modern office-bearers’, van Binsbergen (1987: 175)
writes, ‘the modern government can sanction the traditional practices of
chiefly selection and election, even if these differ in form from the type of
democratic logic underlying the modern state and the party.’ It is also, he (176)
continues, ‘by virtue of the same distinction that the state, even while paying 
a subsidy to the chiefs, can afford to deny the chiefs the sort of facilities and
public services to which they could lay claim if they had been perceived as 
civil servants’.
The ‘distinction’ that van Binsbergen refers to is a precarious one. On the
one hand, chiefs insist on being incorporated into the general fabric of the
modern state, on being civil servants, claiming material benefits from the 
government (cars, fuel, secretarial services etc.), which are to serve as 
symbols of authority, as signs of state recognition and as a logistical means 
to enable them to play the development roles assigned to them by 
government. On the other hand, chiefs need to assert a qualitative difference 
to legitimize their claims to political authority. In his eloquent analysis of
Zambian chieftainship, van Binsbergen (1987) turns his attention to the
material culture of chiefly authority, observing that chiefs have a particular
set of regalia, paraphernalia and ceremonial and courtly practices that stand
apart from the symbolic register of state power. This produces, he argues, an
‘illusion of two separate worlds, of boundaries between the modern and neo-
44
 
    
    
           
  
   
   
    
 
     
   
    
 
  
   
   
  
    
  
   
  
   
  
   
        
  
 




   
  
  
   
 
 
       
traditional.’ This boundary ‘is carefully maintained – almost as if the raison
d’être of chieftainship in postcolonial Zambia is to evoke a political and
cultural focus that appears to be outside of and independent from the state’
(van Binsbergen 1987: 47). What this means, then, is that the notion of a
fairly rigid separation between state and chiefdom in itself belongs to a 
political culture. The boundaries emerge as devices of difference making, of
holding apart but at the same time maintaining relations of power. Put
differently, the separation between state and chiefdom becomes visible as a 
critical site of legitimation, a site where political authority is made.
This is perhaps most evident in the form of accoutrements in their
dealings with state authority. Ceremonial robes and headdresses, animal
species or parts thereof, such as leopard skins or hippopotamus tails, which 
are exclusively reserved for chiefs, ceremonial ironware, stools, barges,
musical instruments, royal shrines and architectural details are all symbols 
of chiefly authority. These chiefly paraphernalia are particularly apparent at
installations, funerary ceremonies and in meetings between chiefs and state
bureaucracy. Yet, it is not difficult to identify a chief walking the streets of
Lusaka, often carrying a chief’s cane or animal tail. In short, much like ‘the
state’ has a ‘language of stateness’ (Lund 2006: 677), so too have chiefs, 
with different practices and meanings becoming emblematic of different
political authorities. These cultural-material articulations have remained on
the margins of social analysis, but they serve an important political purpose:
they continue to embody the chiefs with ‘customary authority’ (Hoffmann et
al. 2020). This authority is neo-traditional in the sense that it has been 
adapted to colonial incorporation, including selectively dropping elements,
such as offerings to spirits, which were less favored by the colonial state; but
the cultural forms of chieftainship are still very much alive today. Chiefs
have also adopted the documentary practices of state bureaucracy, having
their own councils of advisors, unique stamps, seals and emblems on
paperwork and protocols. In short, the salience of chiefly authority is
founded upon creativity and invention as much as upon ‘tradition’. Some
chiefs have started to experiment with different types of land certification
outside the circuits of the state bureaucracy (see Chapter 8), thus imitating
the symbolic and material practices of the state and at the same time 
competing over authority to govern. 
In sum, in Zambian political culture, different symbols of power and 
political legitimation fade into and out of each other and refuse essentialist
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or functionalist divides between ‘state’ and ‘chiefdom’. Thus, while the
Africanist wisdom that ‘customary authorities’ ground their legitimacy in a
set of norms and practices that preexist the establishment of the colonial state
still holds some traction (Williams 2010; Logan 2011; van Binsbergen 2003), 
we must eschew a search for authentic origins of authority grounded in
‘tradition’ and instead track the effects of practices of rule.
2.3 The property landscape
On the property landscape, however, state-chiefdom boundaries are
splintered into different legal regimes, mirroring those drawn up during
colonial rule. In 1975 the government of Zambia, as part of its transition to
single-party rule and under the guise of its ‘humanist’ state ideology,1 
stripped all land of its value, vested it in the president, and converted all
freehold titles on State Land to leaseholds. Lands held by absentee landlords
were expropriated, and only ‘unexhausted improvement’ in land could be
owned (Roth et al. 1995; Ng’ombe et al. 2014; Sitko et al. 2014). This was
an important step in the consolidation of the Zambian state, which came to 
be largely synonymous with Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP, which tried to unite
the citizenry under the banner of ‘One Zambia – One Nation’. Yet in the late 
1980s, after two decades of land policies that suppressed land transactions 
and market interaction, discontent started to spread within the international
donor community, which led the World Bank to encourage Zambia to initiate
market reforms. It was declared that:
The current system of land administration … is badly in need of modernization.
Private ownership is effectively repressed if not prohibited … Lack of private 
ownership and a land market ostensibly constraints development … and inhibit
economic growth. (Roth et al. 1995: 1)
The Zambian government opposed external intervention, however, which led
the World Bank to isolate Zambia from international loans and bilateral
donors, creating civil unrest and food riots (Ihonvbere 1996). This ultimately
resulted in the fall of UNIP, and in 1991 Zambia changed government and a
liberalization of the economy began with the intention to stimulate economic
1 This was based on a combination of mid-20th-century ideas of central planning/state control and what




      
 
  
    
 
    
 
 





      
         
    
       
 
      
      
    
activity and market interaction. As requested by overseas donors, and finally
conditioned by the World Bank in return for international loans and debt
relief, land administration was to be deregulated and subjected to market
reforms (Christensen et al. 2011). The new government, led by Movement
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), declared the following:
The MMD shall institutionalize a modern […] land law code intended to
ensure the fundamental right to private ownership of land. […] The MMD
shall attach economic value to undeveloped land […] and promote regular
issuance of title deeds to productive land owners. (cited in Roth et al.: 33)
Three years later, the Land Act of 1995 (henceforth the Act) was passed in
Parliament, serving to commodify land in order to stimulate agricultural 
productivity and land investments (Brown 2005). The Act reaffirmed a legal
divide between State Land and chiefly territory (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: An approximation of the geographical extent of State Land (darkened) at the
time of national independence in 1964. No national land audit has been conducted since
independence, but see Sitko and Chamberlin (2016) and Sitko et al. (2015) for a 
discussion on the geographical expansion of State Land since 1995. Map provided by the 
Ministry of Lands, Lusaka.
As stipulated in the Act, State Land is to be held in the form of private
property, and its tenants are required to pay annual land tax, while customary
land falls outside formal legislation and tenure security enforced by common
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law. Yet the Act took it one step further. In order to promote further
commodification of land, the Act provides for the conversion of customary 
land into State Land, i.e. into private property, which has led scholars to
conclude that the Act ‘is designed to permanently diminish the amount of
land held under communal tenure and to open up more land for investment’
(Brown 2005: 87; see also Malambo 2013; Ng’ombe et al. 2014; Sitko and
Jane 2014). 
While the Act does little to clarify the rights of customary landholders, it
states that no land should be allocated ‘without consulting any other person
or body whose interest might be affected by the grant’ and further that ‘the
President shall not alienate any land situated in a district or an area where
land is held under customary tenure – without taking into consideration the
local customary law on land tenure which is not in conflict with this Act’ (The 
Lands Act, The Laws of Zambia, Cap. 184, Section 4, emphasis added). 
However, this implies that if customary law is in conflict with the Act, such
considerations are not required, rendering customary rights legally invisible
to the statutory administration when different interests over the land are at
stake (see Brown 2005). In many ways, state legislation has institutionalized
insecurity on lands located outside the legal sphere delimited by the Act by
opening up chiefly territory for government appropriation, rekindling 
taxonomies of the primitive peasant whose use of and relation to land is 
deficient and destructive.
It is against this backdrop that this thesis is set. What should be clear from
the historical overview above, however, government appropriations of chiefly
land do not correspond to some expansion of state power and authority into
places and fields that have not previously been regulated by the state (per Scott
1998). The historical and cultural ambivalence permeating political life in rural
Zambia blurs and denies clear-cut conceptions of power and legitimacy and
brings out severe limitations of approaches whose purpose is to account for
discrete, mutually irreducible logics of chiefly and stately authority (cf.
Hoffmann et al. 2020; Lund 2006; Boone 2014).
How chiefly land becomes an ‘object’ of ‘state capture’ is no longer the 
right question to ask, as it suggests a more rigid distinction than the actual
intertwinement of activities, histories, roles and cultural aspects seem to
warrant; rather, we must draw analytical attention to the myriad relations
through which power works, to the struggles for home and land through 











        
 
  
become entangled with the material-ecological fabric of the landscape and
the social-historical texture of chiefly territory, thereby opening up an 
analytic unconstrained by ideas of jurisdictional and territorial fixity. 
Because, as I will show, state-chiefdom boundaries are very much open to
struggle and negotiation across myriad sites, with chiefs, headmen and
smallholders continuously testing the limits of state governance, in turn
provoking new attempts to govern – iterative struggles which continue to
produce new natures, forms of authority, social closures and exclusions. In
the following chapter, I map out the conceptual groundwork that forms the 






    
  
         
   
  
      
  
    
 
 
   
   











  3. Conceptual work
It is wrong to look for boundaries between preexisting social entities. Rather
we should start with boundaries and investigate how people create entities by
linking those boundaries into units. We should not look for boundaries of
things but things of boundaries. (Abbott 1995: 857)
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter showed, through historical elaboration, the shifting and
variable relationship between state and chiefdom in Zambia. It drew attention 
to some of the ways state and chiefdom intertwine, intermingle, and pull
apart. My analysis is situated in this contested interface, and at the foundation
of my thinking lies a performative notion of power and political authority
that unsettles conceptualizations of state and chiefdom as singular and stable 
entities with a fixed set of relations in between. From this perspective, there
are no entities awaiting my exploration as some ready-made objects of
analysis; rather, state, land and chiefdom are continuously made and remade,
conceptually and materially. 
The key conceptual figure I use to explore their making is that of the
boundary, a heuristic rubric that captures both relations of power, authority,
exclusion and control and moments of contention, transgression and fissure. 
In this chapter I link up analytical insights drawn from five bodies of literature
to enable me to ‘see’ how boundary struggles manifest and play out in the
messy geographies of everyday life: legal pluralism, political ecology, critical
geography, anthropology and postcolonial theory. My conceptualization 
brings these literatures together by weaving theoretical argumentation and 
empirical insights. This is because, in my reading, state-chiefdom boundaries
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are both abstract and material, they link the conceptual and the empirical – an 
articulation that has emerged from both my data and from theory. 
While the concept of the boundary might evoke a concern with spatial
territory – dividing stately and chiefly spheres of authority into distinct
geographies – here, I develop a broader approach that captures how state-
chiefdom boundaries operate across multiple social and spatial sites: state-
chiefdom boundaries, wherever they emerge, do not demarcate a line of
ideological or geographical division between different modalities of power
and authority, but, on the contrary, enable the exercise of power and control,
whether in the form of fences on the ground, lines on a map, thresholds to
government offices or engrained colonial imaginaries that set the ‘savage’
apart from the ‘civilized’. Yet, rather than marking out sites of separation
and estrangement, I take boundaries to be sites of relational emergence 
(Bhabha 1994; Pratt 1991; Wilson 2017), where stasis and rootedness give
way to struggle, negotiation and invention. Boundaries mark political
encounters, sites where authority, exclusion and control are negotiated, 
struggled over and grappled with.
In the latter half of this chapter I use this broader conceptualization to
develop an analytical strategy around four ‘boundary objects’, corresponding
to the four case-study chapters that make up this thesis: (I) the body
corporeal, (II) the forest (III) the survey beacon and (IV) the title deed. Each
of these ‘objects’ sits, in different ways, in the betweenness of chiefly and
stately authority without fully belonging to either of them. They mark sites 
of political struggle and, as such, reside not on some periphery, but rather
constitute a shared space of political engagement. As such, boundary objects
are analytical locations that allow for critical investigation not only of how
relations of domination, dispossession and exploitation are being redefined
presently but also of the struggles and creative politics that take shape around
these changing relations (cf. Mezzadra and Nielson 2013). My boundary
objects are drawn from ethnographic fieldwork as well as archival research,
and they mark, in short, points on my conceptual map where state-chiefdom
boundaries are vividly open to the play of insubordinate citizens, diffident
bureaucrats and unruly lands.
First, however, I shall briefly anchor my ‘boundary thinking’ in
poststructuralist thought, arguing that an emphasis on boundaries signals a
‘methodological readiness’ to explore the effects of power, but also their




   
        
    
 
    
    
 
 
       
   
  
      





   
   
   
     
    
   
   
  
      
  
     
    
    
  
 
    
   
3.2 Boundaries: a brief poststructuralist account
My analytical interest in boundaries and boundary objects should not be
understood as a negation of more postfoundational approaches that attempt
to destabilize categorical orders. Quite the opposite. It should be seen as an
affirmation of the crucial role boundaries play in how power operates, how
order is established and contested, and how boundaries shift, fold, harden 
and soften over space and time. In generic terms, boundaries are instruments
through which order is established and power exercised, and there is always 
a concomitant suppression of alternative ways of life as new boundaries are
imposed, as highlighted by a diverse range of scholars including Deleuze and
Guattari (1987), Derrida (1976) and Foucault (1971). Indeed, scholarly
inquiry into boundaries is not a recent phenomenon. As Brubaker et al. 
(2004: 31) have noted, as the social constructedness of categories has been
widely accepted, ‘categorization has emerged as a major focus of research’
(see also Jones 2009; Newman 2003; Newman and Paasi 1998). Foucault
(1971), for example, focused specifically on how society is ordered, arguing
that power emerges from obscuring difference by forcing the multiple into
manageable units (categories) with solid separations (boundaries) between
them. I shall return to some of these literatures in the conclusion of this thesis, 
but the key point here is that boundaries do not simply mimetically mirror
the world but simultaneously create and limit it.
This analytical move shifts our attention away from whatever boundaries
enclose – a place, a community, a culture, a polity – and toward the
construction of the boundaries that do the enclosing, exclusion, or de-fining
(Barth 1969; cf. Anderson 1983). In other words, this is a move away from
structure and fixed conditions of possibility and toward ‘lines of potential’
(Stewarts 2007: 11). Andrew Abbott (1995) furthered this argument by 
contending that the boundary must come before what is inside can be
understood as an entity. In his processual ontology, it does not really matter
what these boundaries were, at first; rather, ‘they began as simple, inchoate
differences. They were not boundaries of anything’ (Abbott 1995: 868).
Abbott argued that the ‘thing-ness’ of any entity is not pre-given but, rather,
is only the result of the contingent process of linking up ‘locations of
difference’. As he noted in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, ‘We
should not look for boundaries of things but things of boundaries’ (Abbott
1995: 857; see also Brubaker 2002; Loveman 1999). 
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In this thesis I build on the work of Judith Butler (1990, 1993) to suggest
that boundaries are performative. Understanding boundaries as performative
draws analytical attention to the necessity of re-narrating, re-fixing, re-
writing and constantly patrolling boundaries, which also is evidence of their
incompleteness and inchoateness – a fact that allows for further contestation
and re-evaluation. The notion that boundaries are always ‘in the making’ is
supported by ubiquitous references to ‘possibility’ and ‘potential’ (Ahmed 
2000; 2002; Stewarts 2007), or is expressed in the language of ‘becoming’
(Nightingale 2018), signaling the potential of becoming ‘otherwise’
(Povinelli 2014). In short, stability is not a sign that nothing is happening,
but of effective reiteration. This, I claim, is a key modality of power, whether
boundaries are operating along lines of gender (Butler 1990; 1993),
distinctions between nature and society (Watts 2005; Whatmore 2002), 
between state and society/citizen (Mitchell 1991; Gupta 1995), or intertwine
to form more socionatural entanglements (Nightingale 2018). 
A boundary is ‘a doing’; the boundary and the world it delimits emerge
together, and not simply as intertwined with one another as in the joining of
distinct entities but as lacking independent existence. There is no nature
without society, no modern without the traditional, no black without white.
Boundaries, in other words, are expressions of the power relations that make
up the world. Consider, for example, Douglas’ (1966) astute notion of ‘dirt’
as ‘matter out of place’. This underlines not only the cultural constructedness
of social-spatial boundaries, but also that belonging is a product of power
relations. As Douglas (1966: 98–99) writes, some-thing that is ‘out of place’ 
becomes ‘pollution’, referring to a ‘particular class of danger’ to ‘sources of
power’. The danger that is ‘risked by boundary transgressions is power’, so
that ‘though we seek to create order, we do not simply condemn disorder.
We recognise that it is destructive to existing patterns; also that it has
potentiality.’ That which does not belong thus exerts both danger and power
in its ability to challenge existing forms of order. 
This observation permeates critical scholarship, in which the deviate, 
degenerate, apart or Other become conceptual resources for the theorization
of power (e.g. McClintock 1995; Foucault 1989). In many ways, then, a
focus on boundaries signals, first and foremost, a methodological readiness
to explore relations of power, authority, exclusion and control, but also
transgressions and fissures. Many thinkers on ‘the political’ share this view.





   
   
  




      
    






      
   
   
  
  
   
  
   
    
 






‘productive incoherence’, and Derrida (1996: 84) writes that ‘chaos is at once 
a risk and a chance’:
[C]haos and instability, which is fundamental, founding and irreducible, is at
once naturally the worst against which we struggle with law, rules,
conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but at the same time it is a
chance to change, a chance to destabilize. If there was continual stability,
there would be no need for politics, and it is to the extent that stability is not 
natural, essential or substantial, that politics exists … Chaos is at once a risk 
and a chance.
Boundary struggles – what is ‘dirt’ and what is not – thus provide strategic 
grounds for the analysis of political contestation. Land’s making and remaking 
in rural Zambia – surveying, fencing, appropriation, reclassification – bring
the importance of investigating such processes into sharp focus, not least
because the boundaries between State Land and chiefly territory are very much
‘in the making’, and something that cultivators, administrators, chiefs and
headmen navigate around every day. As I explicate below, these boundaries
emerge not only on a border geography of the landscape itself, but more
generally manifest themselves in social and material practices on the land, in
encounters with bureaucracy, on the body corporeal and in the movement of 
spirits, in storytelling and legislation. These are all sites of ‘chaos’ – however
minute – where acts of subversion, compliance, opposition, support, evasion, 
confirmation, transgression and inculcation shape the way new orders emerge
(or not). My ethnographic explorations of (state) practices bring into clearer
view the inherent uncertainty of land’s making by taking seriously the history
in which these boundaries become embedded and the material and social
landscapes through which relations of power operate.
3.3 Studying the state in the everyday
My analysis takes its cue from the work of Timothy Mitchell (1991), which
revolves around the boundary between the state and its conceptual twin, 
society. According to Mitchell, the state is reproduced in visible, everyday
forms, such as the language of legal practice, mapping, lettering,
architectural forms, the wearing of uniforms and the marking out and
policing of frontiers (see also Hansen and Stepputat 2002; Painter 2006).






        
  
  
       
   
  




         
 





   
   
  
  
      
 
  
     
  
     
   
     
   
and above a social order, producing the effect of an external ‘state’
intervening ‘in society’ (cf. Foucault 1980; Abrams 1988). As such, state-
society boundaries do not mark the limit of authority, but enable it, and rather
than ‘searching for a definition that will fix the boundary’, Mitchell (1991:
78) writes, ‘we need to examine the detailed political processes through
which the uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and society is
produced.’ Subsequent scholarship has probed a range of practices through 
which political authority is produced as distinct from its social surround: by
regulating property relations (Lund 2016; Sikor and Lund 2009), laying
roads (Rankin et al. 2016), through foreclosure (Neumann 2004) or by 
mapping and surveying (Mitchell 2002), to name a few. In short, the
relationship between land’s making and the institutions that act upon it is co-
constitutive, with the very notion of stateness wrapped up with control over
land (and forests) and the people who dwell on it (Nightingale et al. 2018). 
In this thesis, I take up this analytical imperative, emphasizing land as a key
arena through which myriad ‘state-chiefdom’ boundaries are drawn and
contested, with different institutions deriving their authority (or ‘stateness’)
from their shaping of land and land use through practice and legislation.
Yet this thesis offers a shift in analytical emphasis, away from how the
state emerges as a distinct form of authority through the ‘assertion of control
over territory, resources, and people’ (Neumann 2004: 185) and toward how
stately authority emerges within the current of people’s involved activity, in
the specific relational context of their practical engagement with their
material surroundings. It is a move away from displays of overall strategies 
of government and toward the opaque reality of local encounters and 
makeshift tactics. In many ways, this corresponds to an interest in what
Foucault (1995[1977]: 11) has called the imbrication of people and things,
as expounded in this oft-cited passage:
Government does not bear on territory but rather on the complex unit
constituted by men [and women] and things. Consequently the things which
government is to be concerned about are not men, but men in their relations,
their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth,
resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities,
climate, irrigation, fertility etc.; men in their relation to that other kind of
things which are customs, habits, ways of doing and thinking, etc.
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This passage is, of course, too imprecise to offer any theoretical direction
other than pointing us toward some of the relations through which
governance works, entangling subjects, space and geophysical substance (cf.
Moore 2005). My point here is a different one: if we take the quote above
seriously, we can start to see how (state) power is sunk into social and
material relationships and, as such, uncertain in its effects precisely because
it remains susceptible to the eventualities of the social and material relations
of the everyday (Valdivia 2008; Meehan 2014; Nightingale 2018). As the
boundaries of the state stretch, they become susceptible to critique, resistance 
and other ways of being and doing. Contrary to Foucault, therefore, my 
ambition is not to make clearer how (state) power works as a disciplinary
technology, but rather to bring to light how ‘government’ is continuously
troubled by unruly natures and the surreptitious forms taken by the dispersed, 
tactical, makeshift creativity of citizens.
In what follows below, I assemble five conceptual components of state 
making, drawn from five different bodies of literature, each serving, in
different ways, to push our understanding of state power as riddled with 
sociality, uncertainty and ambiguity. Taken together, these literatures serve 
to summon up an analytical critique of the effectiveness of state power to
produce stable effects, showing instead how spaces never become fully 
exclusive but take on liminal qualities through which a plurality of political 
actors reinject elements of indeterminacy, rendering absolute ordering all the
more impossible. 
3.3.1 Component One: Legal pluralism and the fragmentation of
authority
Political pluralists invite us to move our analyses beyond ‘the state’ as the 
sole source of public authority, probing instead how governance proceeds at
different levels and through an assemblage of different actors who employ a
range of state and state-like tactics to secure their claims to legitimate
authority (von Benda-Beckmann and Turner 2018). Here I build on work that
has studied negotiations of disputed political authority among rebels and
guerilla groups (Korf 2005; Suykens 2010; Vandekerckhove 2011; 
Hoffmann and Vlassenroot 2014) as well as Africanist literature that 
underlines the political and cultural constructedness of the distinction
between ‘state’ and ‘chiefdom’ (Moore 1978; Berry 1993; Moore 2005; van 
Binsbergen 1987). Indeed, Zambian chiefs and headmen, too, have a
57
 
    
        
    
    
 




   
 
   
   
   






        
 
   
  
   
 
    
 




‘language of stateness’ (Lund 2006: 677) with a repertoire of symbols of
power and political legitimation that mimic, but also mock, those of statutory
bureaucracies. In the context of Zambia, a multiplicity of dispersed 
authorities – bureaucrats, field officers, chiefs, headmen, forest rangers, land
surveyors and spirits – are complicit in land’s making, and they may derive 
influence through proximity to (or indeed distance from) the institutional
sites of the statutory administration, or operate in their ‘shadows’ or
‘margins’ (Das and Poole 2004; Harris-White 2003). 
Thus, far more than a mute backdrop upon which ‘state meets citizen’,
rural Zambia is contested territory, or what Donald Moore (2005) has called
an ‘entangled landscape’: a space where state power mingles with chiefly
authority, where colonial histories and spatialities intertwine with the politics
of the present, where people become subjected to multiple matrices of power.
Here the domains of stately and chiefly government overlap and rub up 
against each other, sometimes fitting uneasily within the ‘paper boundaries’
(Byrne et al. 2016) surrounding them. Turning attention to diverse and 
dispersed practices of government (both stately and chiefly), and to the 
boundaries that emerge as an effect, thus shifts analytical attention away
from both state and chiefdom as predefined entities with a fixed set of
relations and toward the plurality of actors exerting authority to govern, with
different registers and faculties of power, ranging from the application of
statutory law, situational adjustments and spiritual sanction to references to
embryonic rules and myths (Lund 2002). As Berry (1997: 1228) notes:
‘people interact, within and across various social boundaries, in multiple
ways and relations among them are constituted less through the uniform
application of written or unwritten rules, as through multiple processes of
negotiation and contest’. In short, as the state wends its way through land
through surveying, titling, enclosing and demarcation, it is remade, dispersed
and stretched into a myriad of social and material relationships – it becomes 
susceptible to both chiefly resistance and a creative citizenry that comply,
subvert, support and evade different practices of government. State-
chiefdom boundaries become visible as situational and highly elastic. The
first component thus reads: state governance does not proceed from some
nexus of centralized power, but from multiple and translocal sites. Political
authority is, at its core, an empirical question. 
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3.3.2 Component Two: Political ecology and the unruliness of land
The second conceptual component I wish to introduce concerns the very 
grounds of state politics: land. Land is, in many ways, the material and
symbolic base of state making; it is measured, mapped, enclosed,
demarcated, classified and so on. Yet political authority and its principles of
government are not simply ‘mapped onto’ the land; land is not external to
culture and history or an inert object over which politics happen – it is
‘artifactual’, emergent with the practices upon it (see Braun 2002; Paasi
1996). But land is not only elastic in the sense of its existence in multiple and 
incommensurable registers of social and political life (Li 2004), but also in a
firmly material sense. Building on work within political ecology, and that of
Andrea Nightingale (2011, 2018) in particular, I shall insist that the outcome
– or boundary effect – of struggles over land and legitimate authority remain
crucially dependent on the diverse ways that practices of government and
resistance become entangled with the material-ecological fabric of the 
physical landscape (which Foucault hinted at but never developed). As 
Nightingale (2018) theorizes, as we bring into analytical view how state (and
state-like) efforts are thwarted by water sources silting or drying up (Harris
2012) or roads eroding beyond repair (Butz and Cook 2011), we can no 
longer separate political authorities from the material environment or
landscape through which they come into social and political existence (see
also Peluso 2011; Meehan 2014). 
In conceptual terms, political authorities not only come into being through 
efforts at ‘making natures’, but material-ecological environments themselves 
– the very physicality of land – are constitutive of social and political
boundaries. Rains render slopes slippery, thwarting attempts to climb paths
easily ascended during dry seasons. Erosion washes away soil and rock while 
simultaneously redistributing sediment in ways that frustrate travel and
movement. In Chapter 6 of this thesis, we see how both the materiality of
food crops and heavy rains shape struggles over land and forest. Thus, where
the physicality of land ends and where its sociality begins is not easily
delineated (in itself a boundary effect). What we often encounter are socio-
material or socio-ecological entanglements (Harris 2012; Nightingale 2018). 
Peters (2004; 2009), for instance, observes how drought produces stricter
definitions of those with legitimate claims to resources, catalyzing more 
exclusively defined group boundaries. And, as Sud (2019: 12) concludes,








     
   
  
 




   
 
  
     
  





      
       
   
  
   
    
 
    
  
 
        
to order, but also from land and nature that remain unruly in the face of
official decrees’ (see also Kadfak and Oskarsson 2017). What these studies
in political ecology suggest, in short, is that we cannot understand state
power and its effects without contextual and empirical investigation, without 
which we would be unable to appreciate unexpected and inadvertent
fractures and fissures in the flows of power, prompted by material-ecological
conditions. The second component thus reads: state making is crucially
contingent upon the material-ecological properties of the landscape through 
which authority is produced.
3.3.3 Component Three: Critical geography and the uncertainty of
territory
What emerges from these insights is an image of state authority as 
fragmented and variable in its material and spatial relations, open to political
contest and the play of unruly citizens and erratic ecologies. It is also against
this background, I propose, that we need to understand the spatiality of
political authority, or, more simply put, the concept of territory. Territory is
the spatial effect of the deployment of authority in material space, effectuated
through variable practices of controlling or claiming authority or rule over it
(Peluso and Lund 2011; Byrne et al. 2016; Korf, Hagmann and Emmenegger
2015). A performative notion of boundaries, however, renders territory not
immutable or inert, nor a source of stability for discourse. Rather, it is a
process that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of bounded space:
nations, colonies, provinces, protectorates, districts, tribal homelands, chief-
doms, settler estates, villages, spiritual dwellings, forests and townships,
with their boundaries – or lines of difference – disciplining the practices
within and defining who belongs to a place and those who are subjected to
exclusion from it (Paasi 1996). Some territorial formations are more durable
than others, contingent upon their re-narrating and re-fixing. Territory
determines what is ‘dirt’ and what becomes ‘pollution’ (Douglas 1966), but
it is never more certain than the boundaries that make up its constitution
(Brighenti 2010). 
These boundaries are not merely geographical, but spill over into other
domains (Paasi 1996). A century back in Zambia, for example, a black
female body in a mining compound was seen as a danger to the orders of
colonial spatial control; envisioned as a site of social reproduction, the black 













   
  
 
   









           
 
   
    
       
 
      
 
 
   
  
  
territory was displaced onto the bodies of women, with their movement
becoming a central concern for the administration (see Chapter 5). Such 
boundaries sediment over time, with new territorializations not simply 
replacing old ones, but rather creating fractured and multilayered landscapes
(cf. Byrne et al. 2016). Zambian lands are crisscrossed with territorial boun-
daries, past and present, moving in and out of formal-jurisdictional ambits –
well past the scripts of statutory bureaucracies. As the chapters that follow
will show, the authority of the state is never written onto the land as a secure
achievement; territorial boundaries are constantly negotiated and redefined, 
as are the social categories in which people are placed, forcing us to remain 
alert to the ways some territorial formations are entrenched, while others are 
blurred and struggled over, and how processes of entrenchment and struggle
intertwine to define rights, belonging and difference. The third component
reads: territory is un unstable product of practice.
3.3.4 Component Four: Anthropology and the trappings of officialdom
Geographical thought offers important insights into the processes through 
which stately and chiefly authority achieve a spatiality, and how territorial
boundaries determine who can occupy what space and who cannot. Yet
territory is but one expression of stately and chiefly power; orderings of state
power are always more-than-territorial. Specifically, they become manifest
in government offices, in courtrooms, in people’s encounters with agents of
officialdom, through documentary practices and paperwork (Hetherington 
2011; Hull 2012; Mathur 2015; Gupta 2012). In anthropological work on the
state, the uniform, letterhead and signature, along with many other insignia
of officialdom, have been analyzed as symbols of social distinction (see 
Hansen and Stepputat 2001). These artifacts imbue agents and organs of the
statutory apparatus with ‘stateness’, or ‘statehood’, which (re)produces a
division – or boundary – between ‘state’ and ‘society/citizen’ in bodily 
encounters. Already Friedrich Engels noted that agents of the state need to
‘present themselves as organs of society standing above society’, and
embody ‘a power which estranges them from society, they have to be given
special decrees, which invest them with a peculiar sanctity and inviolability’
(Engels 2016 [1941]: 157). Others (e.g. Hull 2012; Gupta 2012) have
stressed bureaucracy as a domain of officialdom, with waiting rooms and 
government offices as crucial sites wherein unequal power relations between
state and citizens are reproduced; bureaucratic practice – writing, lettering,
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stamping, documenting, endorsing – are all practices that reproduce and reify
the state and agents of officialdom, making them distinct from their social
surround (see also Das and Poole 2004). What these literatures say, in other
words, is that boundaries of officialdom do not represent authority as much 
as they bring it into being. 
Africanist theory has underlined the same phenomena for neo-traditional
authorities: chiefs, headmen, rainmakers and earth priests are all dependent
upon an expression of a quality or ability of difference (e.g. van Binsbergen
1987). Officialdom is a social performance of difference – a qualification for
the claim to legitimate statehood that reproduces unequal relations of power
between those who are governed and those who do the governing. However, 
like territorial boundaries, social boundaries are open to political contes-
tations, with manipulation or forging of stamps and signatures (Hull 2012).
In the ‘epistemic murk’ (Bubandt 2009: 556) that often characterizes 
bureaucratic arenas, the truth or falsity, authenticity or inauthenticity of
paperwork is often not what determines its effects (see Hull 2012b: 259).
State artifacts, like documents, are ‘iterable’ or ‘citable’, susceptible to
forgery, mimicry and alternative interpretation (Das and Poole 2004).
Official dress is also a site of contentious politics, as evident in colonial
efforts to redesign chiefs’ outfits so as to reposition African rulers as more 
distinct from their social surround (see Chapter 5). The fourth component
reads: material performances of officialdom are important arenas for the
reproduction of political authority, but also for its contestation. 
3.3.5 Component Five: Postcolonial theory and the spaces of
encounter
What I have shown above is that state power is always fragile and uncertain
in its effects, open for contestation and subversion across political,
ecological, spatial and social sites. Yet to fully understand how political
authority is constituted in the present, we also need to understand how state
power echoes a past, with colonial boundaries constructed around race
disparately and partially absorbed into social and spatial relations. Here, I
follow Ann Stoler’s (2016) invitation to study the multiple temporalities in 
which people live, for many boundaries we encounter in Zambia today are
sediments of a racially scripted landscape formed around constructs of
cultural difference that legitimized the colonial appropriation of lands for
white settlements, and a concomitant displacement of ‘tribal natives’ onto
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marginal geographies ‘outside’ the bounds of colonial modernity (see
Chapter 2). The Zambian landscape still bears the marks of this history; the
trope of the ‘frontier’ that separates the ‘civilized’ from the ‘savage’ is still
powerfully operative, and my argument here is that land’s making and
remaking reanimate colonial and sometimes hidden relations of power that
shape the ways that land is struggled over.
Yet as Stoler (2016: 26) reminds us, colonial legacy is not a question of
unbroken continuity; rather, in probing imperial effects in the present we
need to attend to their partial, distorted, and fragmentary qualities, to uneven
and intangible sedimentations. Residues of historical-colonial inequalities
becomes visible throughout my ethnography, and not only as enduring
divisions between State Land and chiefly territory, but also in concrete places
and encounters. For example, for those outside the circuits of statutory land 
law, for those without documented titles to the land they farm, the threshold
to government offices is not only a boundary of postcolonial officialdom (cf. 
Gupta 1995), but remains embedded in colonialist epistemologies of law and 
property; government offices are both contemporary spaces of engagement
between ‘state and citizen’ and historical places of colonial repression of
those who occupy spaces ‘outside’ modern land law. Still today, people face
discrimination for lacking ‘papers’, official documentation for their land
claims, in encounters with bureaucracy (see Chapter 7). As such, state-
chiefdom boundaries fold into themselves a history that become complicit in 
how people engage with and across them in the present. Thus, colonial
struggles are not historical and ‘over’, but fold into everyday spaces where
enduring taxonomies of the primitive peasant, whose use of and relation to
land is deficient, continue to shape geographical imaginaries (see Peters 2009
for an excellent review).
Yet I wish to debunk a common perception of colonial discourse, namely,
that it appears everywhere to be effective to the point where it becomes almost
impossible to imagine its contestation. Subaltern studies, in particular, has
been eloquent in exposing the internal contradictions and gaps and fissures
within colonial discourse that open up possibilities of subversion, or the
manner in which colonial discourse fails to suture the totality of social and
ideological fields (Bhabha 1994). The potential for different forms of
transformations is perhaps best articulated by Pratt’s (1991: 34) descriptions
of the ‘contact zone’ as the space of colonial encounter where ‘cultures met,
clashed and grappled with each other’ in instances of highly unequal relations
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of power. For Pratt (39), the contact zone was characterized by ‘rage,
incomprehension, and pain’, but also exhilarating moments of wonder’ (see
also Nash 2002; Shaw et al. 2006). It was a site of destabilization that was 
laden with coercion and inequality, but also improvisation and creativity. In
Bhabha’s work, such boundary moments appear as ‘interstices’, that is, ‘the
overlap and displacement of domains of difference’ (1994: 2) – where stasis
and rootedness give way for oppression and domination, but also struggle,
negotiation and invention (see also Wilson 2017). It is here – in encounters –
that we can locate the failures and fissures of the colonial discourse, and the
insubordination and ingenuity of subaltern and indigenous peoples. 
Subaltern studies offer important insights into how spaces of encounter
contain the possibility for subversion and disruption of the ongoing, 
rendering cultural difference a relational process rather than some
ontological essence (Chakrabarty 2000). In this thesis, colonial discourse is 
indeed both present and folded into multiple temporalities, but the analytical
focus is placed on its localized reiteration; here lies the risk of failure and the
troubling of authority, rightful presence and power (Bhabha 1994). In
colonial Zambia, for example, native women altered their bodies and dressed
up as men to avoid detection at police checkpoints, and chiefs tossed their
attire in acts of defiance (see Chapter 5). And today, even ostracized farmers 
probe their way into government offices, navigate the state bureaucracy to
obtain signatures on various documents, or track down agents of the state at
their private residences when turned away from government compounds (see
Chapter 6 and 7). A focus on spaces of encounter serves to throw into relief
enduring colonial relations that can otherwise become obscured by everyday,
often hidden, repetition, but at the same time it also makes visible their
failure to suture the totality of social and ideological fields. The fifth
component reads: colonial orders of power are neither over nor omnipresent,
but fold into different social and spatial relations.
3.4 Toward an analytic of the uncertainty of state power
As shown above, any theory of the state needs to take into account its
constitution through a complex set of performances and practices and take
seriously that land occupies multiple registers of social and political life and
weaves its way through multiple polities, relationships and histories. The five






    
   
   
 
   
  
         
  
  
    





   
   
   
  
 
   







    
      
   
power as everywhere effective, and provide for an empirically grounded
analysis of the state as an utterly uncertain achievement. Indeed, previous
scholarship, across disciplines, provides spectacular insights into the
variability of power and political authority, and bringing these insights
together means querying state power’s entanglement with material-
ecological properties of land, a plurality of political authorities, uneven 
territorial productions that escape scripted lines, the circulations of
bureaucratic artifacts, material performances of officialdom and colonial-
historical sediments of racial exclusion. 
To understand agrarian struggles and the state-chiefdom boundaries that
emerge as a result, I contend, we must hold these processes in view
simultaneously. From the insights assembled above, we can explore how
state-chiefdom boundary making, connected officialdoms and exclusions
take place at myriad sites. Because, state-chiefdom boundaries do not locate
only a border area on the landscape itself, but are also ‘spread’; fences on the
ground, lines on maps, thresholds to government offices, the body corporeal 
and colonial imageries of the savage all mark spaces of struggle, where
power and political authority are negotiated and struggled over. As becomes
evident throughout this thesis, state-chiefdom boundaries are inscribed onto 
the land, yet fences corrode and boundary stones are unearthed, they are
written onto documents in a faraway capital but writings are lost or
manipulated; they are written on the bodies of chiefs in the form of official
regalia but chiefs toss their attire; huts are burned and fields ploughed under
to erase signs of human occupation and use, but people repeatedly write
themselves back into the landscape through tree plantation or chiefly 
sanction. Such strategies continuously reinject elements of eventuality into
processes of boundary making, rendering absolute ordering all the more
impossible (Bhabha 1994), and introduce or maintain an element of plasticity
in land’s making and remaking. 
To render these dynamics visible, this thesis features four case-study 
chapters, each following an evolving struggle around a particular ‘boundary
object’ sitting in between stately and chiefly forms of authority: the body, 
the forest, the beacon and the title deed. Each of these boundary objects
connect – in different ways – to the insights assembled above: they are
analytical locations that link the empirical and the conceptual, folding the






        
 
   
  
      
  




       
 
      
  
     
    
  
    






    
  




‘Boundary object’ is a sociological term used to designate an interface
between different communities of practice (Star and Griesemer 1989; Star
2010). Boundary objects are plastic enough to adapt to local needs and
constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to
maintain a ‘common identity across sites’; they ‘have different meanings in 
different social worlds but their structure is common enough to more than 
one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation.’ (Star and
Griesemer 1989: 393). A geographical map provides a good example. It
allows for different people to come together in mutual understanding, yet it
is elastic enough to allow for different deployments. It can be used to detach 
land from lived reality but also to inscribe new geographical truths. It is an
instrument of power, it performs political work, it is malleable, open to 
contestation. It has a history and materiality that opens up for different
readings etc. To capture the transience and changeability of boundary
objects, Lee (2005) has proposed that we call them ‘boundary negotiating 
artifacts.’ As such, a boundary object is a shared space, and consequently
does not reside in some periphery, marginal space or at the edge of the
political, but rather constitutes the political (cf. Mezzadra and Nielson 2013). 
Boundary objects, in short, are methodological instruments that provide for
situated analysis of larger-scale processes. This guides me not only in the
selection of the relevant empirical settings for my investigations but also in
the very construction of the ‘objects’ to be studied.
The illustration below (Figure 2) shows my four boundary objects, sitting
in between State Land and chiefly territory, where multiple powers coincide. 
All of these objects are, in different ways, hooked up to institutions of both
stately and chiefly forms of authority. They sit at different levels of analysis,
and all have a particular materiality that shapes how they are engaged with,
from fleshy corporeality, topographical ‘nature’, fragile stonework to brittle
paper. My boundary objects are derived from ethnographic engagement and 
a reading of the colonial archives, and they function as points of departure in 
my exploration of how land comes to be struggled over, inhabited, labored 
on, and a powerful conduit for the subversion of state power. 
By centering the analysis on these boundary objects, I argue, we can open
up a translocal – localized yet scalar – reading of the limits of state
governance that captures connectivities between different sites, linking 





















   
 
Figure 2: Four boundary objects. Drawing by the author.
But why these four boundary objects? On lands subjected to state appro-
priation, people often struggle to stake claims to home and land, and the
courtroom is seldom a viable terrain of struggle. More often than not, conflicts
over land in rural Zambia ensue in other domains, visible only on the ground 
itself. My boundary objects signal the more hidden spaces through which 
people engage with change on the ground: the colonized were deprived of their
rights, but not of their bodies, which became political tools in the face of
colonial decree; those dwelling in the forest face dispossession, yet maneuver
its materiality and ecology (ruggedness and remoteness) and invoke the
histories and spirits that lie buried within to resist eviction; farmers who
discover survey beacons on their land know that is has been targeted for
government appropriation, but they have few other options than acting upon
the boundary stones themselves; the title deed detaches land from lived
realities, but by reworking its meaning, people reconnect it to the land to which
it refers, and in so doing open up a space for other forms of claim-making.
Thus, my boundary objects connect sites that all carry the common
denominator of being spaces of political engagement – from the body
corporeal, into material nature, onto material objects, through paper-work,
67
 









    
  






extending from a past into the present – revealing how marginalized peoples 
exploit indeterminacies in the situation or indeed generate such indeter-
minacies, using whatever areas there are of inconsistency, contradiction and
ambiguity to stake claims to home and land. 
My ‘boundary objects’ are not analytically given, nor are they simply 
‘there’; rather, they are made into ‘boundary negotiation artifacts’ (Lee 2005)
by people themselves to open up possibilities for subversion and opposition.
What I have done above is to recast them in conceptual cloth, taking four
schemes of government with scripted outcomes (settler colonialism, forest
enclosure, physical demarcation and land titling) and rendered them
analytical locations for the study of the contested means through which 
power and political authority operate. At their core, my boundary objects
allow for critical analysis not only of relations of domination, dispossession
and exploitation, but also of the struggles and creative politics that take shape
around these changing relations. Taken together, they provide for an 
emergent, empirically grounded and historically contingent analysis of how
land becomes struggled over, and the different ways state power operates and
positions people with variable capacities for action and critique within 





   
    
  
     
 
   
    
      
 
 




        
 
  




   
  
  4. Methodology
All readings are also mis-readings, re-readings, partial readings, imposed 
readings, and imagined readings of a text that is originally and finally never
simply there. Just as the world is originally fallen apart, the text is always
already enmeshed in contending practices and hopes. (Haraway 1991: 124)
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter laid out the theoretical foundation for this thesis and
developed an analytical strategy around four boundary objects, which
correspond to the four case-study chapters that make up this thesis: the body, 
the forest, the survey beacon and the title deed. Each of these objects are
analytical locations that link the empirical and the conceptual, folding the
study of state making into spaces of everyday life. In this chapter, I explain
how approached this study during fieldwork, employing a case-study
methodology with an emphasis on ethnography and archival research, with
each individual case-study chapter being a constituent of the larger question 
of how the cracks, contingencies and inadvertent outcomes of governance 
shape land struggles and state making in rural Zambia. Laying out my 
methodological orientation implies more than elaborating a set of methods,
however; it signals my approach to knowledge production, and how the 
worlds of others may be brought into my ‘epistemological reach’ (Trouillot
1995). Certainly, to disentangle what we think we know about others from
the worlds we inhabit ourselves is not an ethnographic challenge to
overcome, but a process of permanently provisional translation, and the
process of translating culturally contingent idioms into a unidimensional
textual form is never innocent. Different methods of ‘reading’ realities open











   
 
 
   
  
  
      
    
















   
 
   

















    
    
   
 
 
always partial. Knowledge is a product of interpretation between the 
observer, the observed and the method of observation, forming a ‘research 
assemblage’ (Fox and Alldred 2015). Like other assemblages, it is never a
certain accomplishment; it shifts, sometimes holding together and at other
times breaking apart, and I am far from its only architect. Simultaneously, as
I navigated and positioned myself on Zambian landscapes, others’ conduct
both governed and politically positioned me.
In what follows, I elaborate on my process of assembling methods. First, 
I detail my methodological approach, or what it means to approach ‘state
making’ through case-study research, and map out my ‘ethnographic field’.
Subsequently, I elaborate the particular methods I employed: ethnographic
observation, interviews and archival research (see Table 2 for a scheme of
methods and how they map onto each empirical chapter). Thereafter, I
explain my analytical strategy. In the final part, I think through the power
relations within which this research is embedded, reflect upon questions of
positionality and elucidate my approach to ethics and anonymity. 
Table 2. Scheme of methods.
CHAPTER / STUDY FOCUS /
CASE STUDY GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE DATA COLLECTION
Empirical chapter I The colonial appropriation of Archival research (1 month) and interviews with Chief
The body indigenous lands / colonial
Zambia (multi-sited)
Liteta IV and his advisors. Participant observations
also inform the analysis.
Empirical chapter II The enclosing of an inhabited Participant observations in Munyama Forest (around 
The forest forest / Munyama Forest, 5 months). Archival research (1 week). Interviews at
Lenje Chiefdom the chief’s palace, District Council, Provincial
Government, the Ministry of Lands and Forestry
Department.
Empirical chapter III The demarcation of village Participant observations in Mulonga village (3 
The survey beacon land / Mulonga village, Lenje months). Interviews at the chief’s palace, District
Chiefdom Councils, Provincial Government and the Ministry of
Lands.
Empirical chapter IV Land titling / Lenje Chiefdom Interviews with title holders, applicants of land
The title deed (multi-sited) conversion, village headmen, Chief Liteta IV and land 
officers at different statutory levels. Participant
observations also inform the analysis.
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4.2 Case study research and its ethnographic field
As laid out in the previous chapter, land’s making and the formation of
political authority are intimately intertwined. I proceeded by rescaling
processes of state making onto the land, and thus into people’s lives, 
proposing an analytic around how state-chiefdom boundaries are lived, 
performed and engaged with in everyday life. Methodologically, this serves
the purpose of making visible how (state) efforts at making land remain open
to the play of insubordinate citizens, diffident bureaucrats and unruly lands.
This research is, therefore, situated at the interface between practices of
government, subjects of rule and materiality of milieu, where efforts at
making land become enmeshed with immediate political ecologies; it is here
that state authority and chiefly politics emerge as items of ethnographic
analysis. Hansen and Stepputat (2001: 14) write:
By treating the state [and, I would add, the chiefdom] as a dispersed ensemble
of institutional practices and techniques of governance we can … produce 
multiple ethnographic sites from where the state [and chiefdom] can be 
studied and comprehended in terms of its effects.
Consequently, my ‘cases’ are not to be mistaken for spatial domains into which
the state ‘enters’; rather, they should be understood as relational spaces
through which state power operates, where the practices of government make
and remake land and produce particular places, peoples, bodies, expectations
and desires. A case is an ‘analytical construct’ (Lund 2014: 224) aimed at
arranging knowledge and structuring my thought processes around certain
phenomena, and not some pre-constituted unit of analysis (see Yin 2018).
Likewise, an ‘ethnographic field’ is not some pre-existing research site
awaiting the analyst, but something that we make in order to erect boundaries
around our exploration. ‘An ethnographic field’, Madden (2010: 38) writes,
‘provides an interrogative boundary to map onto a geographical and/or social
and/or emotional landscape that is inhabited by a participant group.’
While this thesis is about the political, material and imagined lands
inhabited by the people of ‘the Lenje’, these lands are certainly not contained
within the boundaries of ‘a community’. The Lenje is a loosely bound category 
– an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) – with its spatial and cultural
boundaries shifting, depending on whom you talk to. My conceptualization of
state-chiefdom boundaries draws diffuse, separate, mobile and distant places 










    
  
    
   
 
  
   
  
 








    
  








I introduce Mr. Mulenga, a farmer in Chibombo District who is in the process
of acquiring a title deed. When he receives a letter ornamented with the official
seal of the ‘Republic of Zambia’, summoning him to the Ministry of Lands,
my conceptualization of the state, my ‘analytical construct’, informs me to
follow. Mr Mulenga’s spatial movement expands my ethnographic field, 
incorporating an encounter at an office at the Ministry of Lands into my
analytical frame. This movement is both spatial and temporal; I trace relations 
of power both into the offices of state agents (Chapter 7 and 8) and into a
colonial past (Chapter 5 and 6). In this manner, I travel translocally between 
‘sites’ – both spatial and temporal – within the ethnographic field. Just as the 
state is multi-sited, so too, is my ethnographic field.
I stayed in two sites that were targeted for government appropriation: 
Munyama Forest (Chapter 6) and Mulonga village (Chapter 7). Both are
located in Lenje Chiefdom (previously Lenje Native Reserve), Central
Province, but they are separated by a district boundary between Chibombo 
and Chisamba (previously one district, Kabwe Rural). Munyama Forest was
previously located in Chibombo District, but following a district rebordering
in 2003, it was subsumed into the new district of Chisamba (see Chapter 6
for the political implications of this). Two of the case-study chapters are
broader in scope, drawing on empirical material from Northern Rhodesia as
a whole (Chapter 5) and Lenje Chiefdom at large (Chapter 8).
The selection of these particular field sites was a strategic-methodological
choice, emerging out of a pilot study I conducted in 2016. Rather than seeking
‘representativeness’, I sought field sites that could ‘speak back’ to the overall
concerns of this thesis. The field sites were, in other words, selected with
reference to their theoretical application, to their relevance to my research
questions, my theoretical position and to the phenomena I was trying to 
understand (see Silverman 2010). Put somewhat differently, my research did
not aim to be representative of the empirical world but of the processes 
outlined by theory. Geographically this translates into a borderland situated
between State Land and chiefly territory; Lenje Chiefdom is situated at the 
spatial-political intersection of stately and chiefly authority, and Munyama
Forest and Mulonga village are places where these spaces, in different ways,
overlap, entangle and ‘rub up’ against each other. They are at once frontier
spaces of the statutory land law regime and places where social, political and
historical-spiritual practices on the land provide considerable friction to state 

























    
          
 
  
territory and rural subjects, which allowed me to explore in detail how (state)
power operates on and through lands with multiple and malleable political and
historical layers. Taken together, then, my choice of field sites was driven by
an effort to look for critical research units that would help me to ‘better
illuminate the case’ (Baxter and Jack 2008: 550; Yin 2018: 179; Bryman 2012:
70), providing the opportunity to building an explanation within a certain
frame of analysis. 
While case-study methodologies have been celebrated as a strategy to
understand the ‘how’ of power and the practices that govern our relations to
the environment (Peet and Watts 2004; Robbins 2012; Rocheleau et al.
1996), a limitation to case-study research is what might be called the ‘localist
trap’. My case studies (body, forest, beacon, title deed) are certainly
connected to wider geographies, histories and regimes of knowledge, and an
analytical focus on everyday life might conceal these larger-scale processes 
that are shaping the case (Peters 2014). At the same time, as Goffman (1989:
130) writes, ‘you can more easily move up a social system, than down.’
Indeed, research that starts from larger-scale dynamics risks seeing a 
‘government rationality’ that does not necessarily reflect local experience.
This is, in part, why I chose to approach the study of state making from the
perspective of four case studies: because this would allow me to collect
multiple readings that could then be assembled into an understanding of
social processes ‘from below’. In turn, this helped me to uncover exceptions
to representations of state governance as the rationalization of power, and









   
   
   
       
   
   
  





      
 
  
     
  
 
    
  
 
   
 
  
   
       











Ethnography forms the foundation for this thesis, particularly in Chapter 6
(the forest) and Chapter 7 (the beacon), yet it also supports parts of Chapters
5 and 8. At the center of my research lies questions pertaining to the
operation and exercise of power, to relationships between state and citizen,
subject and authority, people and place, and to how different people interpret,
resist and endure change in their social and political surroundings.
Ethnography provides opportunities for close and contextual readings of these
relationship and processes as they occur in everyday life (Burawoy 1991).
Above all, ethnography provides for a ‘slower accumulation of evidence and
for key insights to arise unexpectedly, during experiences that allow
glimpses of how the world is experienced by local peoples’ (Roncoli et al. 
2009: 88). The primary value of a fieldwork strategy based on ethnography, 
then, is that it provides certain kinds of insights that are difficult to obtain in
any other way, such as people’s social positioning, relations to land and
connections to officialdom, and it allows the ethnographer to encounter and
discern the differences between what people say (meaning), what people do
(practice) and what they imagine (emotion) in their everyday contexts
(Lofland and Lofland 1995). It is not that living in a place and watching its
daily life ebb and flow somehow enables you to capture its totality or
essence; it is, rather, that the bits of life that you do see, you see in context. 
In other words, the advantage of data collected through observation, rather
than through direct questioning, is that data is arrived at not as a response to 
some conjectural question but as it spontaneously occurs: the quarrel that
erupts outside your front door, the unprompted storytelling over breakfast,
the unexpected arrival of a survey vehicle. You expose yourself to chance
encounters and events. It is, in short, the practice of being there in ‘continued
proximity to the studied reality’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 22) that forms the
foundation of my analysis. 
My time in the field was split into three fieldtrips (November 2016– 
March 2017, August–October 2017 and April–June 2018), and while at times 
generating discontinuities in the relationships I developed, this also allowed
me to refine my research strategy and locate important gaps in the data 
between each period of fieldwork. The latter proved critical, especially in my
understanding of past experiences and events, as oral accounts are often
conflictual and fragmentary (Moore 2005). I also benefited greatly from two










        
 
   
      
 
 
      
       
 
      
       
     
 
  
    
         
 
 










   
relationships with state officials at the Provincial Government in Kabwe, in
the District Councils of Chibombo and Chisamba, at the Ministry of Lands
in Lusaka, and with several headmen and families in Lenje Chiefdom, all of
them deepening during subsequent field work (in 2016, 2017 and 2018). 
Several of my early contacts have become informants, others friends.
During fieldwork, I took part in daily work, routine activities and village
meetings, closely observing people’s myriad material and affective 
encounters with state authority, and charting out the historical, material,
political and emotional dynamics at play in these encounters – all recorded
in a research journal. Chapter 6 (the forest) is based primarily on following 
people’s involvement in their daily activities – how they invoked and
maneuvered the historical, material and ecological terrain of the forest to
position themselves in relation to state authority. In addition to observations
of everyday serendipitous occasions, particular events became objects of
more focused study. Most of Chapter 7 (the beacon), for example, is centered
on the three-week-long period of material demarcation of the land in
Mulonga, and the villagers’ responses to that demarcation. But I also traced
survey lines into the offices of the state administration to map out the
bureaucratic field from which the beacons had sprung. Here, another set of
encounters took place that were equally important to understanding state-
chiefdom boundary dynamics. 
Throughout my time in the field I spent single days in the halls of the
District Councils, in various offices and winding corridors of the Ministry of
Lands in Lusaka, and at the chief’s palace. Field research at these sites is best
described as a form of ‘step-in-step-out’ ethnography (Madden 2010: 80): I
observed meetings in District Councils, listened to hearings at the chief’s 
court, trailed documents as they traveled between offices and departments in
the Ministry of Lands, and spent time with people in halls and waiting rooms,
delivering, collecting or trying to push paperwork through. While this work
primarily maps onto Chapter 8 (the title deed), it also informs a more general
understanding of encounters with officialdom (see Appendix 1 for a sample
list of participant observations).
Munyama and Mulonga are located about a half day’s travel apart (in dry
the season), and while lodging in one location, I often received telephone
calls from informants in the other, telling me about recent events or
upcoming meetings, inviting me to come along. Thus, while I dedicated 









      
  
   
   









   
  
    
  
 
   
      
 
       
     
      
    
   
in between, sometimes on a weekly basis. In Mulonga village I stayed with
Chipepo, Thabo and their two sons on their small farmstead comprised of a
cluster of a few thatched mud-and-wattle sleeping huts and a larger cooking
hut made from sun-dried bricks. In Munyama I lived with Bernard, Samfya,
and their two daughters. Headman Chiwala, however, insisted that I stay with
him and his family, as he had a ‘better roof’, and he convinced me to split
my time between Bernard and Samfya’s family and his own. In Munyama,
the politics of my whereabouts were tangible. Chiwala was often curious
about whom I had been talking to and what people were telling me, on
occasion cautiously advising me against talking to certain persons. More
often than not, it turned out that these persons were critical toward Chiwala’s
rule. Gatekeepers abound. During my first field visit to Munyama (2016), 
my research attracted considerable suspicion. If I was seen at Chisamba 
District Council at times of heightened political tension, the group of
headmen administering the forest lands questioned me carefully to ensure
that I was not ‘working for the government’. Over time, however, a certain 
amount of trust was built, and both Chiwala and Chief Liteta IV crafted hand-
worked ‘research permits’ for me to carry. Yet my association with both state
officials and farmers sometimes conflicted. For example, quite early on in 
my field research, Chisamba District Council grew increasingly suspicious
of my inquiries into Munyama Forest, and I learned that there were
discussions within the Ministry of Lands in Lusaka about ‘whose side the 
white researcher is on’, as my informant within the Ministry informed me 
over the phone. When returning to Lusaka for a few interviews at the
Ministry, my request to see the officer in charge of Munyama was denied,
and I was warned of the risks of ‘allying’ with ‘forest headmen’. 
These shifting relationships required constant tending, and I endeavored 
to be as transparent about my research activities as possible, continually
explaining the reasons for my movement in the field while ensuring that the
anonymity of research participants and informants was maintained when 
issues were contentious (see below for a discussion on ethics and 
anonymity). Yet it was inevitable that my movement between translocal sites
within the field – frequenting the palace of Chief Liteta IV of Lenje
Chiefdom, District Councils, the offices of Kabwe Provincial Government, 
and the corridors of the Ministry of Lands in Lusaka – entangled me in scalar
relations of power. It is from these situated entanglements that this thesis is 





    
     
    
  





      




   
        
   
  
    
       
             
 
       
    
        
    
     
    
           
     
    
  
  
relations emerge; and my intention is to bring these entanglements and
insights into contextual view in each of case-study chapters. The tension-
laden field of Munyama Forest, for instance, proved critical for
understanding how colonial categories of forests, modernity and 
chieftainship still shape interactions and encounters between headmen who 
claim the forest as their own and state officials who seek to bring it into the
fold of the statutory administration. 
While I have basic knowledge of iciBemba (the regional lingua franca),
both Chipepo, Bernard and Chiwala are fluent in English, and they facilitated 
my efforts at contextual understanding. Newman Nkandu, a research 
assistant whom I have been working with since 2015, supported me at times
when the local vernacular Lenje was spoken. Yet Newman’s role extends far
beyond offering translation support; he read drafts of most of my empirical
chapters and provided critical feedback and suggested alternative readings of
data; he contributed new questions in interview situations that proved critical
to my understanding; and he also, on more than one occasion, pacified people
who had perhaps had one drink too many and wanted to pick a fight with the
odd white guy. Newman was, in many ways, indispensable for my fieldwork, 
and helped me in my labors for contextual understanding. 
Still, I have, of course, been unable to capture the totality of social,
political and ecological processes that shape the ways land becomes struggled
over. Some important limitations to what I could learn through fieldwork have 
to do with the names and the categories I inevitably used to process what I
saw: land, forest, state, chiefdom, etc. How much of the life going on around
me in the field was I capable of seeing? Part of the baggage I took with me
was the intellectual legacy acquired in the course of my studies, and inevitably 
this kept telling me what I was seeing: this is significant, that insignificant;
this falls into that category, that into another one, and so on. In other words,
what I was seeing had already been named in the literature with which I was
familiar, and it was impossible for me to think about it without using those
names. In other words, my research is not only a product of my relationships
in the field, but also with a body of scholarly theory that defined certain
questions as important and others as irrelevant. Central to the experience of
my fieldwork, therefore, was the continual struggle between the names I
carried and the untidy realities in which I moved.
In this sense, the ethnographic field is a site of ‘betweenness’ (Staeheli







    
  
       
 
  
     











   
  
   
  
   
      
   
 
   
  
 
    
  
oppressions but never fully know the worlds of others or speak with authority
for them (Stoler 2009; Spivak 1988). This is perhaps particularly evident in
relation to ecological-spiritual entwinements (Chapter 5 and 6). Yet, while it
is important not to underestimate the difficulties of seeing and naming
elements of different realities, it is equally important not to retreat into a
position that holds that the difficulties are so great that it is simply not 
possible to gain any knowledge of that which lies beyond immediate
‘epistemological reach’ (Trouillot 1995). While it is never possible to
experience these realities in any ‘unnamed’ way, the world ‘out there’ can
sometimes stretch and tear those names in such a way that we are forced to
rethink them. My strategy in the field for disturbing my preconceptions
involved attempting to undermine my own preconceptions, and to allow
empirical insights to challenge my ready-made names. Still, however open 
to doubt I have tried to be, I remained bound to a particular moment in time;
I joined a dialogue already in progress in which certain ways of naming 
reality have become hegemonic.
4.4 Interviews
Apart from following the ebbs and flows of daily life in Mulonga and
Munyama, I have done interviews (semi-structured and targeted ‘elite’
interviews) and chronicled oral narrations of colonial histories to understand
past experiences, to capture how people talk about themselves, how they
understand and interpret their social and material environment, what social
and political categories people invoke and how they explain processes of
change. Interviews were the main source of data used for Chapter 8 (the title
deed). As the title deed is an odd element in rural villages, I purposefully 
interviewed farmers across several sites in Lenje Chiefdom who have tried
to convert their landholdings into private property (20 in total, of which 3 
were successful), people who had inherited title (5), as well as Chief Liteta
IV, a number of his headmen (11) and officials within the statutory
bureaucracy (9). Together, these interviews sought to understand how the
title deed was taken up and reworked in spaces outside statutory bureaucracy.
Asking questions is not an easy thing to do, however. What fieldwork is
often about, it seems to me, is the struggle to discover the questions we have 
not asked but which our informants hear and are struggling to answer in their








           
      
 




   
  
       
   
 
 
       
      
  
 
    
 





          
  
          
       
 
 
interviews I asked how much land title holders cultivated. I soon learned that
people exaggerated these figures because they assumed, whatever I might
say to the contrary, that I would pass this information on to state officials,
and that land which was not under cultivation would be reappropriated by a
headman or the Ministry of Lands. The threat that uncultivated lands would
be edited out from people’s control was a staple of the exhortations delivered 
by various officials. What the answers to my questions about cultivated lands
were actually telling me about, therefore, had less to do with actual practices
on the land and more to do with the relationship between farmers and
officialdom. In other words, what those questioned heard was a question
about whether they were properly productive farmers, and whether the extent
of their cultivation justified their claims to the land.
Although I took to my interviews as a set of topics, I used these more as a 
way of starting conversations than of getting answers to specific questions. In
my ambition to enable respondents with a variety of perceptions and subject
positions to freely articulate their opinions, I was careful to ensure that my
interviews followed from a natural rather than imposed, interface,
apprehensive of the fact that the interview setting in itself carries implications
for the outcome. The space wherein the interview is conducted, as Elwood and 
Martin (2000: 659) write, ‘produces “micro-geographies” of spatial relations
and meaning, where multiple scales of social relations intersect in the research
interview.’ Many people who participated in this research were suspicions of
formal interview situations. Therefore, interview questions were asked within
flows of conversations taking place at the respondent’s house or homestead,
whilst working the land or walking into town, serving to mitigate some of the
interpersonal artificiality commonly associated with the interview setting.
Some, however, preferred a more formal interview setting, sitting face to face 
across a table, as this provides a more tangible forum for ‘setting the record
straight’ or ‘getting the facts rights’.
Targeted ‘elite’ interviews were conducted with purposefully selected
representatives occupying key positions in the land regime – including those
in the Ministry of Lands, Provincial Government, District Councils as well as
members of the royal family of the Lenje dynasty – both as part of the
background research and as a response to specific data collection requirements 
emerging from empirical insights gained through participant observation. The
demarcation of Mulonga, for instance, lead me to conduct a number of




   
   
        
  




   
    
  
   
  
    





    
         
          
    
  
 
        
 
    
          
 
   
           
  
my original design, and when learning that the Ministry of Lands had ordered
the burning of fields and farmsteads in Munyama in 1994, I tracked down
forestry officers who were on civil duty at that time. For these interviews, I
benefited greatly from my already established relationships which facilitated
research access. I had repeatedly interviewed some of these official since 2013,
and also had a social acquaintance with them; and I met several on them over
beers on weekends, which allowed for a more open interaction with these
agents of the state than I had expected to be possible (see below for ethical
considerations).
Over the course of my research, I shifted between using a tape recorder,
notebook and transcribing the interview from memory. Using a tape recorder
often compromised rapport and conversational tone, and sometimes, it
seemed, implied a hidden motive of the research. Not taping interviews,
however, posed challenges for creating accurate annals. For this reason, I
carved out time for transcription immediately after all interviews; yet
sometimes an interview would evolve into lunch or a visit to a neighbor,
which made recollection a trial. On days when my research assistant,
Newman, was present, we often transcribed these interviews together. In
many cases I also interviewed the same person several times, giving
opportunity for clarification on points raised on earlier occasions. In total, 
the number of interviews exceeds 100, half of which are with ‘officials’,
either in the statutory administration or in the ‘traditional’ leadership of
Lenje Chiefdom. Throughout the research I was driven by the aspiration to
attain a variety of interview participants with regards to age, gender and class
(see Appendix 2 for a list of interviews).
4.5 Archival research
Parts of this thesis (in particular Chapters 5 and 6) draw on archival research
carried out in the National Archives of Zambia in Lusaka. In total I spent five
weeks in the archive, out of which four weeks were spent on locating ‘the
body’ in colonial space (Chapter 5). This research objective emerged out of
a more general reading of the founding of the settler state of Northern 
Rhodesia (originally meant as background research). In the colonial records,
the ‘unruliness’ (in various formulations) of Africans is cited repeatedly from
the 1890s through the 1930s. This led me to a focused reading of the ways










   
   
          
  
   
 
         
    
     




    
   
     
  
    
  
  
     
          
  
   
 
   
 
  
control, emanating in a conceptualization of ‘the body in colonial space’. The 
archive itself made a systematic approach difficult, however, with outdated
inventories, misplaced files and an organizational logic that at times escaped
my comprehension. I chose to structure my inquiry around three themes,
corresponding to three colonial spaces (territories): ‘the proper village’, ‘the 
native reserve’ and the ‘mining compound’, allowing a more systematic
reading of the relations between particular constructions of space and the 
people meant to occupy those spaces. More than fifty files were reviewed for
each of these spaces. The remainder of the time spent in the archive (1 week)
was devoted to charting out the enclosure of Munyama Forest in the 1940s
(Chapter 6). These records were more easily obtained as they were neatly
organized into a handful of binders (see Appendix 3 for a list of archival
source materials).
The archive is not a container of ‘raw data’, however. In itself, the archive 
tells a great deal about how the colonial administrators claimed to know the
colony in which they intervened, and how they intervened in that world on 
the basis of the knowledge they generated (see Burton 2005). Indeed,
elements of the archive were intended to be performative: to bring into being
the very reality to which they referred. Colonial documents were projective 
devices, narrating the future of a colonial project while at the same time 
reconstructing the past (Stoler 2009). Archived accounts of colonial
governance must be read and analyzed in that light. My aim, thus, was not to
uncover some hidden rationalities behind colonial interventions, to chart
some linear form of change, or to use historical documents to reveal the truth
about the past, but rather to provoke new ways of thinking about peoples and
spaces subjected to imperial power, and the duress and durability of
boundaries drawn during colonial rule. As Walter Benjamin (1968[1940])
once wrote: ‘To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it
“the way it really was” … It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes 
up at the moment of danger … The danger affects both the content of the
tradition and its receivers.’ With this in mind, I am relying on archived 
accounts not to bear the weight of theoretical assertions, but rather to 
stimulate reflection and elaboration on theoretical propositions (Chapter 5),



















      
 
   
   
 






      
     
      
 
    




Through my fieldwork, field notes have been systematically recorded in a
research diary, describing fieldwork situations and chronicling unrecorded 
interviews. These have been transcribed and analyzed using standard quali-
tative techniques by coding in NVivo for key themes, patterns and repetitions. 
Archival documents have been photocopied and arranged according to themes.
I combined inductive and deductive research approaches to stimulate 
reflection and an iterative generation of insights. 
The transcripts gave an overview of ideas, depth, width, credibility and 
quality of the information. Thereafter, the materials were carefully reviewed
synchronously as segments and observations of theoretical significance were
labeled, categorized and organized into themes, moving from tenuous ideas
and concrete details in the data toward a more comprehensive analysis of
wider processes (see Neumann 2007: 337). While I coded interviews, field
notes and archival materials, new topics and codes emerged: for example,
the ‘the body’ in colonial space, which formed a stand-alone case study
(Chapter 5), or the spiritual ecologies of land (Chapter 6) and materiality of
documents (Chapter 8), which inform the analysis more broadly. These
pointed to themes that I had not considered beforehand but which were
important to give greater insight into the theoretical framing of my research.
The relationship between these ‘new’ grounded codes and my more
deductive codes, derived from previous scholarship (see Chapter 3), helped
me move toward more general themes and then to narratives and results and,
finally, to the contributions of each empirical chapter.
This process is not sequential; rather, it is characterized by constantly
traveling between empirical material and emergent codes grounded therein,
evolving theoretical themes and concepts, and the relationships between
themes and concepts. My analytical codes have emerged in an iterative 
process spanning three years of intermittent fieldwork, with momentary
ideas and topics nuanced with new empirical material and fieldwork. In other
words, as new empirical insights are gained, the theory is infused with
empirical meaning, meaning that theory ‘evolves’ during the course of
analysis. That is, theory is both a priori and a posteriori in the sense that
theory has not be generated but ‘elaborated’ in relation to my case studies 
(Yin 2018: 180). The premise of this strategy is that ‘theory cannot be
understood without empirical observation and vice versa’, creating a ‘cross-




     
 
    
    
  




       
  
   
    
   
    
 
 
   
 
       




      
  
  





    
   
established theoretical models and new concepts derived from the
confrontation with reality’ (Dubois and Gadde 2002: 555). Once the themes 
had been elaborated, I revisited the original journal entries and audio-
recordings to saturate the themes. Particular attention was directed toward
themes that arose often, and toward how such themes related to the 
conceptual foundation upon which the analysis rests. The themes were then
reviewed through the theoretical frame and arranged to speak back to my
research questions. 
4.7 Positionality, ethics and anonymity
Fieldwork is laden with unequal power. I arrived in Lenje Chiefdom as an
envoi of a distant world: with an impressive letter of introduction from a
foreign university and my apparent access to that limited and vital resource, 
transport, I obviously belonged to a world of ‘development experts’ –
always, in various ways, politically charged in my presence. Indeed, my
presence had a tendency to turn any occasion into a public one. I clearly 
remember Chipepo’s laughter resounding across the lands while teaching me 
to work the land. It was one of my first days in the field, and he was
instructing me how to maneuver the plow behind their oxen. ‘It’s lucky that
white farmers have tractors, otherwise the world would be a different place’,
he mused. The following day it appeared to be the only thing people were
talking about: ‘the white researcher that can’t plow’ – an expression that
mapped an inexperience of manual labor onto my body, extending into
historical and geographical configurations of power. 
Being in the field offered constant lessons and new ways of locating 
myself, making me awkwardly aware of my own position of privilege
(England 1994), but also of how different people were sizing me up,
politically positioning me. In her writings on ‘situated knowledges’, Donna
Haraway (1989: 193) elaborates a method of ‘critical positioning’, stressing
that ‘positioning implies responsibility for our enabling practices’ (see also 
Fabian 2001). In effect, this links questions of my positionality to the ethical
responsibilities that I carry toward those I worked amongst. Being a white
researcher allowed me to move between farmsteads and offices of high-level
bureaucrats in a way that few rural Zambians can, a movement that
constantly generated ethical predicaments. This is perhaps particularly






   
   
    




   
  
          
    
  
   
  
 
   
       
    
         
   
 
            
 
         
   
 
   





long and conflictual history, with charges of police beatings, violent
evictions and hut burnings ordered by the government. On several occasions
I was asked by forest inhabitants to make inquiries into ‘government plans’
or deliver messages to state officials, often to the effect of ‘leave our land
alone’. Simultaneously, those same bureaucrats continually asked me what I
had learned about the activities of the forest inhabitants, whether they carry
firearms, and how many heads of cattle the average forest household has.
Navigating these different sites required continuous ethical monitoring. 
The approach that seemed most appropriate to me was to have an open and
ongoing dialogue about my presence and role as a researcher, and to stand 
by my commitment to not engage in palpable political action. This is a fine
line, of course. The simple act of sharing a piece of information across sites
can be highly political, and I did so only when the security and integrity of
all informants, bureaucrats and forest inhabitant alike could be ensured (for
anonymity, see below). For example, on the request of the forest headmen, I
took a photocopy of a document that they had in their possession 
(purportedly proving that a state official once authorized their settlement in
the forest) and showed it to an officer at the Ministry of Lands, and then
reported back what that officer had told me about the validity of that
document. Certainly this action also served me in terms of data generation, 
but I was careful to make my motives clear on such occasions. Throughout
my research, I was careful not to raise any false expectations emerging out
of my stay, and to have open conversations about such expectations if and
when they did arise; I did so based on my conviction that bringing to light
conflicting interests may in itself hold value. Still, I was inevitably altering
the reality in which I was trying to participate, with both my research agenda
and that of the participants shaping the outcome of this research. Often my 
data collection was limited by my ethical commitments to not obscure my 
motives, yet this was also crucial for building trust across conflicting sides
and, in extension, ensuring long-term research access.
My encounters with research participants were never ‘neutral’; they were
marked by emotion and shaped by the social and political context in which 
they took place, with each side having particular interests and presumptions as 
to what was involved in our encounters. Over time, many of these encounters
also evolved into friendships. This was somewhat of a double-edged sword,
creating both a nourishing fieldwork environment and a host of ethical









   
  
   
 




     
  
 





    
 
 
   





   
 
 
      
 
Banks and Scheyvens 2014). Some informants certainly divulged information
that they would not have shared had we not been friends (and sometimes under
the influence of alcohol). These dynamics were carefully considered
throughout this research, and many events, experiences and stories that I
recorded have not been included in this thesis on the basis of protecting the
integrity of research participants.
Ethics command continuous attention to how actions and reactions,
questions and answers, are determined by relations of power. Anonymity is
often presented as a solution to ethical problems, yet it also poses its own
quandaries. While most participants of this research remain anonymous by 
choice, other have expressed a will not to be silenced through anonymization. 
Chiwala, for instance, insisted that I use his real name, expressing that it
validates his claim to personhood. In all such cases, the decision follows 
from careful consideration and sometimes a dialogue with the person in 
question. Others I chose to anonymized, guided by my concern for their
security, even when I was conscious of the fact that doing so might go against
their desire not to be silenced. In Mulonga village, for example, all names 
have been replaced. Many people have chosen their own pseudonyms.
Anonymized state officials sometimes feature under vaguer titles, such as
‘forestry official’, so as to conceal the identity of people who occupy a
position easily connected to a particular person (see Appendix 2). 
I have also changed the name of the village I call Mulonga, shifted its 
location on the map (see figure 3), altered or omitted some geographical
signifiers and shifted the timeline of the demarcation of the village lands.
Efforts to identify Mulonga by the events I describe are impeded by the fact
that demarcations of village lands were underway throughout the district 
over the years 2015 to 2018, with outcomes similar to those I narrate in
Chapter 7. Yet the district in which Mulonga is located is featured under its
real name, thus enabling identification of local state officials figuring in my
narrative. Since the time of the demarcation, however, key officials have (as 
per routine) been rotated to other districts. The village that features under the
name Kangwa has also been renamed (Chapter 8). Munyama Forest, and all
other places referred to in this thesis, carry their real names, but data are only
presented when the security and integrity of the participates living in those
places can be ensured.
The following chapter mirrors my attempt to navigate contested and 
conflictual landscapes. As shall become clear, research is never about raw
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unmediated ‘reality’. Views of informants (and my own) are shaped by the
historical, geographical and political context in which they are recorded. 
Still, this is not to say that knowledge produced through fieldwork is 
somehow ‘false’, or that beyond a tainted understanding we could find 
absolute ‘truth’. Knowledge is always partial, situated and determined
historically, locally and personally and, in effect, produced from particular
subject positions (Haraway 1991; 1998; Rose 1997). We are, as Kate Crehan 
(1997a: 43) writes, ‘condemned to scrabble about with our secondhand 
categories in a tension-laden field. The best we can do is to try to conscien-
tiously follow the threads dangling from the different truths back to their
origins.’ Why might this person have told me this? What kind of associations
might those terms have in this particular context? Such questions have guided 
me throughout my research as methodological means to produce results both
rigid and situated. 
While living in Lenje Chiefdom, I always, to some extent, represented the
eye of the outside world, and it was inevitable that I appeared as a potential
channel through which local interests might be able to make themselves
heard. At the very least, I was recording what went on locally, and would 
later tell people outside Lenje Chiefdom what I had learned. Many have been
keen that their history, plight and ‘traditions’ should be recorded. Translating
these diverse and sometimes contradictory voices into an academic text is 
not an innocent project; it is necessarily an imperfect translation and involves
bringing some voices to the fore and silencing others. In the end, I hope my 











   
    
      
       






      
   
   
  
      
    
    5. Empirical Chapter I: The Body Corporeal
Race, gender, territory: How ‘out of place' bodies made (a)
difference in colonial Zambia
Bodies – raced, sexed, classed and ethnicised – were the sites through which
imperial and colonial power [was] imagined and exercised. (Ballantyne and
Burton 2014: 6)
5.1 Introduction
Mwomboshi Forest, Lenje Chiefdom, sometime in the 1940s
When Thandiwe was young, she moved outside the tribal area in which she
was registered to settle on a piece of untenanted land on an abandoned and
overgrown plantation a couple of hours’ walk from Chisamba township. In 
doing so, Thandiwe challenged the orderly rule of the colonial state, which
differentiated settler estates from Africans neatly and securely fixed in
villages next to them. When the taxmen came the following year, Thandiwe 
first went into hiding. Yet they returned after a week or so and found her at
home. Standing there at her new homestead, she refused to pay them,
insisting that ‘only villagers’ are obligated to pay tax. Her conception of
‘villagers’ was not shared by the tax collector; one of the men grabbed a
chicken by one of its legs, asserting, as Thandiwe recalled, that ‘all people
are villagers … this chicken will be your tax if you refuse to pay’. She
quickly grabbed hold of the chicken by its other leg, repeating her argument. 
Even after receiving a blow, she did not let go. The dispute ended with a tug-
of-war, with the chicken ‘going in two pieces’, as she put it to me. Her strong
assertion was based on the fact that she was outside her tribal ‘homeland’, 




           
    
 
 
      
  
        
    
   
    
  
   
       
 
 
   
  
   
  
 
    
  
     
 
  
      
  
   
     
 
 
    
  
   
 
meaning that one could exit tribal territory simply by walking away. For the
tax collectors – themselves African – the signs marking the territory to which
she belonged were written on her skin; they ‘saw another black African’ and
therefore placed her within a tribal geography. Thandiwe explained: ‘Those
days were all black here and white there. Myself, I didn’t look at my skin.
But those people looked, even deep inside there [gesturing towards the
forest]. It followed you.’ The words ‘it followed you’ signaled to Thandiwe
that, for the tax collectors, race had a geography, but it had been displaced
onto her body, which then carried it across space, even ‘deep inside there’. 
Yet the tax collectors left without their levy, and when I asked her why, she
replied: ‘There was blood coming out of here [pointing to her eye], they saw
suffering … I think they were scared’. The vulnerability of her body shaped 
a politics of indignity; her skin broke, disturbing the boundary between her-
Self and the Other, producing a gendered space of defiance.
My conversation with Thandiwe kindled my thinking about how the
colonial appropriation and organization of space was lived and experienced.
Indeed, the spatial architecture of African settler colonialism has been
subject to ample research in the field of geography and beyond. Most salient,
perhaps, is Mamdani’s (1996, 2012) rendition of how racialized constructs
of cultural difference were reified as historical facts, which legitimized the
creation of tribal territories, fixing African bodies to institutional sites in
marginal geographies: ‘Encased by custom, frozen into so many tribes, each
under the first of its own Native Authority, the subject population was, as it
were, containerized’ (Mamdani 1996: 51; see also Mbembe 2000, 2003;
Moore 2005; Berry 1993). ‘Tribe’ and ‘tribal homeland’ were among the
most rigid categories that yoked people and place together. Importantly, 
however, they were synthetic concepts in the ‘creation’ (Ranger and
Hobsbawm 1983) or ‘invention’ (Vail 1989). The British annexation of
Northern Rhodesia (later Zambia) largely followed this logic, with African
bodies being pinned to particular places in a racial topography of tribal rule
(see Roberts 1976; Gould 1995; Moore and Vaughan 1994). But Thandiwe’s
story made me wonder what such narratives hide. Is it so, as Robyn
Longhurst (2001: 2) writes, that hegemonic plots of geographical theory
‘offer a purity that materiality and practice threatens to taint and soil’?
In this chapter I shift analytical attention to the bodies that transgressed
colonial boundaries, to the bodies that moved ‘out of place’ and unsettled the




     
  
  




     
 
      
            
 
       
   
 
        
 
  
   
    






   
  
     
    
      
     
as ‘stray’ in an otherwise rigid grid of racialized rule, I pause at the moments
when those who were racially marked refused – or simply ignored – the
appellation assigned to them, when the rubrics of racial bifurcation failed to 
work, albeit momentarily (cf. Stoler 2010). I think of these ‘out of place
bodies’ and their ‘grammar’ as analytical spaces through which we can read
colonial territory at the intersection of the corporeal, political and spatial,
with the ambition to make visible the political work performed by these 
bodies: how their movement engendered administrative anxiety and
ultimately became critical sites around which race, gender and territory were 
constructed and contested in intimate relation to each other. In short, placing 
the body at the center of analysis draws attention to what Sundberg (2008:
876) calls the ‘intimate frontiers of geopolitics’ where ‘embodiment renders
visible things that would otherwise remain hidden about the everyday, 
material practice of geopower’. In following this analytic path, I claim, we
are better able to understand the localized effects – their achievements,
failures and limits – of colonial spatial rule, but also how the traces of past
struggles still linger in the present.
The term ‘out of place bodies’ is a rendition of Douglas’s (1966) notion
of ‘dirt’ as ‘matter out of place’, signaling a ‘by-product of a systematic
ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting
inappropriate elements’ (35). ‘Out of place bodies’ unsettle order. Yet they
are not merely passive sites of inscription; they are lived and ‘encultured’
through material interactions with the world, and when they move, they carry
with them the ability to rework the spaces they occupy. Here, I draw insights
from a wider body of feminist and postcolonial theory that explores how
bodies are places where discourse and power relations are simultaneously
mapped, embodied and resisted (Grosz 1993; Nightingale 2011; Valdivia
2009; Longhurst 1997; Gatens 1996; Butler 1993; McClintock 1995). The
unruliness of bodies, I contend, is something we need to probe more carefully
in order to understand how the colonized body was not only subjected to
cultural spatial politics, ‘walled in’ as Franz Fanon (1967[1952]: 117) put it,
but also how the colonized redeployed their bodies to challenge the social
truths and legal decrees that secured racial segregation. This, I propose, has
not been adequately drawn out in the geography of settler colonialism, which 
tends to privilege analyses of population and its disposition in geographical
space rather than of the body and its being in the world. Put somewhat




     
   
   
  









   
      
           
   
 





   
  
   
   
      
    
          
  
 
     
    
bodies but also through bodies, and how bodily movement and comportment
emerged as critical sites for political contestation over social difference and
belonging to place. As such, it is not a question of bodies – raced, gendered
– being ‘territorialized’, but rather a question of how race and gender
emerged through various attempts to make space and population governable.
Out of my analysis comes a conception of territory that is not simply bodily
experienced; instead, territory emerges as an extension of and extend onto 
the body as a site of subjugation, negotiation, invention and resistance.
This chapter probes, first, the political landscape into which the British 
South African Company (BSAC) entered in order to understand how the 
African body was tangled up in colonial administration. Subsequently, I
explore three governable spaces bordered by colonial power: the ‘proper
village’, the ‘tribal homeland’ and the ‘colonial township’. I will show how
the construction of each of these spaces (territories) was contingent upon the
making of African bodies as objects and subjects of colonial imaginary,
effectively becoming public sites on which the construction and contestation 
of the colonial state and its boundaries took place. By ‘reading’ these spaces
through the body, I show that administrative efforts to control ‘out of place’
bodies were not merely ‘extra-ordinary’ work, undeserving of scholarly
attention, but central to the making of race, gender and territory; at the same
time that bringing ‘out of place’ bodies ‘into place’ was paramount for main-
taining the imperial body politic, colonial conceptions of race, gender and
territory were repeatedly challenged by the recalcitrance of the very bodies that
the colonial regime defined. I attempt, in short, to unsettle the colonial state’s
boundaries, to scratch on the surface of their ‘hard’ crust, tracing out the
interstices that make visible colonial space as insecure and unstable.
5.2 The bodily performance of chiefly territory
To understand how the African body was tangled up in colonial
administration, we have to first understand the territorial configuration of
pre-colonial Zambia. Here, food production was the predominant aspect of
social life, with its activities – cultivation in particular – bound up in material
and symbolic practices of territorialization. Most people practiced citemene, 
a form of swidden agriculture whereby fields are prepared by cutting and
burning trees and branches so as to create a nurturing bed of ashes (Moore 
and Vaughan 1994; Richards 1995[1939]). The word citemene is derived 
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from the Bemba word kutema, meaning ‘to cut down trees’, which is the first
stage in citemene cultivation. The first tree to be cut is the umufungo. The
chopping of this tree is done with a blessed ax, invoking and acknowledging
the succor of ancestral spirits, a ritual called ‘to return thanks for the food’
(ukulubulo lupe) (Rasing 2001: 70). After cutting, branches are collected,
piled in a circular formation and left to dry, a practice known as kuanse
fibula. Traditionally, it is the chief who decides on the date of firing, or kuoce
fibula, which marks the beginning of the agricultural year. The term
icitemene denotes a new millet plot during preparation. When the field has
been sown, it is known as an ubukula, and in its further years of life, it is
called an icifwani until it reverts back to mpanga, or bush (field notes).
A citemene field has a lifetime of about five years, after which it is 
abandoned and only revisited once the vegetation has recovered and new
brushwood can be cut and burnt (Kakeya and Sugiyama 1985). Due to this
system, people were grouped in ambulatory hamlets, or mushi, which 
shifted between sites of citemene cultivation. In oral history, land which has
not been cultivated by citemene is often referred to as a place ‘not burnt’ or
‘untouched by fire’, denoting a place not only far from human habitation,
but, as Gould (2010: 117) puts it, ‘magically invisible to human
imagination’. I have spent considerable time mapping out these practices in
oral history. Chief Liteta IV of Lenje Chiefdom explained to me that it is to
such places that cibanda (wicked spirits) are expelled, and can later be
awakened if you are unfortunate enough to plow a field where these spirits
dwell, which may then manifest in a bad harvest, sickness or even death
(interview, Chief Liteta IV). This ontology is captured in the work of
Binsbergen (1981: 109), who notes that ‘everywhere places remain which
have not been subjected to man’s ecological transformation or which, once
used, have been abandoned again … [These places are] of great
significance; they tend to represent hidden forces on which man draws for 
his survival but which, on the other hand, are only too prone to hurt him.’
This spatial symbolism is key for our understanding of the formation of
chiefly territory; the forces resting in unbroken lands were not only cultural
constructs but were also bound up in a wider system of chiefly governance.
For example, the perils associated with tilling unbroken land could be
averted by a spiritual leader (chinganga) or a chief with spiritual powers
who, as people moved onto unknown lands, first ‘cleansed the land’ and
thereafter emplaced the ancestral (matrilineal) spirit of the chief in the land
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so as to ‘fertilize the soil’ (interview, Chief Liteta IV). It was through such
ritual practices, rather than through legalistic procedures, that chiefs
controlled land (see Binsbergen 1981). One of Chief Liteta IV’s advisors
explained it thus: spiritual fertilization served to establish a governing
relation between chief, land and subject through the practices of cultivation, 
so that as new land was cut and burnt, it was incorporated into a relational
chiefly territory, with its boundaries being continually redrawn as people
moved between sites of citemene cultivation (interview, chief’s advisor).
Chiefly authority was, in other words, carried across geographical space by 
bodies and territorialized by toil, producing social, political and spiritual 
territory (for similar observations, see Moore and Vaughan 1994; Ranger
1971; Herbts 2000). In other words, chiefly territory was not a bounded space
within which people resided; rather, it emerged out of social relations and
practices on the land, performed by moving and laboring bodies. As such,
the spatiality of chiefly power was forever fractional, always in the making
and in some cases eroded to the point of irrelevance, thus giving way to new
political-territorial formations (see Crehan 1997a; Roberts 1976; Chanock
1985; Meebelo 1971).
These lands were reached by commissioners of the British South Africa
Company (BSAC) in the late 19th century. Sanctioned to enter into 
‘agreements’ with ‘tribal chiefs’, these commissioners effectively traded
promises of prosperity for exclusive rights to land and precious stone. The
land mass vested in the BSAC gradually grew, until the whole area of what
became Northern Rhodesia was placed under BSAC administration in 1899.
I will not reiterate the history of BSAC expansion here (but see Caplan 1970;
Galbraith 1974); rather, what I want to draw attention to is that the encounter
between BSAC and chiefly authority marked a point of contact between two
conflicting conceptions of political territory. For the BSAC, control over
laboring bodies was assumed to follow from control over the land these
bodies inhibited. To dwell in the territory was to submit to colonial authority;
once the colonial state was instituted, consent consisted in residence
(Galbraith 1974: 220; for a genealogical exposition of territory, see Elden 
2013). This rendered the body politically passive, inhabiting a geography 
written into possession of a sovereign authority. Control over material space
was, in other words, assumed to extend also to the bodies that occupied it,
with political territory both preceding and prescribing the movement and
actions of bodies. For chiefs, as laid out above, this governing relationship 
94
 
   
  
    
 





    
     
 
  
       
       
 
  




       
 
    
       
   
   
 
  
     
   
  
   
    
   
was reversed; land was not something that could be proprietarily ‘held’;
rather, control over material space was an effect of the chiefs’ abilities to
govern the bodies inhabiting and moving across it (see Meebelo 1971). In
this political arrangement, the body is politically active, with its material
practices on the land (citemene in particular) reproducing relations of
authority, thereby rendering space political.
From an administrative view, then, the African body was an impediment
to centralized control. As the BSAC established its control over these lands,
the frequent and unpredictable movement of the African population resulted
in administrative confusion. This is most evident in early attempts at
taxation, as moving bodies undermined the collection of hut tax (introduced
in 1901), which relied on a known and spatially located population. As
expressed by one BSAC officer: ‘The chiefs … have almost no control
whatever over their people. This renders administration difficult for the
official who is compelled to deal with the individual instead of the tribe’
(BS3 A 2/1/14, Memo from the Secretary of Native Affairs, Aug. 1910). The 
African body, thus, needed to be folded into a spatial organization of rule. It
is against this background that I set out to explore how the African body was
tangled up in colonial administration. My ambition is to map out how
colonial constructs of bounded space (territory) rewrote relations between
bodies and environments, and how African bodies transgressing these
boundaries enacted Other realities, and so become pivots for racial and 
gendered discourse.
5.3 The ‘proper village’ and its antithetical outside
The BSAC administration was quick to ascribe the frequent movement of the
African population to the citemene system. Thus in 1906, in an effort to 
recode chiefly territory and fix African bodies in space, citemene was banned
and people forcibly rounded up into what were called ‘proper villages’,
defined as twenty huts or more, wherein the payment of colonial taxes could
be more easily enforced (see Moore and Vaughan 1994: 13). The ‘proper
village’ is best described as a material-discursive construct. The English
word ‘village’ was an approximation of the Bemba term ‘mushi’, but their
meanings diverged in important ways: while ‘village’ denoted place and
fixity, ‘mushi’ signaled a translocal and ambulatory kinship group with its
boundedness independent of any particular spatial location. While the
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‘mushi’ was in movement, the ‘village’ was considered an administrative
unit that remains in place.2 
In early Northern Rhodesia, the very category of the domiciled ‘villager’
was, in this sense, a construct that discursively pinned bodies to a particular
place, presuming that a ‘villager’ inhabits a ‘village’ which by definition is
spatially fixed. In the village, then, villagers were allotted enclosed fields in
the immediate vicinity of their dwellings, affixing land rights to a precise site,
and were instructed to build houses that were square instead of round. This
architectural reordering wrote new sexual and symbolic divisions of labor into
material space at the household scale. Above all, it shifted the location of the 
hearth – the central point of the hamlet – from the main house to a marginal
outbuilding (BS1 A 9/6/3 Report on housing, Oct. 1906). As the hearth was a
symbolic site – a ‘domestic shrine’ (Rasing 2001) – through which women
exercised authority over social life, the repositioning of the hearth bodily and 
symbolically displaced women from the locus of mushi politics, and placed
them more firmly in marginal kitchens void of political import.
In an administrative optic, villagization brought people ‘into place’ and 
into more legible relations of power and production. The historical literature
is relatively consistent in that most chiefs encouraged more permanent
settlement, in part because they were promised a share of the taxes in return
for their political support and in part because it consolidated their realms (see 
e.g. Meebelo 1971; Roberts 1976), producing both emergent alliances and
tensions. Colonial boundaries are not simply lines of demarcation, they are
the subject of social struggle and of negotiation in ways that pose challenges 
for the powers that maintain them (Paasi 1996). The archive tells of
administrative problems with ‘natives wandering off’ to settle in the forests
beyond the village boundaries where the rugged terrain provided ample
opportunity for covert citemene cultivation (e.g. BS1 C 3/3/3 TR, Kempe, 
Aug. 1908), as well as spaces for resistance and rebellion (loc. cit. West
Awemba Division Report, Sept. 1909). The situation evolved into what
Moore and Vaughan (1994: 11) describe as a ‘guerilla war between
cultivators and administrators’, with cultivators resisting attempts at
sedentarization and administrators burning fields and farmsteads discovered 
outside their grid of intelligibility. What I want to draw attention to here,
2 Traces of the discrepancy between ‘village’ and ‘mushi’ can be seen in today’s Zambia, where a ‘mushi’ 
can dissolve whereas ‘the village’ in which that mushi has homed can remain ‘in place’.
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then, is that these conflicts drew bodies, material space and symbolic
practices into racial regimes of knowledge and social struggle.
In particular, the now ‘illegal’ citemene fields often lay at a great distance 
from the ‘proper village’ in which people were registered. On these distant
fields, people built seasonal dwellings, or mitanda, which allowed entire
families to reside on the citemene site during clearing, seeding and cropping. 
For BSAC administrators, it thus became impossible to know where people
resided; people might be registered in certain villages but for part of the year
lodged in the forest. Mitanda came to represent uncontrollability, a place
located outside modern time and space. As one officer commented:
In the Mitanda are collected the mass of malcontents who have renounced the
authority of the Boma [colonial district office]. Here the fungoid growths of
superstition flourish unchecked … the mitanda are the chosen haunts of the
prisoner, the outcast and the adulterer. (loc. cit. West Awemba Division
Report, Sept. 1909)
Here we see clearly how material place and cultural images of backwardness 
were yoked together. The Mitanda emerged as a site ‘out of place’ and was 
enrolled in colonial administration as such: in 1909 the BSAC set out to 
modify the citemene ban to bring these spaces into administrative view.
Citemene was once again allowed, but was confined to the environs of a
‘proper village’, and the construction of any mitanda was prohibited. Instead,
people were allowed to build sakwe, a temporary shelter in which the male
head of household was allowed to stay, but not his wife or children, at the
time of cutting, gathering of branches and burning. Messengers (kapaso) 
were instructed to investigate the men working in the citemene fields. If a 
messenger found a man accompanied by a woman in the sakwe, he was to 
be arrested and fined (KSD 4/1, Vol. 2: Indaba at Chilonga, Feb. 1909).
Again, village boundaries were mapped onto bodily relations; not only did 
the new regulation entrench the sexual division of citemene labor, pinning
women to village farmsteads, but the administration entered the symbolically
charged area of sexual relations. Above all, it prevented men and women
from sleeping together in the mitanda. For the farming population, sex, soil
and the social body were intimately entangled in both symbol and substance,
with the mitanda figuring as a symbolic site for social reproduction, drawing






   
     
 
    
   
  
  





   
       
        
  
 
   
  
   
  
  
   
   
     
    
 
    
  
  
   
  
  
The bush refers to the fertile powers needed for food production and the well-
being of the people. The sexual act may result in the procreation of humanity 
and symbolizes the procreation of the soil and if it is performed in the mitanda
in the bush, it was thought to be a powerful act for the well-being of the people
and the land.
This symbolism echoes in today’s Zambia. In Lenje Chiefdom, a mitanda (or
sakwe – a temporary shelter) is often built in the bush for the purpose of a
girl’s initiation rite. In the house, the girl is made to lie down on a bed of
maize or millet, linking the fertility of the soil to that of a woman’s womb
(field notes). In this way, social reproduction and cultivation are intimately 
bound up in each other, with bodily encounters in the mitanda endowing
space with social meaning.
My point here, then, is that in BSAC-controlled Zambia, both race and 
gender would emerge out of these practices on the land and would take on 
qualities as boundary markers. This becomes evident when reading these 
struggles through the archive, where ‘out of place bodies’ became places on
which symbolic and corporeal ideas of difference were mapped and 
inscribed. For example, one officer proposed that an ‘inherent restlessness’
prohibited ‘natives’ from ‘staying in one place’ (BS1 B 5/8/3 TR Ndola, Feb.
1908). At the mitanda, another officer wrote, the ‘native mind’ is ‘clouded 
in the smoke of the burning bush’, making him ‘superstitious’ and ‘utterly
unmanageable’ (BS3 A 2/6/9 TR, Kaoma, June 1909). Increasingly, prac-
tices of cutting and burning became symbols of a ‘primitive native’ that,
rather than farming enclosed fields, ‘ravages the forests’ where ‘his already
dark skin’ turns ‘almost grey in the ashes’ and takes on ‘ghost-like features’
(BS1 A 7/7/9 Letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Aug. 1910). 
Territorialization worked through the African body which was rendered 
different in form and phenotype by repeated citations of Other ways of being
in and interacting with material space. For the BSAC, the forest became the
antithetical outside of the village – an ‘anti-territory’ – where race was 
assembled both discursively and materially, bound up in spatial and symbolic
practices and written onto bodies and landscapes.
It might be tempting to read these as discursive or epistemic inscriptions.
Yet as feminist theory shows, what certain bodies come to mean or
symbolize is inextricably bound up in the environment within which they
move and come into view (Gatens 1996), requiring equal emphasis on social




         
  
            
         
 





    
   
          
  
   
   
   
  
   
    
  
   




      
  
 
    
 
          
  
  
   
and Mollet 2018; Longhurst 1997, 2003; Moore et al. 2003). Constructs of
cultural difference are not only bound up in the environment in a symbolic
sense, but also in a firmly material sense. Several BSAC officers explained
the difficulty in getting people to stay in designated villages with reference
to the ‘male native’ who had an ‘urge to cut tress’, and it was said to be in
‘his nature’ to ‘swing the axe’ (e.g. BS1 A 7/7/12 Letter to the Secretary of
Native Affairs, Aug. 1910). Historians concur that citemene was gendered in
particular ways. Kutema (to cut down trees) was done mostly by men, while 
kuanse fibula (to collect and pile branches) was done mostly by women
(Rasing 2001), and it might be true that the citemene fields cut out of the
forests were an important symbol of male autonomy, as Richards
(1995[1939]) maintained. Yet, as skillfully argued by Moore and Vaughan 
(1994), it was only after citemene was banned that being a man became 
intertwined with the right to cut tress. As such, citemene acquired new and
powerful symbolic and political meanings in a contested colonized context, 
so that masculinity was re-inscribed amid struggles over land and symbolic 
control over territory (for similar insights in other contexts, see Nightingale
2011). In this sense, the regulation of cultivation and settlement was not only
a form of spatial fix, but also a reconfiguration of the performance registers
of masculinity; cutting trees was now re-expressed as a material exercise of
rights to land and forest. Through the analytical lens of the body, it becomes
quite apparent that while the ‘guerilla war’ between administrators and
cultivators was territorial, it was not fought ‘over’ territory, but through its
very fabrication; while administrators struggled to enforce permanent
settlements, citemene and mitanda reproduced geographies of resistance.
Indeed, colonial concep-tions of race, gender and territory (village) were
repeatedly challenged by the movement, practices and recalcitrance of the
very bodies that they defined.
The ‘proper village’ never materialized as envisioned by the BSAC.
Administrators were too few to enforce the new regulations, and messengers
and tax collectors were repeatedly beaten when policing the forests (Meebelo
1971). In a way, the most significant product of villagization was not the
villager but the ‘non-villager’, the ungovernable native, discovered through 
attempts at territorialization. Using bodies to think with reveals the friction
of these boundaries and their intimate places of contestation: the village, the 
hamlet, the forest mitanda, the citemene field. It was here that (some of) the 









   
    
 
    
    
  
 
   
      
   
   
  
   
     
     
  
     
  
  
   
           
  
        
   
 
   
    
   
territorial struggles played out in early colonial Zambia. Attending to the
ways symbols and material environments become entangled collapses the 
distinction between intimate and political space, thus pushing forward an 
understanding of how bodies become enrolled in territorializing practices
(e.g. masculinity becoming a function of territoriality). It also troubles tales
of BSAC territorialization as a hegemonic project, showing instead how the
social truths and legal decrees deployed to secure boundaries (racial and
gendered imaginaries, bodily restrictions) also contain the seeds of their
failure to determine what bodies ought to belong and where.
5.4 The tribal homeland and its bodily scripts
In this section I wish to push these insights a little further through an
examination of the tribal homeland, established in the mid-1920s in an effort
to create more conducive conditions for the in-migration of white settlers.
Lands needed to be free of African occupancy and more rigidly bordered to
enable control of the unpredictable movement of the native population. This
process is well-rehearsed in Africanist and historical literatures, which point
to the ways administrators and anthropologists chronicled each chief’s
history, installed origin stories and established ethnic boundaries through 
tribal totems and subclan praise names, casting assumed inherent tribal traits
as a ceremonial recognition by the colonial administration of immemorial
principles, thereby imbuing the tribal homeland with territorial authenticity
(see e.g. Chanock 1985; Sorrenson 1967: Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983;
Gould 1995, 1997; Crehan 1997a; Mamdani 1996; Moore 2005). What I
want to draw attention to here, instead, is how – through the production and 
protection of the tribal homeland – the colonized body was not only depicted
as Other and pinned to place, it was rendered tantamount to place, collapsed
into it – making it all the more difficult to move beyond the organizing
principles of race. Yet it was never a certain achievement, but always open
to unruly lands and to bodies that moved across its boundaries.
The tribal homeland was patrolled by colonial officers, as well as
anthropologists, for whom the native body became something that could be
studied in efforts to understand the traits of the tribe as a whole (see Pels 
1997). This is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the village-to-village
tour reports that colonial officers were tasked with writing. For example, one






   
   
    
 
  
   
   
     
  
   
  
     
    
 
 
       
    
  
     
  
    
         
    
      
  
        
 
 
     
                                                     
   
     
    
       
     
  
‘unmanly’, not one ‘free from some deformity’. This was, he continued,
because the ‘tribe preferred to remain under nourished and diseased rather
than expend a little more energy in cultivation and adopt new practices’
(ZNA, sec, 2/936, Kasempa Tour Reports, Tour Report no. 2, 1927). Reports
like this abound, and they all describe an African body that is reduced to a
mere vector for backwardness; what is being mapped and narrated in these
reports, then, are people’s bodies as carriers of racial distinction, with
poverty and social distress figuring as biological flaws (cf. McClintock 1995:
48). Colonial administrators rarely spoke of the fact that it was the relocation
of the African population that produced bodies as different. It has been left
to historians to show that much of the ‘tribal land’ was unsuitable for
cultivation, and that cultivating the generally poor soils depended on frequent
movement from one patch of land to another to allow soil and brushwood to 
recover. And the construction of tribal homelands meant that such movement
became severely restricted, and neither soil nor trees were given enough time 
to regenerate (Roberts 1976: 183–185). Projects of government literally
eroded the conditions of possibility for material survival. Thus, what was
inscribed onto people’s bodies were the effects of poor material-ecological
conditions (disease, dirtiness, malnutrition), which colonial officers then
translated into markers of social difference (idleness, backwardness,
unmanliness). As such, tribal natives not only came to wear social difference
on the body, they became bodies.3 In these ways, the African body was
implicated in the production of the tribal territory as pre-modern space
populated by natives bound to the instincts, rhythms and desires of their
fleshy, located bodies. Put differently, embodied ideas of difference were not
discursive products simply mapped onto the landscape, but were folded into
the fabric of a territory that was at once ethological and political.
In an administrative optic, tribal boundaries followed a natural order, and 
a significant amount of political work went into maintaining this order. At the
same time, the relocation of the African population onto Native Reserves
engendered new concerns for the colonial administration. Especially, as the 
new wave of expected white settlers never came, much of the Crown Land set
3 Of course, administrators also ‘had bodies’ but the difference lies in in that administrators could speak
and pursue universal knowledge, unencumbered by the limitations of a body placed in a particular time
and space (see Longhurst 1997; Rose 1993; Grosz 1993; Kirby 1992) ‘The knowing subject who produces
knowledge’ Grosz (1993: 19) writes’, has been ‘bracketed off from the knowledges thus produced’. White
bodies need an Other upon which to found their (insecure) identity (see Gatens 1996; Rose 1993). For the





    
    
   
 
           
   
  
       
  
   
   
       
     
    
   
   
   
  
     
  
    
   
        
 




   
     
    
 
   
  
aside for Europeans remained mostly uninhabited. Thus, despite the fact that
movement between the two domains was regulated, many Africans entered
unoccupied Crown Land – especially in the railway farming belt where
rugged and forested terrains provided for covert cultivation – and created
autonomous enclaves thereon (SEC2/1185: Natives on private estates, May
1932). Tour reports started to arrive, describing people organizing themselves
into ‘new tribes’ under ‘new chiefs’ outside grids of colonial control (ZNA,
sec, 4/651, Lenje Tour Reports, Tour Report no. 1, 1931). For the colonial
administration, these ‘out of place’ Africans were seen as a significant threat
to orderly rule as they challenged the reciprocal exclusivity of Native Reserve
and Crown Land, and therefore the racial basis upon which their
differentiation rested. Of particular concern was what administrators labeled
‘detribalization’, as a ‘detribalized native’ in the context of indirect rule would
literally be an ‘ungovernable native’ (Moore and Vaughan 1994: 140; Crehan 
1997a: 73). This was discussed in some detail during the Governors’
Conference in Livingstone in 1933, where it was concluded that ‘natives 
occupying Crown Land are beyond the control of their tribal chief … The
dignity of the chief is affected … conditions are not conducive to good order
or the maintenance of tribal authority’ (SEC2/1168: Governors’ Conference, 
June 1933). Thus the limits of tribal rule lay not in discourse or territorial
imaginaries, but in the more ‘intimate frontiers of geopolitics’, in the
contingencies of bodily movement and encounter.
Thandiwe, whose story began this chapter, was one of those who left her
proper place and upset the established order. On the one hand, her violent
confrontation with the taxmen speaks to how tribal rule was upheld though 
a topography of power operating on racialized bodies, and thus to the
impossibility of moving outside the vision of ‘white eyes’ (Fanon
1967[1952]: 116). Indeed, the color of her skin became an important resource
with which the colonial regime re-expressed spatial categories of belonging. 
As such, tribal territory was never more actualized than when one tried to
leave it; it was the moment of ‘exit’ which made the disciplinary boundaries 
of the tribal homeland visible as bodily script. On the other hand, despite
leaving Thandiwe with an open wound, the tax collectors were unsuccessful
in editing out the conception of the forest as space that she had rights to. The
chicken ‘going in two pieces’ metaphorically speaks of a partial territorial
achievement, and she had quite literally ‘stood her ground’, and used her






   
      
       
     








   
 
 
        
 
  
      
      
 
        
             
         
  
     
     
    
    
      
       
              
           
    
                                                     
    
they saw suffering’, Thandiwe told me. In postmodernist thought, bodies are
sometimes depicted as though they were little more than surfaces etched with
discourse and social messages, a ‘linguistic territory’ (Longhurst 2001: 23). 
Yet Thandiwe’s story points to the limits of such an understanding. 
Thandiwe occupied a site of sovereign betweenness that disturbed identity,
system and order by not respecting borders, positions and rules. Her bleeding
marked an unpredictable interstice in the boundary between her body and the
world, and in its seepage lay the danger of contaminating the space of
encounter with emotion and abjection (see Longhurst 2001), which 
Thandiwe interpreted as making the taxmen ‘scared’, resulting in the men
fleeing the scene. Thandiwe spoke of it with pride and joy: ‘I chased them’, 
she laughed during one of our conversations.4 
Text box 1: Franz Fanon and the body
Franz Fanon is perhaps the most evocative theorist of the colonized body. For him, social
difference was not only mapped onto the bodies of others, but was embodied by the colonial
subject, which made it all the more difficult to escape bodily confinement and the racialized
relation between body and the world (see Gibson, 2003: 133). The colonist, Fanon writes, ‘is not
content with physically limiting the space of the colonized’, as if to ‘illustrate the totalitarian nature
of colonial exploitation, the colonist turns the colonized into a kind of quintessence of evil’ (Ibid:
6), that is, the embodied Other. White and black are separated spatially, geopolitically; but
conceptually, their common reliance on racialization ensures that they are (hierarchically) bound
to each other so tightly that each is unthinkable without the other. White bodies need an Other
upon which to found their (insecure) identity (see also Gatens 1996; Rose 1993). Along these 
lines, Fanon describes forms of everyday separation as ways of being immobilized, of being
‘walled in’ (Fanon, 1967[1952]: 117). Through racialization, he writes, ‘the white man is sealed
in his whiteness and the black man in his blackness’ (Ibid: 9). Kipfer (2007: 708) observes that
the metaphor of sealing alludes to ‘spatial relationships that, through body language, gestures,
looks, and physical distance, separate colonizer and colonized’. Fanon writes:
I am the slave not of ‘the idea’ that others have of me but of my appearance … I am
being dissected under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am fixed … I slip into corners,
and my long antennae pick up the catch-phrases strewn over the surface of things –
nigger underwear smells of nigger – nigger teeth are white – nigger feet are big – the 
nigger’s barrel chest – I slip into corners, I strive for anonymity, for invisibility. Look, I will
accept the lot, as long as no one notices me! (Fanon 1967[1952]: 116)
From Fanon’s phenomenology of racism a colonial order thus emerges at the intersection of
space, race, body and Self, and the spatial grids of colonial rule are seen operating not on a
population and its disposition in geographical space, but on the body and its being in the world.
4 To ’chase’ someone denotes, in Zambian lingo, to ‘evict’ or ‘displace’.
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My intention here is not to take Thandiwe’s experience as a springboard to
theoretical assertions; rather, encounters such as Thandiwe’s tell of the
everyday boundary-work involved in protecting the system of tribal rule, 
forcing us to remain alert to the conditions and interactions through which
bodies become subjected to systems of knowledge, entangled with the
material landscape and its physical properties, and how bodies both embody 
territory and carry its symbolic boundaries across geographical space.
Indeed, racial imageries carry with them – sometimes on the body corporal
– a material and symbolic weight that reproduces racial hierarchies even
when people struggle to move out of them. Yet bodily movement also draws
alternative lines that extend beyond the corporeal and into administrative
regimes, and thus become part of geographies and histories of resistance.
The ‘pollution’ (Douglas 1966) of Crown Land by African bodies
continued to haunt the administration throughout the 1930s. As one officer
commented, ‘natives’ bring with them ‘spears, guns & dogs’ which is
‘appalling’; the ‘invasion of natives [into Cown Land] means serious 
trouble’ (LOC 216: Letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Sept. 1931).
Yet administers were too few to enforce spatial segregation, thus the
protection of tribal territory remained contingent upon the reification of the
chief as an authentic African authority, meant to embody the spirit of the
tribe. Put somewhat differently, indirect rule was contingent upon the
recognition of chiefly authority; if the authority of chiefs diminished, the
colonial state as a whole would be undermined. Chiefs needed to be ‘men 
of authority vested with powers not possessed by common people’ (cited 
in Negi 2011: 214). The administrative concern revolves around the belief
that the authority of the chiefs was eroding, allowing Africans to simply
leave their designated lot by foot to break new land elsewhere (SEC2/1168:
Governors’ Conference, June 1933). It was around this time that the chief
reemerged as a site of politics. Interestingly, the political work deployed to 
entrench the chief as a legitimate authority worked not (only) through 
abstract law, but through the materiality of his body.
Prior to the 1930s, the absence of spatially bounded chiefly power meant
a corresponding lack of importance of material markers of majesty and of
imposing physical space in which power and authority took physical form
(Crehan 1997a: 48). The continued movement of the African population
resulted in a reorganization. Chiefs were classified into Paramount Chiefs,





      
 





   
        
    
   
 










    
    
    
   
 
      
   
  
  
   
  
Subordinate Chiefs, ruling over ‘less important tribes’. They were given 
annual subsidies and clothed in emblems of authority: a Paramount Chief
was given a red fez with a brass or chromium plate replica of the territorial
crest on the front, a cloak, a coat, a collar and a stave (CNP 2/11/2: Official
dress for Chiefs, Dec. 1933), making colonial authority manifest on their
bodies. If a chief was found violating his mandate, he was stripped (quite
literally) of his chiefly apparel. The archive tells of chiefs clamoring for these
artifacts (CNP 3/11/3: Letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Dec. 1933) 
as well as chiefs refusing to wear them. One such moment occurred when
Chief Kapwepwe arrived for a meeting at the local boma (district
government office) in Nshiki District without his chiefly attire. The incident
resulted in an officer writing a letter to the Ministry of Native Affairs, 
describing how the chief was ‘stubborn’ and ‘un-cooperative’. The officer
demanded further that the ministry should explore the ‘grounds for [the
chief’s] decommission’ if he continued in his ‘refusal to represent the tribe’
by not wearing the ‘official dress given to him’ (CNP 1/5/2: Letter to the 
Secretary of Native Affairs, Feb. 1934). In these ways, symbolic ideas of
difference, of boundaries between colonial state and colonial subject, were
reproduced and expressed through bodily interactions that were firmly
corporeal yet extended into social spaces of everyday life. Chiefs’ bodies
became interfaces between space and politics, public sites on which the
construction of the colonial state and its tribal boundaries took place.
Once we rescale our analysis of the tribal homeland onto the body 
corporeal, we can begin to discern how its boundaries were not rigid, stable
and imposed from above, but required constant policing, patrolling and 
redrawing in spaces of everyday life. The body acts, in this regard, as a 
methodology by summoning up a theoretical imperative to make visible the
micropolitics of tribal rule, its banality, if you will. Yet it also expands
beyond the body into material space, into the colonial administration for
which unruly bodies disturb the order of things. In the movement of bodies, 
we can thus locate disorder, ‘matter out of place’ – a ‘by-product of a
systematic ordering and classification of matter’ (Douglas 1966: 35) – that
undermined colonial visions of the tribal homeland: the cultural and spatial
separation of some bodies from others. Tribal territory worked through the
mapping of tribal bodies as dirty, diseased and unmanly and through the
bodies of the chiefs by making them distinct from their social surround; but
its boundaries were repeatedly challenged by the insubordination of the very 
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bodies they defined. Bodies were both the ‘script’ of oppression and the
means of resistance.
Thus far I have charted out how a reading of the ‘proper village’ and the 
‘tribal homeland’ through the body can taint narratives of colonial space as
bordered by sovereign power. Instead, I have laid bare the intimate sites
where the colonial boundaries were open for struggle and political
contestation. I now turn to an examination of ‘township’ to link up both 
village and tribal homeland to a wider discussion of the colonial state and its
boundaries. In particular, I will show how the male migration into towns
redrew village boundaries around constructs of gender and linked up the
control of bodily movement and sexuality (one’s relation to one’s body and 
the bodies of others) to an administrative anxiety over the health and wealth
of the imperial body politic.
5.5 The township and its gendered frontiers
Both the ‘proper village’ and the tribal homeland were founded upon a
sedentarist cultural politics that fixed bodies in space. Yet the introduction
of hut tax (followed by a dog tax, radio tax and wheel tax – the latter
evidently introduced to stall independent spatial movement) and the
subsequent eviction of Africans from the most fertile lands deterritorialized
farmers from subsistence farming and produced a ready supply of wage labor
(Roberts 1976). As envisioned, many men sought employment in the mines
or on the plantations along the line of rail (Meebelo 1971). Yet, not all bodies
were eligible for work in town. Arrival in mining towns was followed by a
health examination that determined bodily abilities, and if rendered bodily
unfit, the aspiring worker had to leave town (SEC 2/786 Kasama: TR Nov. 
1936).5 In town, then, bodies were separated according to their different
qualities, with tribal particularization leading to conceptions of different
bodies being suitable for different work, such as the Lovale people on the
5 An example of this appears in a tour report from 1936, which tells the story of a man who struggled to
raise money for the hut tax. In an effort to gain a monetary income, he walked to Ndola to apply for wage
work in the mines. When finally reaching Ndola, he failed the medical examination and was turned down.
While in Ndola, however, he was given a pair of trousers, which he brought back to Northern Province
and sold for 3/6d. He took the money he raised to Laupula Province and used it to buy salt, which he then
sold along the Laupula River, raising 6/-. After borrowing 1/6d, he was finally able to pay his tax. In total, 
it had taken him over six months (SEC 2/786 Kasama: TR Nov. 1936). As this report shows, the
introduction of tax stimulated new, sometimes quite peculiar, patterns of movement and interaction




     
 
 
    
   
      
  




     
 
   
 
      
  
  
    
  
    
        
    
  
       
  




    
                                                     
    
   
Copperbelt being considered ‘unclean’ and therefore suitable as night-soil 
removers (Siegel 1988; Negi 2013). What distinguished the township the
most, however, was that it was a male space, with women tied to a rural
economy as symbols of social reproduction and rural domesticity (Parpart
1986). While men ventured into a ‘modern’ urban space, women were
charged with the duty to uphold ‘tradition’ in the villages. At the same time, 
however, men’s presence in town was dangerous; while indispensable for
their labor power and labor time, townsmen posed a threat to the stability of
the boundaries between the modern and traditional. This danger permeates
colonial reports from the 1920s onwards. The anxiety revolved around the
question of social disintegration, seen as an inevitable result of the impact of
urbanization and modernity on a ‘traditional’ way of life. As noted by one
colonial officer in his memoir In Witch-Bound Africa:
The miscalled ‘mission boy’, the worker on the mines and on farms, the house
boy (all equally anathema to the chiefs and headmen), pick up bits of
knowledge, lose their old habits and religious checks and become a
disintegrating, destructive element. (Melland 1923: 305)
As Gould (1997: 156) notes: ‘the sudden and massive incidence of migratory
labor to towns … was seen as having split apart primordial domestic units 
and communities, casting large sections of the population into situations for
which they had no moral guidelines’ (see also Mayer 1961; Onselen 1978;
Ferguson 1999: 87–90). The African townsman might be urbanized in terms 
of inhabiting an urban space, it was reasoned, but not in terms of having
abandoned his ‘tribal’ identity.6 These accounts mirror, of course, the
conception of the tribal homeland as an authentic native space, legitimizing
the notion that townsmen were simply expected to ‘go home’, to be
reintegrated or reterritorialized into their ‘tribal’ environment after
retirement or termination of contract.
What I want to draw attention to here, then, is that the ‘integrity’ of the
colonial township was contingent upon controlling bodies, and bodies of
women in particular. In 1935 several chieftainships introduced laws that
permitted a woman to divorce her husband if he had been absent for more
than thirty months (Moore and Vaughan 1994: 166). These laws were
6 For a much more detailed analysis of migration dynamics in colonial Zambia, see the Ferguson-








   
  




    
       
 
   
  
  







       
   
 
   
   
     
    
  
evidently intended to encourage men to return ‘home’ quickly to prevent
their wives from divorcing them. However, these laws proved to be
ineffective, in part because many women chose to migrate to town of their
own accord. Married women were allowed to stay in town, but only as
dependents, feeding and caring for their working husbands (Parpart 1986);
but soon reports emerged around a problem known as ‘unattached women’,
sometimes divorced, sometimes unmarried, but always ‘unattached’ (Moore
and Vaughan 1994: 165). For example, a colonial officer touring Central
Province reported the following:
… a large number of unmarried women appear to have gone to Broken Hill
[now Kabwe] and Ndola of their own accord … gone to find husbands. This
indiscriminate migration of young women to the mining areas is a thing to be
deprecated not only from the moral point of view, but from the point of view
of the effect it has on village life. (ZA 2/4/1 Awemba: TR Nov. 1929)
In the 1930s, thus, fears of the ‘uprooted’ and ‘detribalized’ male mine-
worker who was a ‘menace in town and a liability in his rural village’ were 
mirrored in images of desolate villages, inhabited only by ‘dogs and old 
women’ (Gould 1995). In effect of these concerns, various measures were
put in place to prevent women from leaving rural villages. The admi-
nistration installed road blocks along the major bus routes to stop women 
from traveling to town (SEC/1350 NR police inspector, Fort Jameson, to
deputy commissioner of the police, Lusaka, Feb. 1949; see also Negi 2010:
216). Yet women frequently bribed bus drivers, walked around checkpoints
and got back on the bus, and when police searched the compounds for
unattached women, they had conveniently ‘disappeared’ (Parpart 1986: 15). 
The archive also tells of women dressing up as men to avoid detection at
checkpoints (SEC/1102 NR police inspector, Broken Hill, to deputy 
commissioner of the police, Lusaka, Nov. 1941), thereby altering the frontier
of their bodies as symbols of rural domesticity.
By deploying one’s body as male, women made the checkpoint a site from
which the boundary between the bodily substrate of sex and the spatial
relations of gender could be challenged. The influx of women in towns was, 
in an administrative optic, what Douglas (1966) refers to as ‘pollution’ or ‘a
particular class of danger’ to systems of control (see also Foucault 1989). 
The discourse of ‘pollution’ looms large in colonial reports from this time. 





      
 
  
     
 
  
   
  
 
       
     
  
        
    
   
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
     
  




    
  
                                                     
       
   
[and] spend their energy on chasing men rather than village upkeep … they
pick up diseases’ which they then ‘transmit in the villages’ (CNP 1/7/1: 
Letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Sept. 1940). Implicit here, of
course, is that disease transmitted ‘in the villages’ would threaten
reproduction of the labor force. Indeed, the migration of women to towns
generated administrative anxiety over their propriety and possible degene-
ration of their bodies, so that controlling people’s sexuality became 
paramount for controlling the health and wealth of the imperial body politic
(cf. McClintock, 1995: 47).
The measure of control was matrimony, deployed as a political
technology to police the relations between men and women, because when
reaching town, most women took ‘husbands’, some more than one, to avoid
repatriation (see Parpart 1968: 15). Initially, for a woman to be recognized
as a wife she had to live with a man for a week and cook his food (Spearpoint
1937: 37), so that women’s ability to stay in town was arbitrated in the
kitchen. Soon, however, legislation was passed that branded a woman who 
had been ‘married’ three times a prostitute, giving the mine police the legal
means to ban her from town (Acc. 72/13: Native Courts of the Copperbelt, 
district commissioner’s office, Mufilira, May 1939).7 The socio-legal
category of the prostitute was thus a product of an administrative effort to
protect urban space from dangerous elements (as well as to protect rural
space as a site of social reproduction). As such, the prostitute was an integral
part of territorialization that linked together the scales of body, town, village
and colony. Indeed, the boundary-work that protected the township from
degeneration was, at least in part, rescaled onto the bodies of women, 
surveilled, classified and controlled.
Spatial corporeal politics – what body can occupy what space and under
what conditions – are paramount for understanding the colonial township and 
how its boundaries became rescaled into kitchens and onto the bodies of
women. We cannot understand the colonial township without attention to the
bodies that occupied it (or not), and the bodies of women in particular; entry
into town was bodily sanctioned, and the ability to remain in town was
mediated through bodily conduct. And these processes were not contained
within ‘the local’; for the colonial administration, controlling sexual relations
between men and women was paramount for maintaining the order of
7 It was in 1944 that marriage certificates were first introduced as a measure of urban control. Still, these 





    
      
  
  
     
 
     
 
   
  
         
   
  
 
     
 
    
   
     
      
  




     
  
        
 
  
       
   
difference between the modern and traditional, which, in turn, was the
foundation upon which the colonial project rested. These efforts were, at
least in part, routed through bodies that navigated these boundaries – not only 
as lines of demarcation but also as sites of social struggle and of negotiation 
in ways that posed challenges for the regime that maintained them.
5.6 Chapter conclusion
The theory and methodology I have laid out in this chapter suggest that
attention to bodies can offer insights into where colonial boundaries are
drawn and how they operated by tracing out what bodies could occupy what
spaces (or not) and under what conditions. I have shown how myriad colonial
boundaries were displaced onto people’s bodies and naturalized, negated and
negotiated through bodily practice, movement and encounter. The body itself
– raced, sexed, placed – became a site of territorial inscription through which
the construction and contestations of the colony and its boundaries took
place. If the practice of drawing boundaries, while in many cases implicit
and even invisible, is the constitutive process of territorialization (Brighenti
2010), using bodies to think with offers incomparable insight into how the
colonial state and its boundaries worked on the scale of the intimate and how
colonial space was lived and enlivened. Bodies – chiefs’ bodies, deceased
bodies, tribalized bodies, women’s bodies – became important bearers of
symbolic value, subjected to racial regimes and power relations, all of which
were expressed and implemented in the making and contestation of the
colonial state.
Focusing on how bodies become enrolled in colonial politics and interact
with and shape spatial relations is necessarily a subjective exercise and a 
limited lens through which to make theoretical assertions. Yet the kind of
theorization and methodology used here underscores the need to remain alert
to the inseparability of body and material space, where spatial corporeal
politics – what body can occupy what space and under what conditions – are 
paramount for understanding territoriality (the strategies by which control over
territory is asserted) and how the configuration of territory remains crucially
contingent upon the bodies that inhabit, move through and intermingle with it,
and how those bodies linked up wider systems of knowledge and discourse. 
In previous research on the architecture of British colonialism in Africa, of
which Mamdani’s (1996) is perhaps the most prominent, structural binaries
110
 
      
       
 





   
           
 
     
 
  




       
    
    
    
  




    
     
         
 
   
   
  
     
    
  
are seen to separate exclusionary spaces. Citizens and subjects, the urban and
the rural, savage and civilized become ideal types reified as historical facts
mapped onto discrete institutional sites. Mamdani’s brilliance has been to 
chart the condensation of chiefly power inaugurated by the colonial
institution of indirect rule. Yet as Moore (2005) has argued, his institutional
analysis pivots on ideal types of power, identity and space which risk
obscuring both African and administrative practices. By rescaling the spatial
architecture of colonial rule onto the body, we escape grand narratives of
territorialization as an expanding imperial frontier and put into question 
understandings of colonial space as bordered by a colonial authority that is
distanced and detached from the lived realities of everyday life. Instead, we
see the limits of colonial control, the micropolitics of spatial rule and the
pervasive ambiguity permeating categories such as ‘proper village’, ‘tribal 
homeland’ and ‘township’. We see how the subject-bodies defined by 
colonial spatial power (the villager, the tribal native, the rural, domesticated
woman) refused or ignored the appellation assigned to them by government
and instead became bodies of resistance (the non-villager, the detribalized
native, the unattached woman).
Here it is important to probe the ways discourses on race, tribe and gender
carry with them – sometimes on the body corporeal – a material and symbolic 
weight that reproduces hierarchies even when people attempt to move out of
them (Nightingale 2013). At the same time, bodies – raced, sexed, placed –
are not pacified bodies, but potent bodies, carrying the ability to unsettle
spaces imbued with eternal necessities. As bodies move, they open up spaces
of contestation on a scale that exceeds the body. From BSAC villagization
in the 1910s, to tribalization in the 1920s, to the male in-migration into
mining compounds in the 1930s, the movement and practice of bodies
repeatedly challenged the orderly rule of the colonial administration. 
Recognizing that such practices permeate the history of Northern Rhodesia
is a testament to how administrative efforts to control ‘out of place’ bodies
were not merely ‘extra-ordinary’ work; rather, bringing ‘out of place’ bodies
‘into place’ was paramount for maintaining the imperial body politic.
This analysis presents glimpses of such dynamic processes, yet processes
that I argue help explicate how ways of being and moving in material space
were implicated in the construction and contestation of the colonial state and
its territories. The construction of race and gender is inseparable from these






   
     
  
 
reaction against villagization, as women become tangled up with kitchens
and marital relations to secure their access to town, or as poor ecological
conditions in tribal homelands become racial markers once they have left
their imprints on the human body. Taken together, this chapter points to how
territory is not external to the body, not simply bodily experienced, but




        
 
            
   
  
     
   
    
   
    
   
    
     
   
   
  
     
  
   
   
       
     
  
      6. Empirical Chapter II: The Forest
State, chiefdom and the forest in between: the reinvention
of legitimate authority in Munyama
Connecting history to a place is the condition of possibility for any social
analysis. (Michel de Certeau 1997: xv)
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I shift analytical focus from the body to a forest claimed by 
both chiefly and stately forms of authority to probe the ‘limits’ of state
governance vis-à-vis chiefly assertions of rule. The analysis maps out how
the forest has been constituted through multiple practices and imageries,
past and present, and brings to light the different sediments of the
landscapes to which we must attend in order to understand how
geographical space is struggled over in Zambia today. At issue here is the 
life of ‘imperial debris’ (Stoler 2008), or leftovers of imperialism, and I
pick up many of the points that I left hanging above. In particular, I trace
(some of the) boundaries drawn during colonial rule into the present to
bring into view how colonial classification, chiefly takeover, spiritual
sanction and state recategorization have placed forest dwellers within an
entangled landscape of property, territory, rights and belonging that does
not map onto the jurisdictional borders surrounding them. As such, the
forest provides a potent ‘analytical location’ for understanding the
interplay between different authorities, ‘natures’ and histories, and the







      
  
  
   




    
  
  
   
    
  
  
         
    
  
         
      
  
    
  
    





         
 
 
Headman Chiwala’s homestead in Munyama Forest, September 2017
The cry of the cock cut through the predawn air, slowly stirring the household 
awake. Veronica, Chiwala’s eldest daughter, was first to her feet, fetching a
bucket of water, which she then put to boil. I emerged into the chill where
two watchdogs named after Zambia’s most prominent freedom fighters,
Kapwepwe and Nkumbula, announced my awakening with lurid yelps. ‘The
water is hot’, Veronica said while chuckling at my futile efforts to prod the
obtrusive dogs away. ‘Maybe you want to take the dogs with you? They look
like they need a bath too’, she tittered. Chiwala appeared at the doorstep with
a towel slung over his shoulder. ‘Yes, and take the goat too’, he chuckled. 
The jaunty tone was interrupted by a familiar ring. Chiwala hastily climbed
the tree behind the storage hut. His climb was effortless, almost graceful, but
at the same time quite amusing as he was still in his underwear. Climbing
trees was a necessary skill in these parts of Munyama; it was the only way to
pick up a cellphone signal. On the line was headman Kambobe, sitting in
another tree two villages away.
Over the past few weeks the headmen in Munyama Forest had been in
dialogue over the future of their lands. Munyama Forest was to be
reappropriated by the Ministry of Lands, which would entail the headmen’s
demise as administrators of the land. This day, Chisamaba District Council 
had summoned Chiwala and his fellow headmen to a ‘sensitization meeting’, 
which was the name given to it by the district secretary (DS) when I met her
a few days later. Yet the meeting was only the most recent development in
an unfolding historical drama that extends into a violent colonial past. In
1947, during British colonial rule, Munyama was proclaimed a ‘Protected
Forest Area’ and thus was edited out from the jurisdiction of Lenje
Chiefdom. In many ways, this was achieved through the constitutive erasure 
of indigenous territorialities, with the forest inhabitants displaced onto a
territorially fixed topography of tribal politics. Following national
independence in 1964, however, Munyama was re-occupied by a peasant
population governed by a group of village headmen loyal to Chief Liteta III
of Lenje Chiefdom, and was thus brought back into the fold of chiefly
control. State authorities have repeatedly tried to reclaim control over the 
forest lands, issuing eviction letters and ordering the arrest of unruly forest
cultivators. Huts and homesteads have been burned, and fields ploughed
under, in efforts to erase signs of human occupation and use. In 2009
114
 
    
 
       
  
      
         
  
  
     
   






   




   





   
    
 
    
 
 
     
       
  
Munyama was reclassified anew, this time as State Land – giving legal
license for the production of a private property regime in the forest.
The meeting was still hours away, but Chiwala was visibly nervous and
spent the morning pacing his grounds. From an old coffin, he assembled a
dossier of paperwork – pleas, appeals, certificates, court rulings – which he
had amassed over the past twenty or so years. Ever since Chiwala had moved
to Munyama Forest in 1994, these documents had functioned as his
armaments in meetings with agents of the state; they established what
Chiwala considered to be a legitimate claim to the forest lands. Many of the
documents are brittle, the writing faded, and folded so many times that they
nearly fall apart, undermining the political work that these documents are
meant to perform. Even if he could, Chiwala makes no claim to autochthony,
in the sense of someone who sprung from the soil he inhabits. Autochthony, 
he has learned, is not a language that state agents understand. For most
officers of the statutory bureaucracy, the boundaries of Munyama Forest are 
unamendable decrees, fixed by law, rendering the people living in the forest
illegal settlers. In this chapter I situate a critique of these boundaries within
a wider field of cultural and historical practices in order to make visible their
variability and mutability.
The scholarly study of chiefly power and authority is rich and diverse,
and somewhat difficult to navigate. To some extent, the literature is divided 
between those who consider chiefdoms to be principally ‘inventions’ of
repressive colonial regimes (e.g. Mamdani 1996) and those who consider
chiefdoms to be grounded in pre-colonial culture and tradition – the latter
position often seeing anti-imperial tendencies in chiefly power (e.g. 
Englebert 2000; van Rouveroy et al. 1999). Both of these positions have been
heavily criticized, however. The first for omitting the political agency of
African rulers, and the latter for resting on a static conception of culture and 
tradition. This chapter maps onto a third strand of scholarship that probes
how chiefdoms emerge as a political category through historical struggle,
practices of rule and negotiation over authority to govern (Hoffmann et al.
2020; Lund 2006: Buur and Kyed 2006; Stacey 2015, 2016). In this analytic,
state and chiefdom are not predetermined categories with appropriate spheres
of influence and different symbols of power and political legitimation; rather, 
state and chiefdom emerge together, with their variable and shifting
boundaries shaping who has the authority to govern, who belongs and who




     
    
  
   
  
   
         
  
    
  
   
  
     
    
 
 
        
 
  
        
 









       
                                                     
        
     
 
between state and chiefdom. Building on work within political ecology and 
that of Nightingale (2011, 2018) in particular, I shall insist that the outcome
of struggles over land and legitimate authority remain crucially dependent
on the diverse ways that practices of government and chiefly resistance
become entangled with the material landscape. In other words, without
taking seriously the landscape (or ‘nature’) in and through which boundaries
emerge, we cannot understand why land becomes such a powerful vector for
political contestation, and why struggles over land are so easily transmuted
into disputes over authority to govern, belonging and rights. 
I will show this by telling nine stories about Munyama Forest, each
revealing a layer of cultural, spiritual or political meaning with which the
forest lands have been invested over the past seventy or so years, each
representing an event, accident or practice that reworked the boundaries that
make up the forest’s ‘constitution’, and consequently who can control and 
use the forest lands. The first eight stories interrogate the conditions of
possibility of things being as they are – an attempt at tracing the historical 
relations that make possible the conceptual separation of ‘state’, ‘forest’ and
‘chiefdom’ in Munyama today. There are no neat divides between these
stories, and they do not always line up chronologically; my hope is that by 
juxtaposing and insisting on the simultaneity of multiple spatiotemporalities,
rather than viewing time as a unity, it becomes possible to imagine Munyama
not as one place but as multiple places that co-exist and intertwine. For the
struggle over the forest land is not simply a struggle ‘over’ a piece of nature;
it is equally a struggle over what the forest is (cf. Côte et al. 2018).
After telling eight stories, I return to the meeting that Chiwala was
preparing for in the beginning of this chapter, which is the ninth and final
story. This story is in many ways the culmination of the preceding eight
insofar as it explores how the sedimentation of earlier boundaries are
exposed, invoked, silenced and maneuvered in the context of contemporary
struggles over land and legitimate authority in Munyama.8 Taken together, 
then, these stories amount to a wider story of state-forest-chiefdom
boundaries and their constitution and the political work they perform, which
is discussed in a concluding section. In following this analytical path, my 
hope is to contribute to a reimagining of political authority in rural Zambia,
8 These stories span the reign of two Lenje chiefs, both carrying the name of Liteta. Chief Liteta III reigned





   
   
       
 
          
           
      
 
   
   




   
   
   
 
        
  
  










one that captures the interplay between natures, politics and histories and the
forms of inclusions and exclusions that emerge within them.
6.2 Munyama Forest: Nine Boundary Stories
6.2.1 Boundary Story #1: The Making of Protected Forest Area No. 62
I wish to begin with the story of how Munyama Forest first became a space
set apart from chiefly control, as narrated from within the colonial archive.
The archived history of Munyama dates back to 1946 when a report telling
of Chief Liteta III’s ‘incapacity’ to ‘protect valuable tree species’ from
‘encroaching tribesmen’ in ‘his area’ reached the forestry department (ML
1/6/12: Report to DS Wallace, Member of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, May 1946). Protecting forested lands was one of the duties
devolved to him through the conduits of tribal rule, specifically aimed at
prohibiting citemene cultivation which, in an administrative optic, was seen
as a primitive practice that depleted both soils and forest resources (see
Chapter 5). Chief Liteta III, the report concluded, had failed in his obligations
toward the colonial office, allowing ‘his subjects’ to continue with their
‘primitive methods’. Following the report, a longer correspondence between 
different forestry officers ensued, in which it was established that a
‘traditional Chief’ ultimately was unable to understand the ‘principles of
forestry’, and, consequently, that Munyama Forest needed to be edited out
from Chief Liteta III’s jurisdiction. Chief Liteta III appealed, citing the
existence of burial sites in the forest and that his people depended on forest
resources for their livelihood (ML 3/7/7: Lenje tribal council meeting, 
Chibombo, May 1946). Yet his appeal was overruled with reference to what
was described as his ‘proven reluctance’ to ‘prosecute natives for offences
in the Chief’s court as stipulated in the Forest Act’ (ML 3/7/7: Letters to
Chief Conservator of Forests, Ndola, June–Sept. 1946). Thus, the following
year Munyama was reclassified as a ‘Protected Forest Area’ with the
objective, the forestry department declared, to ‘restore the forest to its natural
state’ (ML 1/1/6: Report to DS Wallace, Member of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, Feb. 1947). ‘Protected Forest Area’ was a categorical construct








   





    
        






    
  






    
  
 
     
 
   
  
  
felling, cutting, taking, working, burning, injuring or removing any forest
produce; squatting, residing, building any hut or livestock enclosure; grazing
livestock or allowing livestock to trespass; clearing, cultivation or breaking
up land for cultivation or any other purposes; and entering in or being in or
upon while in possession of any implement of cutting, taking, working or the
removal of forest produce. (ML 4/2/12 Government Notice No. 305 of 1947:
The Forest Ordinance vol. III, cap 105, Feb. 1947)
The people that had previously depended on the forest lands for shifting
citemene cultivation, for grazing and watering livestock, as hunting grounds
or as a source of firewood and wild foods were forcibly relocated to what
colonial bureaucrats called ‘proper villages’ of ‘20 huts or more’, 
administrative spaces for social life within the confines of the now
rebordered Lenje Native Reserve (ML 1/1/6: Report to DS Wallace, Member
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Feb. 1947), thereby drawing distinct
nature-society boundaries on the landscape of indirect rule. 
A wide range of material, cultural and political technologies were 
deployed to entrench the forest as a space set apart from the chiefdom. First,
surveyors were sent to Munyama to produce a written narrative that graphed
a territory, demarcating its spatial boundaries in relation to prominent
landmarks – rivers, ridges and rock formations – offering a perfunctory
sketch of an abstract space subsequently known as ‘Protected Forest Area 
No. 62’ (ML 5/11/1: Government Notice No. 413, Protected Forest Area No.
62, Sept. 1947). Cartographers plotted the narrative onto maps, inscribing 
the forest boundaries in the consciousness of the forestry bureaucracy. 
Cement survey pillars ornamented with the colonial iron crest were erected
along the outer lines of the forest, writing on the ground its boundaries as
material facts. Finally, armed and uniformed forest rangers – authorized to 
confiscate livestock and burn huts and field crops discovered in the forest –
were installed in encampments at its perimeters, from where they could 
patrol its boundaries (ML 5/11/3: Report to DS Wallace, Member of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, Nov. 1947). Indeed, the organizational
structures and institutional patterns of forestry mimicked those of the mili-
tary, as reflected in the territorial structure of forest range management, the
partitioning of space, the rotation of foresters to avoid their becoming
attached to the people in the district and the arming of forester enforcement
units (see Kaufman 1960; Peluso and Vandergeest 2011). Through these
colonial practices of boundary making – classification, mapping, demar-
118
 
     









   





    
        





   
          
  
     
 
        
     
  
 
   
cation and patrolling – Munyama was set apart and integrated into a colonial
topography of exclusion, making it difficult for people to tend to their trees
and field crops in the forest. 
In and around the forest, the extensive border concession made the
colonial state highly visible. The cement survey pillars, still standing today,
inscribed in material space new relations of rule and became permanent
landscape installments with territorial jurisdictions of land and forests in the
vicinity decades after the end of physical violence (see Chapter 7 for an 
analysis of boundary stones). Elders in Munyama still recall how they taught
their children not to venture past the landmarks marking the boundaries of
the forest when grazing or watering livestock, dreading that their young
might be beaten or arrested by forest rangers. Within the forest, thus, there
should be no society; those defying the spatiality of colonial classification 
were rendered ‘encroachers’, beaten, fined and arrested. Previous settlements 
and existing forms of land use were not recorded on the maps produced,
effectively erasing human occupation and use. As such, Munyama was 
posited as something that lies ‘outside’ history, thereby denying other
histories of nature’s occupation and use (cf. Cronon 1995). If the previous
chapter shows how native populations were collapsed into nature in the tribal
homeland, forming a pre-modern harmony protected in its totality from the
threats of colonial modernity, this chapter shows, instead, how natives were
erased from nature, drawing distinct nature-society boundaries in an effort
to protect forest resources from its social and destructive surround (cf. Braun 
2002), establishing different government jurisdictions, categorical divisions
and state-forest-chiefdom boundaries. 
The inscription of these boundaries marked the beginning of a longer
boundary struggle, still ongoing today. Yet it is important to not take these
boundaries at face value. As postcolonial scholars stress, colonial archives 
are performative; they bring into being the very reality to which they refer. 
Colonial documents were projective devices, ‘narrating the future of a 
colonial project while at the same time reconstructing the past’ (Stoler 2009),
with the past here referring to a forest in its ‘natural state’. Outside the
archive, in the forest, lie subjugated histories and buried epistemologies,
hidden by and within the terms through which forest politics was, and indeed
still is, understood. Together, these make up the second story I wish to tell.
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6.2.2 Boundary Story #2: What the archive doesn’t tell
The archived history of Munyama as laid out above differs dramatically from
the history as told by those who inhabit the forest today. In oral history,
Munyama is the ancestral abode of the Lenje People. Its ‘first mother’,
Natota, is said to have been born on the highest mounds of the forest, where
a shrine comprised of a miniature hamlet shadowed by a cassava plant is
maintained in her memory. As the story goes, Natota was a powerful chief-
tainess, but was beheaded in an act of envy and her body further mutilated. 
Her spirit is still believed to loom over the land, her blood symbolically
drifting with the brooks traversing the wooded landscape. It is not accidental
that Natota’s mystical presence takes material form in waterways. Munyama
covers several dambos, a class of shallow wetlands found in central, southern
and eastern Africa, particularly in Zambia and Zimbabwe. They are generally
located in higher-rainfall flat-plateau areas and have river-like branching
forms, which in themselves are not very large, but combined add up to a large
area (Chidumayo 1992). Dambos are valued for many things, including as a
dry-season water source, for rushes used as thatching and fencing material,
for clay used for building, brick-making and earthenware, for hunting
(especially birds), for soaking bitter cassava in dug ponds, and for growing
vegetables and other food crops, which can be vital in drought years since
dambo soils usually retain enough moisture to produce a harvest even when
the rains fail.
For the Munyama inhabitants, the dambos are not simply ecological but
also spiritual-historical symbols of ancestral belonging. Some people
moving out from Munyama to resettle on a new piece of land fill a flask of
forest dambo water and pour it into the water source at their new homestead,
thereby carrying ancestral spirits with them as they move. Elders and
headmen visiting their relatives are also often seen carrying these bottles, and
while they are sometimes ridiculed for being superstitious, they are also
respected for manifesting care for land and people. Yet, where the ecological
ends and where the spiritual begins is impossible to delineate. In my 
conversations with the forest inhabitants, I found it incredibly difficult to
distinguish between Natota as mystical force and Natota as the system of
waterways that provide ecological benefits. Still, Natota features in many
stories and practices of ancestral belonging and spiritual fertilization that link







     
   
   
          
          
         
  
   
      
 
    
     
    




     
     
  
    
  
 
     
   
      
    
   
     
  
      
Whether ancestral claims and stories of historical belonging predate, were 
reinvigorated by, or emerged out of the 1947 enclosure of Munyama is
difficult to say. In some versions of the story, Natota was decapitated by a
‘white charlatan’, which seems to suggest the latter. In another version, her
corpse was carried out from Munyama by foresters so as to break the tie
between her spirit and the land – but her dogs found her body and dragged it
back into the forest. She is now believed to lie underneath the shrine that is
maintained in her memory. Yet, the shrine was constructed much later (see
Boundary Story #6 for the significance of its construction). Either way, the
oral histories I collected in Munyama reveal that the land was never edited
out from people’s conceptions of what belonged to them. My point here is
that the making of ‘Protected Forest Area No. 62’ placed Munyama between
different conceptions of what the forest was, how it could be used and by
whom. 
The boundaries of the forest – its cultural, ecological and political
demarcation – were, in other words, far from fixed, opening up new spaces
for struggle over rights in land, legitimate authority and ways of moving and
living in the landscape. These struggles were already apparent in the 1950s. 
Chief Liteta III, though stripped of formal judicial authority over Munyama,
continued his efforts to retain political-spiritual influence in the forest.
Through covert channels, he instructed people to abandon citemene
cultivation so as not to reveal their location, yet ‘maintain active presence’
in and around the forest (interview, chief’s advisor). The most striking
testimony of how chiefly politics played out on the ground was given by
Papilo, a man I befriended in Munyama. Papilo doesn’t know exactly how
old he is, but he remembers living on the outskirts of Munyama sometime in
the 1950s. And he remembers being ‘chased’ and resettled in a new village 
about a day’s walk to the west when the forest was enclosed. The stories he
is most eager to share concern how people – encouraged by Chief Liteta III
– discovered that the forest rangers were too few to guard the vast forest, and 
how the rugged terrain frustrated surveillance and eviction, which, taken 
together, provided for various forms of covert cultivation in the forest. While
grazing animals was deemed too risky, as valuable livestock were 
confiscated if found in the forest, people established gardens and temporary
shelters that easily could be abandoned if discovered: ‘We built sakwe
[temporary shelters] inside [the forest] and planted cassava because the




   
 
   
  
           
   





   
     
    
  
    
   
   
    
                                                     
         
  
was the only land we knew … we worked together, carrying those loads of
roots on our backs down the hills.’9 Cassava not only melds with the forest
cover, making crops difficult to spot, Papilo explained, it also requires very 
little care; the plant can be abandoned for months and harvested years after
planting (cf. Scott 2009). Papilo’s story resonates in many accounts of the
past, all recounting a people testing the limits of state governance by using 
unguarded passages and cultivating crops that melded with the forest and
could be abandoned without loss of produce, all to outwit the forest rangers.
Image 1. Papilo’s homestead in Munyama Forest, surrounded by cassava plants (dark
green). Photo by the author.
What I want to draw attention to here, then, is how the particular materialities
of the forest – its ruggedness and the ecological and spatial properties of trees 
and plants – facilitated its continued use, with people folding crops into the
undergrowth of the forest so that forest rangers would fail to recognize
human activity during their patrols. Chief Liteta III, for whom the forest was
of political-spiritual significance, offered shelter when people had to
abandon their forest fields and go into hiding. Both state forestry and the
practice of chiefly resistance worked on and through the materiality of the
landscape, with the forest cover being both the object of colonial conser-
9 I’ve also heard stories of Chief Liteta III instructing people to burn the camps of forest rangers, but I 




    
  
    
  
 
    
     
 
 
    
  
   
 
    















   
   
       
    
   
vation and what allowed people to continue using the forest lands, and
consequently what provided for Chief Liteta III to maintain political-spiritual 
influence in the forest. 
State efforts to isolate nature from society thus created a new form of
sociality. In oral history, this period is almost romanticized, through tales of
a forest community emerging around a shared sense of marginalization, 
dispossession and struggle. Some were beaten, arrested and had their shelters
and granaries burned, but most reentered the forest upon release, only to
resume, albeit using different forms of, covert cultivation practices. This not
only underlines the entwinement of social, cultural, political and ecological
relations in the worlds we inhabit, but it also troubles the divide between
political authority and the landscape through which they come into social
and political existence (per Nightingale 2018). As such, Munyama became a
‘boundary object’ sitting between administrators and cultivators, a space of
betweenness where neither state nor chiefdom could exercise absolute 
control, a space ‘outside’ the grids of indirect rule, where administrators and 
cultivators engendered different territorial imaginaries using different
territorial tactics. What Munyama Forest was, how the land could be used
and by whom were contested, rendering its boundaries (spatial, ecological,
political, cultural, epistemological) profoundly unfixed.
The making of Munyama into ‘Protected Forest Area No. 62’ certainly
rebounded colonial power, shifting authority over the forest from Chief Liteta
III to the Forestry Department of the colonial regime, yet it did not detach 
Munyama from the chiefdom, but brought it into a contested colonial
territoriality where the very materiality of the landscape (ruggedness and
remoteness) made the enforcement of colonial spatiality difficult. Indeed, the
materiality of the terrain made possible the articulation of an alternative 
politics: for forest dwellers and Chief Liteta III, the imagined geography of
Munyama comprised community, and they used cultivation practices to en-
gender it. Encouraged by Chief Liteta III, people outwitted forest rangers with 
concealed cultivation and their knowledge of unguarded passages. In sum, the
making of Protected Forest Area No. 62 was fundamentally imbricated in how
‘state’, ‘forest’ and ‘chiefdom’ were all mapped onto the landscape as
epistemic categories (Neumann 2004) – not as secure achievements, but as
unresolved processes of social, political and ecological contestation.
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6.2.3 Boundary Story #3: The making of ‘Chief’s Forest’
If the two first stories present a relatively stable boundary between the
colonial state and ‘tribal’ chiefdom – two spheres of political association
with different symbols of power and political legitimation contending over
what ‘the forest’ is – I wish to now put these boundaries into question by
drawing attention to a series of discontinuous ‘state-like’ strategies and
practices through which Chief Liteta III reasserted his authority over the 
forest. The story begins with the political turmoil leading up to national
independence in 1964, during which many white landlords abandoned their
estates amid threats from nationalist movements, thus leaving large tracts of
lands open to other forms of claim-making. People who had previously
depended on remote forest lands now saw an opportunity to cultivate more
accessible lands around the forest, where they faced less risk of legal
retribution. National independence thus coincided with outmigration from
Munyama. As a result, Munyama was pushed outside the terrain of struggle 
and lay in political fallow for almost thirty years. This was a window of time
during which the Forestry Department managed and witnessed the regrowth
of the forest with relatively little effort (interview, Forestry Dept.). In 1979,
Munyama Forest was even reclassified as a National Forest, signaling its 
significance for the Zambian nation. 
But by the early 1990s, Munyama was once again enrolled in conflict. 
This time, however, the driving force of change came not from other
claimants, but from a global push toward austerity and deregulation in the
form of structural adjustment programs (SAPs). Conditioned by the Bretton
Woods institutions in return for international loans and debt relief, public
spending was cut, and, as a result, the Forestry Department became heavily 
underfinanced (see Rakner 2003). On the ground in Munyama, this resulted 
in the renouncement of the forest rangers10 (interview, Forestry Dept.). On 
paper, of course, Munyama remained a National Forest under the jurisdiction
of the Forestry Department, albeit now lacking the capacity to meet its
mandate to uphold it. Different scales and political itineraries thus became
entangled in the reconfiguration of the forest boundaries (cf. Byrne et al. 
2016). What I want to draw attention to here, however, is what followed this 
reconfiguration, namely, how Chief Liteta III saw an opportunity to once
again bring Munyama into the fold of chiefly control.
10 The forest rangers were not actually retracted, but as their paychecks stopped coming, they simply left
their camps to seek employment elsewhere (interview, retired forestry official).
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In early 1993, following the discharge of the forest rangers, Chief Liteta
III summoned all his headmen to his palace, where he declared the Munyama
a ‘Chief’s Forest’, a category of his own making. A new position called
‘Chief’s Forester’ was created and assumed by Mr. Kakoma, the son of his
most trusted advisor. Today Mr. Kakoma is in his late sixties and lives in a
small house on the outskirts of Chisamba township. When Chief Liteta III
died in 2003, Mr. Kakoma left chiefly politics due to a quarrel within the
royal family, and while he was hesitant to let me in on the matter of this
dispute, he talked about his accomplishments as a ‘Chief’s Forester’ with
fervor. Mr. Kakoma was tasked with ‘monitoring activities’ to ensure that
people ‘followed the rules of the forest’, as laid down by Chief Liteta III and
his council of advisors. These rules both borrowed and deviated from state
legislation: establishing permanent settlements and breaking new land using
citemene methods were both prohibited, but people were allowed to collect
wild foods and medical herbs, as well as water and graze animals in the 
forest. Cultivating land that had already been cleared was allowed if Mr.
Kakoma gave his permission. At these plots, people were also allowed to 
build temporary shelters where they could stay during seeding and reaping.
At the onset, the forest’s remote and rugged lands made cultivation utterly
laborious compared to working the lands that surrounded it, but people
slowly started to use the forest lands again, mostly for grazing, although it
also turned out to be a valuable resource for the land poor, who reopened
gardens and orchards at the fringes of the forest. In contrast to the Forestry
Department, Chief Liteta III became a ‘leader of people instead of a leader
of trees’, as Mr. Kakoma mused in satisfaction.
In many ways, Chief Liteta III was ‘territorializing like a state’,
mimicking the practices of the Forestry Department, yet adjusting them to
his political landscape. Still, ‘Chief’s Forest’ was not a land category
recognized in statutory law, but something that Chief Liteta III had invented, 
and that he actively concealed from the state establishment. With memories
of colonial dispossession still strong, Chief Liteta III instructed Mr. Kakoma
not to disclose his title if encountering a state agent in Munyama, imagining 
that a chiefly forest concession would be taken as a threat to the sovereignty
of the Forestry Department. Also, the people using the forest were instructed
not to disclose that their use of forest lands had been sanctioned by the
chieftainship. Instead, Chief Liteta III hoped that by extending his loyalties






    




    
           
 
  
   





   
  
   
  
 
    
 
  
    
     
    
 
                                                     
     
  
    
     
    
territorialization move. In Mr. Kakoma’s words: ‘With our people in the
forest, those people [state foresters] could not just come in and chase us …
they had to leave it like that … and maybe they would see we did a good job 
looking after the forest and also giving people a place to farm … That’s what
a chief is supposed to do.’ The ‘Chief’s Forest’ was not only a particular
configuration of forest boundaries but could perhaps more accurately be 
described as a rewriting of the relationship between state and chiefdom. As
much Chief Liteta III was ‘territorializing like a state’, he was also quietly
encroaching on the ‘paper boundaries’ of the state to probe the limits of the
existing relationships, to see what could be gotten away with on the margin, 
and to include this margin as part of an accepted, or at least tolerated,
territorial claim.
6.2.4 Boundary Story #4: Resettling the forest
The making of the ‘Chief’s Forest’ meant that state-chiefdom-forest
boundaries were redrawn anew, generating new registers of rule, forms of
authority, resources, territories and legitimate forest uses and users, all
emergent with wider-scale politics. The ‘Chief’s Forest’ was a short-lived
creation, however. In mid-1993, on one of his patrols, Mr. Kakoma
discovered that people of Tonga Chiefdom had established permanent
settlements in the forest and were in the process of installing a new chief in
a new forest chiefdom called New Monze (Monze being the capital of Tonga 
Chiefdom).11 Taking it as his duty to manage the forest lands, Mr. Kakoma
sent notice of their eviction, but the settlers refused to comply. Chief Liteta
III and his council were notified, and in their reasoning, they could not appeal
the statutory judiciary, fearing that Munyama would be closed off by the
Forestry Department. Instead, Chief Liteta III sent word to Chiwala, one of
his most trusted allies in the royal lineage, asking him to form a ‘war party’
and ‘chase the intruders from the forest’ (interview, chief’s advisor). Chiwala
was working in Choma, a day’s journey to the south of Munyama, in the
UNIP Central Committee (for the then-crumbling one-party state, that is).
Upon hearing from Chief Liteta III, he handed in his resignation papers,
11 According to some sources, it was a group of dismissed forest rangers who, based on their knowledge
of the forest, coordinated the Tonga settlements. If so, they had skillfully maneuvered a shifting political 
landscape, moving from civil/public service to a terrain of chiefly politics. The Tonga settlements in
Munyama draw attention to how boundaries between different chiefdoms are also sites of political
invention and contestation. This topic, however, falls outside of the scope of this thesis.
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knowing that his work for the party was irreconcilable with ‘tribal war’, as
he called it. One late night in early November 1993, Chiwala, together with 
a larger group of men, initiated the operation. Armed with shotguns, they
camped out in the forest for about three months, ousting the settlers in what
Chiwala described as a ‘serious battle’.
This marked yet another juncture in chiefly forest politics. Chief Liteta
III believed that leaving the forest uninhabited would continue to attract
unauthorized settlers that he would be unable to control. Thus, in order to 
protect the forest, the ‘Chief’s Forest’ was abolished. Instead, Chief Liteta
III awarded Chiwala a large portion of the forest land and the permission
to establish a permanent village in his name thereon. Chiwala moved to
Munyama in January 1994 and founded the first farm and permanent
settlement in the forest. It was not long before Chief Liteta III installed
more headmen in the forest and started to direct aspiring farmers to
Munyama. The procedure of resettlement was quite orderly. The headmen
who came to establish villages in Munyama Forest were first given
permission after approaching Chief Liteta III (apart from a select few
approached by the chief himself). The chief would then refer each case to
a ten-man land-allocating committee, which allotted portions of the forest
to each village, setting boundaries based on physical features such as hills,
streams and dambos. Then, each settler approached a particular headman
who allocated a portion of his village land to an individual or group of
individuals. In many cases, however, settlers selected their own sites. After
negotiating with neighbors, they informed the headman, who bore witness
rather than actively allocating rights.
As a symbol of chiefly recognition and authorization, the forest headmen
were given what is known as ‘books’ (ibuku) – village registers that serve
to incorporate land and its users into the administrative fold of the chiefdom.
During colonialism, ‘the book’ was a key vector of government: it invoked
at once a tax roll and state registry of domicile, a geographical subdivision
of a chiefdom, and government legitimacy accorded to an appointed
overseer, or headman (cf. Moore 2005: 250). For a headman, the possession
of a ‘book’ symbolized recognition of his authority by both the chiefdom
and colonial administration. And for administrators and local residents
alike, ‘the book’ proved critical to colonial rule’s grid of intelligibility:
having one’s name noted down in ‘a book’ meant being pinned down in a
‘proper village’ and thus subjected to the lattice of indirect rule. In short,
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the colonial practices associated with ‘books’ – censuses, tax registers,
forced labor, court jurisdictions – contributed to the production of both
space and colonial subjects.
Farmers who now were allocated land in Munyama were noted down in 
these books and incorporated into a local tax regime, with tax paid in the
form of one day’s labor a year on their headman’s land (known as the nduna 
day). Similar to what Hoffmann, Vlassenroot and Marchais (2017) have
argued in relation to eastern Congo, taxation was constitutive of chiefly 
jurisdiction. Today, ‘the book’ is still a powerful token of rule and subjection
and the basis of chiefly authority in Munyama. If a headman is found
misallocating land or in any other way abusing his authority, the book is
withdrawn and taken to the chief’s palace, only to be returned to the rightful
ruler after the misconduct has been tried in the chief’s court and an 
appropriate penalty has been passed. Thus, even though the ‘book’ was
introduced in colonial time, it has subsequently been incorporated into 
chiefly governance as a instrument of social and territorial control, as well
as a form of symbolic recognition of headmen’s authority. As such, Chief
Liteta III’s efforts to contest colonial boundaries did not proceed from
positions outside colonialism’s discursive and material fields, but proceeded
instead by turning the terms and tools of colonial power against itself. Put
differently, technologies of colonial taxation and tribal rule remain in play, 
yet have been reinvented and put to political work in efforts to reclaim and
consolidate chiefly power over lands outside the formal-judicial boundaries
of the chiefdom.
The resettlement of Munyama marked a profound shift in chiefly
institutional practices as well as land use practices on the ground. The
previous ban on cutting and burning trees was revised to permit ‘necessary’
cutting and burning for establishing fields and farmsteads (interview, Mr.
Kakoma). Following the immigration of hundreds of aspiring farmers,
Munyama slowly turned into an agrarian landscape, with maize fields,
cassava plantations and gardens on lands opened up with citemene methods.
For many, the boundaries of Lenje Chiefdom were realigned to correspond
to historical claims, with the category of ‘National Forest’ construed as a 
relic of a colonial past illegitimate in the context of post-independent
administration (interview, chief’s advisor). 
Still, the forest dwellers found themselves sitting within an entangled 








    






   
        
 
       
    
        
   
 
  












    
   
             
onto the paper boundaries surrounding them. As such, the resettling of
Munyama Forest helped set the conditions under which the Forestry
Department could subsequently practice forestry and the terms by which 
forestry officers could challenge chiefly claims to exclusive control over the
forest. What I want to draw attention to in the next story is how the resettling
of Munyama was crucial to refashioning the forest dwellers as racialized
state subjects, in turn reconstituting their spatial relations to national forests
and their political relations to the Forestry Department.
6.2.5 Boundary Story #5: Reconstructing the pristine
Nature, in the broad sense, has held a key position in the national
iconography of many nation-states. One important question to examine is
how the meanings of nature are constructed and exploited in the continuous
nation-building process. During my fieldwork I tracked down several of the
forestry officers that were on civil duty around the time of 1994 – when news
of Munyama’s resettlement made its way to the Chibombo District Council
and later the Forestry Department in Lusaka. I was surprised to find that their
understanding of the forest and its settlers rested on a reading of maps and
forest-cover records produced during colonialism (see Boundary Story #1).
In many ways, it seemed like the postcolonial administration had inherited a
rhetoric of an external nature, which had now reemerged and become
complicit in the construction of the forest dwellers as ‘encroachers’ whose
political presence in Munyama was a threat to both nature and state sove-
reignty. As one officer who previously worked in the Forestry Department
said: ‘National Forests are no place for people … their backward ways 
[referring to citemene] destroy the forest, so much is burned’. Having a
‘National Forest’ populated by ‘those primitive people’ was ‘unacceptable’,
and it was ‘not up to some chief to order the state administration around’, his
former colleague commented. 
From their offices in Lusaka, the forestry officers had little opportunity
to know about the political presence and practices of the Lenje, or the layers
of cultural and political meaning with which the forest lands had been 
invested over the previous fifty or so years. It was a ‘sorrow’ to see a 
‘National Forest ruined’ by ‘primitive farming’, as one retired forestry
officer told me. He continued: ‘They think the area was abandoned [in 1994],
then they moved in. Just like that. Some chiefs just want more land. But they
knew it was a National Forest, but they have no respect for what land is what,
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you see … That’s why in old times that forest was guarded, but when those
guards left, ay ay ay’.
These were all administrative sentiments contributing to a conception of
Munyama Forest as a natural space now tainted by human occupation, and 
consequently they determined the political response to chiefly resettlement.
In mid-1994, with the intent of reincorporating the forest into the
administrative fold of the Forestry Department, Chibombo District Council
gave Chiwala and his fellow headmen notice of their eviction. Refusing to
relocate from the forest, the headmen were arrested for ‘unlawful cultivation
and habitation in a National Forest’ (Court Order, Kabwe Central Prison,
June 3, 1994), and a number of forest dwellers were evicted by force. 
Chiwala spent fourteen days in Kabwe Central Prison in the provincial
capital. Upon reentering Munyama after his release, he was arrested anew,
spending another thirty days in jail. When reentering the forest upon his
release this time, farmsteads had been burned and fields ploughed under. 
State forestry goals clearly coincided with those of counterinsurgency
(see Peluso and Vandergeest 2011; Peluso 2003): to transform the forest
from an untamed, dangerous mixture of people and allegedly wild and
separate natures into more orderly, state-administered and integrated, though 
differentiated, forest and agricultural areas, with people settled neatly and
securely in villages next to them. The burning of fields and farmsteads
followed this logic; by erasing signs of existing human use and modification,
the forest was reconstructed as pristine. At least in part, these post-
independence displacements occurred through the reiteration of colonial
erasures. As one forestry officer recalls the decision to evict the forest
inhabitants: ‘We looked at the maps, and on the maps it was a National
Forest, it was not a difficult decision or anything like … I served the public,
and it is in the public’s interest to protect our forests’. When I prodded him
a bit, querying whether or not the forest inhabitants were part of the public, 
he replied briskly: ‘You don’t find the public in a National Forest, only those
tribal people’. His comment speaks to how constructions of space and
cultural images of backwardness were yoked together in a dangerous mixture
of people and allegedly pristine natures. Haraway’s (1992: 292) insights
come to mind: efforts to preserve nature often ‘remain fatally troubled by the
ineradicable mark of the founding expulsion of those … for whom the
categories of nature and culture were not salient.’
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The marginalization of the forest dwellers, and their history in forest 
politics, was not only a result of how the forest was conceived, of course; it
had also been achieved through legal and political means, backed by the
coercive power of the colonial regime. But there can be little doubt that
colonial concepts of nature, culture and modernity have been deeply
implicated in postcolonial state practices, and that a series of discursive 
displacements made it difficult for forest bureaucrats to recognize the 
political presence and practices of the forest dwellers, or to register ways of
being and relating to the land that diverge from the maps and land-use plans
in front of them. 
Even if the forest – as an ecological configuration – is long gone, 
ecological imaginaries seem to have formed part of an epistemology that
continues to structure perceptions of Munyama as a place outside modernity, 
and its inhabitants as a primitive people that do not belong. Indeed, epistemic
erasures are not innocent; they justify political and territorial erasures (see 
Gregory 1994). Such erasures also evolve into new struggles that set
modernity against barbarity, allowing these framings of the world to be
sedimented into the public discourse. During my visits to the Forestry 
Department in Lusaka, more than twenty years after chiefly resettlement, I
was personally warned of the dangers associated with my staying in 
Munyama Forest. ‘You be careful, it’s a dangerous place … those people [the
headmen] have guns, and there are no police to protect you’, as one forestry
officer told me, further pointing to the ways Munyama was posited as a space 
outside law’s boundaries, still awaiting its integration into the nation.
This story points to the relation between discursive and territorial
displacement and to the reinvention of the pristine and concomitant making
of racialized subject. Yet, although discourse and colonial notions of nature
and culture are clearly important for understanding how the boundaries
were constructed around race and tribe, they are ultimately unable to 
capture the degree to which forest headmen were able to navigate the forest
and stake claims to home and land within the currents of structural




   
 
     
    
       
 
   
    
    
  
  





   
   
   
   
  
   
  
     




       
    
   
   
    
  
   
 
 
6.2.6 Boundary Story #6: Material terrains and spiritual 
landscapes 
The 1994 burning of fields and farmsteads incited a violent response.
Convoys of government vehicles entering the forest were stoned, and at least
one farmer died in clashes with the police. In an effort to put an end to the
violence, the Forestry Department called a meeting between Chief Liteta III,
his council of advisors, all Munyama headmen, the provincial forestry officer
and the district secretary of Chibombo District Council. The meeting was
held at the chief’s palace, about a day’s walk west from Munyama Forest,
and though not invited, hundreds of forest dwellers were also present. During
the meeting, it was explained that the legal label of ‘National Forest’
proscribed settlement within. Eviction letters were once again distributed,
which caused the meeting to escalate into conflict, with government officials
fleeing the scene.
What I want to draw attention to here, however, is what happened after
the meeting. Chief Liteta III had remained silent during the meeting, for his
authority depended upon state recognition, and he was not in a position to
challenge the rulings of the Forestry Department, at least not openly. After
the meeting, however, he lingered, advising the forest dwellers to ‘go home
and plant a lot of mango trees’ and ‘put iron sheets on your roofs’ to fortify 
their presence in the forest (interview, chief’s advisor). He did not suggest
that the headmen should invoke chiefly authority to reinforce their claims to
the forest lands – to back up their claims with institutional influence, so to 
speak – but rather, to more firmly imprint their material presence on the land 
and alter the landscape so as to demonstrate permanent use, and that the
forest was ‘lived’, as a former advisor to the chief put it.
Chief Liteta III thus revived the tactics deployed during colonial times,
covertly encouraging his headmen to maintain active presence in and around 
the forest, thereby allowing for people’s rights in the forest to follow from
their bodies onto the material land on which they labored. For the Forestry
Department, of course, labor in itself is not enough to legitimize chiefly
claims to forest resources; any human intervention on the land must be
preceded by state-sanctioned rights in the abstract (see Chapter 8 for an
elaboration of this point). Over the course of two years, between 1994 and
1996, these different ways of relating to the land translated into material
struggles. Fields, farmsteads and orchards were intermittently burned and
ploughed under, after which the forest dwellers consistently replanted and 
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rebuilt, often with the ash-tainted remains (some houses still bear marks of
these fires). Thus, while administrators incessantly erased signs of human
occupation and use, the forest dwellers snuck in via narrow paths weaving 
through the valley – hidden from the view afforded by the lone dirt road – to 
reassemble their homesteads. As such, the political field was visibly
material-ecological, with mango trees, field crops, irons sheets and heavy
rains all performing political work. The hilly forest also obscured hiding 
places while at the same time affording a view of anyone approaching from
below. Localized knowledge and ingenuity mixed with the materiality of the
landscape to produce potent places of defiance. Through these contestations, 
Chief Liteta III could also stake a claim to Munyama Forest without engaging 
in open conflict with the Forestry Department.
The materiality of the landscape once again emerged as a terrain of
politics. Inadvertent material change, such as the annual flooding of the 
lower parts of the forest, also played a pivotal role in how different political
claims came to be articulated. Let me demonstrate this with an episode from
my fieldwork. In late 2017, I experience the first heavy rains over Munyama.
In a day or two, the heavy downpour had submerged the roads in a layer of
mud, making the forest inaccessible other than by foot or a four-wheel drive. 
‘Now we don’t have to worry about these people for a while’, Chiwala
mused, referring to land survey patrols, ‘they never come during the rains’.
In Munyama, state projects are put on hold when it rains, I thought to myself, 
smiling. Seeing my smirk, he added, ‘Yes, sometimes a bad road is a good 
road’, affirming my own thought that the material faculty of the landscape
shapes the conditions of possibility for state rule. After probing these patterns 
more carefully, I learned that all state interventions had occurred during the
dry seasons, while the rainy season provided somewhat of a rest from violent
confrontations. This was also true in the period between 1994 and 1996. The
burning of farmsteads usually started in May and lasted up until September, 
after which the forest dwellers reentered and rebuilt their homesteads in 
November through March. I recalled how forest inhabitants regularly
referred to the rainy season as ‘peaceful’ and ‘calm’, and I saw that these
words took on new meaning once I realized that they referred not so much to
the agricultural year as to a lack of political intrigue.
Yet I wish to add a spiritual-historical layer to this material landscape by
suggesting that state-forest-chiefdom boundaries are struggled over in arenas




   
 
 
    
  
   
    
    
    
    
       
 
    
       
      
  
 
   
   
 
  
    
     
   
 
 
    
 
        
                                                     
         
     
  
    
    
  
(Boundary Story #2), Natota is believed to reside in the waterways that
crisscross Munyama and in the rain that replenishes the forest dambos. It
took me months of fieldwork before people were comfortable enough with 
me to talk about Natota, and even then, most people did so hesitantly. Yet
her presence was most commonly cited in relation to the 1994–1996 
violence; for many of the forest dwellers, the rains that prohibited (and still
prohibit) state agents and survey patrols from entering into Munyama are not
a ‘natural’ or ‘fortuitous’ phenomena, but a manifestation, or the ‘doing’, of
Natota’s spirit, which makes disentangling the ecological from the spiritual
and the natural from the political all the more impossible. 
It is not accidental, then, that the shrine which is maintained in Natota’s
memory was constructed around the time of 1994–1996. The shrine
transmuted her mystical presence into a physical imprint, morphing her
decomposing body into the soil, which then seeps into waterways, linking 
history and abstract rights in a material emplacement of ancestral history.
Many of those who don’t consider themselves ‘Lenje’ have nevertheless also
incorporated Natota into their own histories – not in terms of ancestral
heredity but as a symbol of historical suffering and common toil, thus
reinforcing a communal sense of marginalization among the forest
dwellers.12 Bernard, a man in his fifties, helped me to understand:
It is like Natota is in the rain, and she can also rain on government as she did
before [in 1994–1996] … It is difficult to explain but, like back then, Natota
helped us to come back [to rebuild and replant after episodes of hut burnings],
that is why we are here today like we were here before. So we the people here
don’t forget, OK, some people maybe don’t remember, but together we know,
and that place on the other side [the shrine], people can go and remember …
It is not only for Lenje, there are so many people from different tribes [in
Munyama] now, and like if a Lenje person has a field and the rain comes, it
[the rain] will also come on my fields.
During the course of my fieldwork, I heard many accounts similar to 
Bernard’s. Taken together, they suggest that the era of hut burnings is crucial
12 My fieldwork indicates that the population in Munyama is not united by kinship or constructs of ethnic
belonging, but through a shared sense of oppression fomented by a sense of common toil, with Natota
being a powerful symbol of historical suffering, animating the landscape and people’s horizons of
belonging. The remoteness and difficult terrain of Munyama certainly help in cementing these sentiments




    
  
  
    
   
 






   
     
       
   
 
    
  
       
  
  
   
   




     
  
  
   
   
   
          
for the construction of a shared history, even marking what Veena Das
(1995) has termed a ‘critical event’, a culturally marked historical hinge
generative of identity. My point is not to form an argument around identity, 
but rather to suggest that practices of hut burnings, the subsequent
reconstruction of ash-tainted homesteads and spiritual ecologies combined
to entrench positions of struggle. Rather than editing out people from the
forest lands, government efforts to undermine the livelihoods of the forest
inhabitants instead added to the multiple layers of the forest, even if these
are hidden within forest ecologies or within more invisible cartographies of
power. These layers, and how they sediment and entangle, are important to
lay bare, for they explain, at least in part, why struggles over land so easily
transmute into disputes over belonging. 
I shall return to these hidden layers of the forest in the ninth and final
boundary story, for they still structure the ways forest inhabitants engage
with the state. Before doing so, however, I shall turn analytical attention to
another field of politics: the bureaucratic arena, through which the forest
headmen would come to interact with state administrators in the period 
following the violent confrontations of 1994–1996. Chronologically, the
next story thus takes to where this one ends, yet it marks a radical shift in
focus, charting out the ways the headmen changed tactics and took the
struggle into the bureaucratic field.
6.2.7 Boundary Story #7: Speaking the language of the state
The headmen were well aware that, like solid roofing, fruit trees and
shotguns, a document, if carefully managed, can open up new possibilities in
the struggle over forest boundaries.  Following two years of violent conflict, 
the forest dwellers, thus, changed tactics, seeking state authorization for their
settlements. In 1996, Chiwala and a group of headmen went to see the newly 
appointed provincial forestry officer (PFO) in Kabwe, Mr. Lewis. The PFO
asked the headmen to come back the next day with copies of all village
registers (‘the books’), in part to ensure that the settlements were, in fact,
authorized by Chief Liteta III, and in part to assess the size of the population 
now dwelling in Munyama. Upon assessing the registers, Mr. Lewis
instructed the headmen to ‘go back to Munyama’ and ‘ban the felling of
trees’, in Chiwala’s words. The headmen asked Mr. Lewis to confirm his
request in writing, and so he did. Whether or not the PFO expected that his






   
 
   
 
     
    
 
   
        
    
 
 








   
 
         
    
 
 






unable to locate Mr. Lewis), yet Chiwala interpreted the ordinance as
conditional authorization for his settlement. ‘In that meeting, I became a
forester, doing the work of the forestry people in the government’, Chiwala
smugly stated in one of our conversations. He suggested, in other words, that
this order changed the dynamics of state-chiefdom boundaries by redefining
the relationship as one of alliance rather than of conflict.
Chiwala hinted here at the fact that any form of official recognition 
represents a space of possibility with the potential of being put to use in the
repertoire of claims he could make. The headmen did not stop here, however. 
After the meeting with the PFO, the headmen continued on to Chibombo
District Council with the PFO’s written endorsement, telling the district
secretary that ‘the books’ have been ‘approved’ by the PFO, and that ‘we are 
working with the government now’, as Chiwala put it. As the PFO outranked 
the forestry officials at the district level, the district secretary also ‘approved’
the settlement in Munyama. Upon Chiwala’s request, the District Council
also confirmed its ‘authorization’ in writing. Chiwala made photocopies of
the letter, leaving one with Chief Liteta III to be stored at the palace and
handing out the rest to the headmen of Munyama. In a clever move that took
advantage of and skillfully maneuvered a fragmented state bureaucracy, the
headmen now had ‘state authorization’ for their settlements, endorsed in
writing. Chiwala, in particular, developed a reputation for being able to ‘talk
the law’ as much as for having a body marked by police beatings. Such 
movement remains critical to a seeming paradox: Chiwala kept government
at a distance by appropriating its practices.
If one were to read these documents with a skeptical eye, however, it is 
unclear what they actually say. In many ways, they are mere acknowledgement
that the meetings took place, and that the state administration acknowledges
the presence of people in the forest. Yet in the ‘epistemic murk’ (Bubandt
2009: 556) that often characterizes bureaucratic arenas, the truth or falsity,
authenticity or inauthenticity of documents is often not what determines their
effects (see Hull 2012b: 259). State artifacts, like documents, are ‘iterable’ or
‘citable’ (Das and Poole 2004), susceptible to forgery, mimicry and alternative 
interpretation that extend ‘the state’ into domains of life that bureaucratic
practices would never access otherwise. Munyama Forest is a case in point:
previously undocumented, existing only ‘outside’ the written record, the
Munyama settlements were now citable in relation to official writings, and to







          
   
 
   
  
     
  
    
  
  
   
   
    
  
    
   
 
      
 
  
   
 
 





       
  
   
  
headmen are eager to display these documents and to recount the achievement
of obtaining them with pride.
Yet, just as bureaucracies exercise control through the uncertainty,
ambiguity and fear created by leaving people and things undocumented (see
Mathews 2008; Ticktin 2006) – by leaving boundaries open for continuous
renegotiation – they do so by disputing the validity of documents (Kelly
2006). For example, in 1999 Munyama was shifted from the jurisdiction of
Chibombo District to the newly established Chisamba District Council.
When the headmen presented the letter authorizing settlement in Munyama 
to officers in the new district, those same officers simply invalidated the 
endorsement with reference to the fact that Munyama was no longer under
the jurisdiction of the district that had issued it (on the politics of district
rebordering, see Byrne et al. 2016). The newly established district instead 
took this as an opening and sent another eviction convoy to Munyama
(interview, retired forestry officer). Fields and farmsteads were yet again
burned, but the convoy was eventually overthrown with stones, and the
eviction attempt failed. Yet the letter would continue to mediate the relations
between state and chiefdom. In 2001, for instance, Mr. Lupunga, the then
Minister of Lands (under which the Forestry Department was located), once
again ordered the arrest of the forest headmen. Chiwala was, together with
two neighboring headmen, once again taken to Kabwe Central Prison. This
time Chief Liteta III was informed of Chiwala’s arrest and went to the prison 
and, citing the endorsement of the settlements issued five years earlier,
demanded his headmen’s release. His request was granted. The following
day, Chief Liteta III summoned the provincial police to the chief’s palace,
where they were ordered not to interfere in Munyama, again citing the letter
of authorization. 
Even if the document had accomplished some important political work,
it had far from secured forest boundaries. The forest headmen still believe 
that the document signals that Munyama settlements were once authorized
by state bureaucracy; yet over time, the document has been subjected to rain
and moisture, changing its form and quality, impacting how it is read and 
received. In recent years when it has been presented to officials at various 
administrative-institutional sites, they have laughed at the old document with
the faded writing and dismissed it, not so much on the basis of its content as 
on its form. That the political potential of documents is contingent upon their







       
  
   
  
             
    
 
   
   
 
 
    
   
   
      
  
 
   
 
 
      
     
  
   
  
  
       
       
     
  
  
         
Hetherington 2009; Kafka 2009). What I want to draw attention to here,
however, is that a document’s materiality not only opens up new sorts of
interpretive possibilities and closes down others, it draws lines of difference
between categories of people.
For example, before the meeting in September 2017 (Boundary Story #9),
Chiwala was not content with the copy of the 1996 document he had in his
possession, which bore obvious signs of exposure to rain. This was one of
the reasons he was up in that tree, talking to his fellow headmen. It was not
only a matter of locating the document, but of locating the copy which had
the least faded writing, the fewest dark spots, and the smoothest paper. As
Chiwala explained later on: ‘I have been to different places showing this
document [referring to his own ‘ruined’ copy], they didn’t even want to look
at it. They think I’m not someone that could have anything to show them
only because I live here … If they see a document that is ruined by rain like 
this, they see someone who cannot take care of anything; it’s not good, you
see.’ What Chiwala suggested was that the shape of a document also says 
something about its holder, his or her house, whether the roof is leaking, and 
whether she or he has been careful enough to protect the document in a
plastic folder. The social position (class, if you will) of a document’s holder
is inscribed onto the document itself. 
In Munyama, documents are incredibly difficult to protect from climatic 
imprints, with prevalent poverty making it hard – even for the relatively
better-off headmen – to afford quality roofing, especially as people have 
been forced to rebuild their houses with materials damaged by fire. Thus, 
even if the content of a document signals an entitlement, the material quality
of that document can also signal that its holder is incapable of taking good 
care of it, which in turn can render the entitlement invalid. As such, it is not
the document itself which fails to signal a rightful claim, but the person
holding the document in his or her hand, and indeed where and under what
conditions he or she lives. Even though Chibombo District Council
purportedly endorsed Munyama settlements in writing, today the very
materiality of that document – molded by the ecological-material-historical 
condition of the forest itself – draws new lines of difference between those
who are able to protect the integrity of documents and those who are not.
I shall come back to this document in the ninth and final story, when it
once more takes center stage (see also Chapter 8 for a discussion of docu-
ments). For the headmen, the document was never seen as an ‘end point’, but
138
 
   
 
   
          
      
   
  
  
    
      
    
      
  
   
   
 
  
      
      
  
    
   
    
  
     
    
    
          
  
     
     
  
  
                                                     
    
     
 
as a site of possibility, to be put to use to generate indeterminacy and
ambiguity in the struggle over forest resources. Before returning to the 2017
meeting, however, I wish to make another analytical move, telling the story
of how Munyama changed from a ‘National Forest’ to ‘State Land’, which
altered the terrain of struggle and reconstituted anew people’s relations to the
forest and the statutory administration. 
6.2.8 Boundary Story #8: Reclassifying space
The letter of authorization issued by Chibombo District Council in 1996 did 
not mark and end to the conflict over Munyama. What sustained the conflict, 
the forest dwellers believed, was the very category of ‘National Forest’, a
legal category designating the population as ‘encroachers’. In 2008 a group
of headmen thus traveled to the State House in Lusaka to petition for the
declassification, or de-gazettement, of Munyama as a ‘National Forest’. They 
reasoned that a de-classification would return the forest to the Lenje
Chiefdom, thereby changing people’s status as illegal cultivators.13 I was
unable to unravel exactly how their petition landed with the state
administration; the labeling of Munyama as a ‘National Forest’, however, did
indeed change, but the new label puzzled the forest dwellers: in 2009
Munyama Forest was reclassified into ‘State Land’. From my interviews with
officials at the forestry department, I learned that the decision was made
because there was ‘no longer any point’ in trying to practice ‘any form of
forestry’ as ‘the forest was gone’. It therefore made administrative sense to 
incorporate Munyama into the jurisdiction of the Department of Lands, thus
rendering the area ‘State Land’. The reclassification not only shifted the 
administration of Munyama from the underfinanced Department of Forestry
to the relatively potent Department of Lands, but it changed the very logic of
state intervention: from a forest that was to be restored and protected,
Munyama became an ‘underdeveloped’ stretch of land that was to be 
‘transformed into an area of commercial farming’, as a former Lands officer
put it to me. As such, it also transformed the forest dwellers from ‘encroacher’
in a National Forest to ‘squatters’ standing in the way of modernization.
Somewhat ironically, the headmen themselves had inadvertently instigated
this transformation by their visit to the State House.
13 At this time, Chief Liteta III had also passed away, and his successor, Chief Liteta IV, was more 





















    
   
     
       
       
 
         
    
  
  









The years following the reclassification were marked by tension. In
contrast to the Department of Forestry, the Department of Lands has access 
to military means, the Land Task Force, deployed to evict ‘unlawful settlers’
from lands that fall under the category of State Land. Violent clashes ensued
in 2010, 2011 and 2013. Farms and fields were burned, but government
surveyors trying to measure and demarcate the forest lands were repeatedly
threatened and on occasion stoned. Many of the documents that the headmen 
had assembled were lost in these fires. Many forest inhabitants also lost
identity cards, marriage certificates and their children’s birth certificates,
making it all the more difficult to legally plead their cases.
In a countermove, the headmen loaded a truck with local residents and
drove to the district headquarters in Chisamba township where they staged a 
riot, storming government offices and threatening district staff, thereby
moving the conflict from the remote forest lands into the heart of district 
politics. The actions of the forest dwellers were vigorously condemned by
district staff. A government memo written by the then district secretary of
Chisamba District portrays a ‘wild crowd’ demanding ‘government retrac-
tion’ from ‘State Land’. ‘Under no circumstances’, the memo continues, ‘can
we allow a tribalist faction to dictate government policy and encumber the
development of the nation.’ (Government memo, Chisamba District Council:
Public Response to Munyama Squatters, Nov. 4, 2014). The framing of these
struggles is revealing, setting an anarchic world that seems to show no
respect for law and property against a settled world of agrarian order – in 
many ways a reiteration of colonial constructs between the civilized and the
savage, the latter imagined as incapable of an appreciation of legal rights and
duties and occupying a space of absence of law and property and the
concomitant presence of violence (e.g. Hobbes ([1651] 1988; Locke ([1690]
1980). Notably absent in these accounts, of course, are the legalized
violences of dispossession and interdiction that underpin such narratives (see
Fitzpatrick 1992). 
My point here, then is that the reclassification had profound state-forest-
chiefdom boundary effects, entrenching Munyama as an anachronistic space
within modernity, populated by a people too backward to understand the
concept of law, whose enunciations of rights are wild and violent. In many 
ways, the reclassification was constitutive of capitalist modernity, in that
Munyama became a constitutive outside to property, a stock of resources for
the accumulation of wealth and for nation-building, while at the same time it
140
 






       
  
     
         
  
    
   







     
 
  
   
     
 
         
  




                                                     
     
    
worked to solidify already highly exclusive notions of belonging to the
modern nation.
6.2.9 Boundary Story #9: Assembling the past in a colonial presence
At least since the 1940s, Munyama has been stabilized and destabilized as
an object of economic, political and cultural control. It is an unfixed space in
which the future of people, natures and institutions hangs in the balance, a
landscape of rupture, discontinuity and turmoil, where boundary effects have
been fragile and preliminary in their achievement. These effects extend far
beyond the spatial compartmentalization of political territory. If we only look 
at this step – the territorialization of categories at different scales and sites in
the world – then the previous processes of bounding and categorization are
overlooked and left unexplored. Yet, and as I hope my storytelling shows, it
is in the processes of ‘bounding’ and ‘bordering’ rather than in the compart-
mentalized outcomes of the various social, political, ecological and spiritual
processes that we can discern the relations of power that determine who is
on the inside, who is on the outside and who becomes authorized to govern, 
with de jure and de facto orders rarely aligning. These processes are very
much ongoing, with state, forest and chiefdom continuing to shift, blur and
fold in and out of each other. 
When I first arrived in Munyama Forest in 2016, two years had passed 
since the ‘Chisamba riots’, and the new district secretary had recently
announced plans to resume the demarcation of the forest lands. But rather
than relying on military means and forceful eviction, the forest dwellers
would be given the opportunity be part of the future titling process, and thus
form part of a land regime under statutory law.14 A year later, in September
2017, a rather chaotic meeting was held to this end. This meeting shall be the 
subject of my ninth and final story, and my hope is that the eight stories above
will help to disentangle what was said (and done), why it was said (and done)
and, above all, how multiple layers of political and cultural meaning and
sediments of earlier boundaries are, to varying degrees, still at play – that is,
how they continue to create spaces of exclusion and inclusion and structure
that ways power is exercised across myriad boundaries that crisscross 
contemporary Munyama Forest.
14 This was a decision partly based on an experience in a neighboring district where violent clashes
between land claimants and military had resulted in two dead.
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‘Aha’ I heard from inside the house. Chiwala came out with the letter of
authorization, dated 1996, in his hand. It was a brittle document, the writing
faded, and folded so many times that it nearly fell apart. Not content with its
quality, he once more ascended the tree behind the storage hut, trying to 
locate a better copy. I sat scribbling in my notebook, and I picked up bits and 
pieces of conversation: ‘After we were released from jail … in 1996 … yes 
… the police inspector wrote something … where are you now? Don’t worry, 
late is good … No, that road is flooded, go up the hill…’ His voice echoed
across the landscape that I had come to know over the past seven months. I
still had difficulties navigating the myriad roads, footpaths and passageways 
that traverse the forest and coaxing my ramshackle motorbike through the 
bog soils in its sinks. More than once I have been the laughingstock of people
trying to pull my bike out of the mire. A ringing once again prompted
Chiwala up the tree. This time it was someone from the government convoy 
calling. They were on their way to the old school building in the center of
forest, the venue of the meeting, but one of their cars had been caught in the
clay. ‘Ah, those people don’t know anything … how could they manage a
place like this?’, Chiwala laughed. Once again, due claim and ecology of
landscape entwined. 
When Chiwala and I arrived at the school, the classroom was already
crammed full with people, and there was a large gathering outside in the
courtyard. Under the blackboard stood three empty chairs, reserved for the
district secretary (DS) of Chisamba District Council, the provincial planning
officer (PPO) from Central Province, and Chief Liteta IV. The place of the
meeting had its own politics, chosen to signal the government’s inclination
to ‘meet the population on their terms’, as the DS would tell me two days
later when I met her in Chisamba township. I spotted many familiar faces in 
the room. Many of those in attendance had helped me to understand the
historical sediments of Munyama, and seeing them gathered under one roof
made me think of the meeting as a window into an unfolding political drama. 
Soon, the convoy of government vehicles pulled up outside the school. Apart
from the expected guests, two police officers with automatic rifles slung over
their shoulders also arrived at the scene. After what seemed like an endless
exchange of courtesies, everyone took their seats. Chiwala, taking the role of













   
 
   
   
       
   
 
   
 
    
 
  
       
      
  
  
    




   
 
    
   
     
The PPO explained that Munyama was ‘officially State Land’, and that
the land was to be divided up into modular units and sold on the land market. 
Those currently living in Munyama would be given an opportunity to ‘buy 
land at a reduced price’ and form part of a ‘modern land government’ and 
‘enjoy tenure security’ enforced by the ‘Ministry of Lands’. The PPO was
reading from a tablet computer, and the rhetoric was pompous. The suit that 
he was wearing was stainless, and so were his shoes. He embodied urban
officialdom, which made him stand out as an odd element in the room. And 
much like Locke, he spoke of a break between a moment when human
relations were governed by their relations with material things through labor
and the moment when relations came to be governed by the abstract order of
the legal contract.
The PPO was persuasive, yet I was immediately reminded of the arena 
and audience of this performance when an older man in the back raised his
voice: ‘Now, why should we buy our own land?’ Encouraged by this
comment, another man intervened: ‘Yes, only a fool would buy something
that is already his’. ‘We have cleared the land, we have built roads, irrigation
channels and planted trees, and now you are saying that we should pay? We
have already paid’, the man in the back continued. ‘We have suffered for this
land. I have rebuilt my house after you burned it, I have replanted my fields
after you burned everything’, a third man interceded, asserting moral cause
in the face of persistent discrimination. Indeed, any enactment of officialdom
needs to be set in context, revealing how geographies and histories of the
present pivot on how past struggles gain traction and recur to shape material 
and discursive fields of action. The PPO seemed genuinely surprised at
people’s unwillingness to acquire titles: ‘Like I said, Munyama is State Land,
only the government can give such land’. He added, ‘Let me put it like this:
land titles mean that no one can take the land away from you’. The PPO
continued his invocation of codes and efficiency implying the superiority of
abstraction over the material, whereas the forest dwellers repeated that such
abstractions are an outgrowth of material-historical processes.
What constitutes a legitimate claim is a question with deep historical-
colonial roots in Munyama (e.g. Boundary Story #2 and #8), and here we see
how it continues to define the relations between agents of the state and those
who find themselves sitting outside the circuits of statutory law, with the
PPO suggesting that property rights require state enforcement. This, of
course, is the paradox at the very heart of liberalism: if possessive
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individualism as an ontological claim to freedom rests on the tenet of private
property, then property itself depends on state power (see Roy 2017). That
is, private property ‘does not exclude but on the contrary demands the
supremacy of the state over the individual’, as Macpherson (1962: 256)
writes. In my reading, it is precisely this relationship between property and
state enforcement that the people in Munyama position themselves against:
it was a direct critique of a place-less, labor-less and history-less conception
of property.
The tension between the abstract-legal and material-historical was not
simply a tension between different ways of relating to land and history;
however, it was equally strategic. No doubt, previous struggles had produced
a strong skepticism toward government promises, and most people believed, 
despite pledges from the PPO that their land would merely be ‘transferred’
to the statutory administration, that they would be evicted once the land had 
been surveyed. Yet this assumption was not based on distrust alone. The
prevalent poverty in Munyama meant that even at a ‘reduced price’ most
forest dwellers would struggle to afford a title and pay annual land tax. Thus,
even if people got the opportunity to ‘buy their own land’, the result would
be eviction as they would be unable to amass the necessary capital. The 
mechanism that would spark the dispossession of the forest dwellers would,
in other words, be folded into ordinary bureaucratic procedure (see Chapter
8 for a discussion on titling). As one person said: ‘We are subsistence
farmers, we don’t have money in our pockets like you do [talking to the
PPO]. Yes, maybe we can sell some maize and goats, but you say we should
buy, but how should we buy?’ In my reading, the forest dwellers’ invocation
of history and material struggle was, at least in part, founded upon the
concern that boundaries previously constructed around the savage and the
civilized (see Boundary Story #1 and #5) would transmute into difference
constructed around class (even if not articulated as such).
It seemed to me that the PPO interpreted people’s assertions as resistance 
against the idea of private ownership, rather than resistance against a
conception of property rights that excludes the rural poor. Tangled up in
these concerns was also the question of how social and material practices on
the land can be translated into abstract lines on maps. As Layla, an older
woman from Chiwala village, put it to the PPO: ‘I have some land here and
some land there, I collect mushrooms in the forest, and I know some people




   
  
    




    
  
    
       
 
       
  
    




   
  
           
   
         
 
 
    
  
  






          
say [silence] our ancestors live there … How will you know what land to
give and not to give?’ She pointed to the complex property system of nested
and overlapping boundaries, with people holding both territorial and non-
territorial resource-specific concepts of rights, such as claims to specific
types of trees in collectively managed areas. These vary by space, time, the 
age and gender of the resource user, the types of trees, their products and 
uses. The inclination of the land, as well as its proximity to waterways,
determines what crops are suitable to plant, and also who is suitable to
cultivate what land. And some lands, as she hinted at, are resting sites for
ancestral spirits.
I knew Layla from following her and a group of other women on forays.
While struggling to keep up with their busy stride, I would listen to the group
share stories of how the spirit of Natota makes trees grow tall in certain parts 
of the forest, how she forms fertile grounds from mushrooms in some places,
and creates productive soils for cultivation in others (see Boundary Story #2). 
The boundaries of the landscape follow from Natota’s movement, Layla
suggested. The question I heard her pose during the meeting was ‘how can
private property be mapped onto such a geography?’ Implicit in her question
was a concern that drawing distinct boundaries in the sand may disturb spirits 
and intensify struggles over the kinds of rights these boundaries signify, 
rather than clarify them. I was not surprised that Natota remained hidden in
the subtext. As Layla had told me the day before the meeting, rendering
Munyama a place of spirits would make the population seem ‘irrational’ in
the eyes of stately officialdom. Indeed, storytelling can legitimize claims to
land by connecting it to history (Fortmann 1995), but some stories are best
kept secret, Layla had reasoned. Thus, when the PPO, who seemed annoyed
by her question, simply stated that ‘everyone will get land, don’t worry’, and
‘we can leave burial sites out of the planning grid, don’t worry’, no rebuttal
followed, and Natota remained a hidden force in a secret geography. 
Instead, headman Kambobe raised his voice: ‘You say everyone will get
land, we say we already have land, and it is not just something we say just
like that, we have proof’. He pulled out the document showing that
Chibombo District Council had acknowledged Munyama settlements in
1996, redirecting attention toward something that he believed would resonate
better with the PPO. Headman Kambobe continued: ‘The land was given to 
us by [the] government in 1996; it is here in this document’. With this, he
asserted that their rights are no mere abstraction of labor, but products of a
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legal agreement: ‘See, it is stamped and everything’, he continued, 
suggesting that the stamp was a decisive sign of government recognition (see
Boundary Story #7). This evidently took the PPO, who was unaware of the
existence of such a document, by surprise. An awkward silence filled the 
room as the PPO took a seat to study the document. The murky room
apparently made it difficult for him to read it, so eventually he took the
document and went to the entranceway where there was more light. The DS
joined him at the doorway where they exchanged a few imperceptible words. 
It was clear that the materiality of the document transformed and distorted
the meaning it was supposed to carry. The humidity had inscribed on the
document patches of dark gray, and it was clear that age had shaped the
relationship between the document and the object to which it referred. The
DS held it up against the light and shook her head. 
Back in their seats, the PPO concluded in a rather submissive voice: ‘I
don’t know what to do with this. I mean, anyone at a government office can
write a document like this … and look, it’s so old that the districts have
changed … Even if the district would be the same, you cannot come with a 
document looking like this, I mean, what would a court say? They would toss
it … and a district council cannot authorize settlement on State Land, only 
the Ministry of Lands can do that’. Headman Kambobe took advantage of
what he saw as a glitch in the PPO’s statement: ‘It was not State Land in
1996, it was a forest, and we took care of the forest for the province… You 
cannot just change the land and tell people this is state land when it was a 
forest before, we have other documents; even the forest people in the
province told us to take care of the forest’. Kambobe went back to his seat
and pulled out the document that stated that the 1996 Provincial Forestry
Officer (PFO) had instructed the headmen to ban the felling of trees, and he
put it in the hands of the PPO. ‘You see, it was a forest, and we did what the
province said’. Kambobe’s point here was that the headmen successfully had
performed the duties assigned to them by the government (see Boundary 
Story #3), which for him signaled a legitimate claim to the forest lands.
During the course of the meeting, there were several moments when the 
silence in the room was painfully awkward. One of those moments occurred
when the PPO and the DS sat with the various documents in their hands,
pointing to different segments in the text while whispering inaudibly to each
other. Indeed, documents carry a ‘messy and excessive potentiality’ (Navaro-








    
   
       
    
          
 
      
   
   
 
  
           






    
  
       
  
    
 
   
 
    
  
  
   
holders and readers across different legal regimes and social situations. It
was the documents’ excesses, rather than legal-formal validity, that were the
terrain of struggle during the meeting. Both documents were highly
indeterminate objects that conveyed information, but never in a direct or
even predictable way. Instead, they were radically open, and hence allowed
for all sorts disputes about the role of the state and the chiefdom, and about
the relations that the state facilitates. When finally pressed by headman
Kambobe to confirm that Munyama was ‘a forest’ in 1996 (which was meant
to validate the documents in his hand), the PPO simply said: ‘But the forest
is not there anymore … if you were protecting the forest like you say, why 
is the forest not there? There’s nothing to discuss’. ‘Yes we must discuss,
because it is there’, Kambobe retorted, ‘just look, we could cut all trees but
we have rules for that. Ask anyone, they will tell you … the forest is there
and the document is there’, he said, trying to ground the document’s validity
in the material landscape.
What this exchange hides, of course, is that prior to 1947, Munyama was
not ‘a forest’ in need of ‘protection’, at least not in a stately administrative 
sense. Before the enclosure of the forest by the colonial Forestry Department,
Munyama had been a collectively managed resource for shifting cultivation,
grazing, the collection of wild foods and the like. During the meeting, it was
the headmen who pressed state bureaucrats to recognize Munyama as ‘a 
forest’ in need of ‘protection’ and administration, thus appropriating the
forest management rationale which had edited out Munyama from chiefly
control in the first place (Boundary Story #1). But the PPO didn’t want to 
comment on the matter further. Instead, he wanted to take all the documents
with him for ‘further validation’. Although he promised to give them back, 
Kambobe was reluctant to hand them over, and not only because these were 
his only copies, but also because he would be unable to control their impact
once they traveled into a domain to which he had no access. Headman
Kambobe was well aware that their ‘validity’ would be challenged once they
entered into the ambit of state bureaucracy. Kambobe’s documents are not
places where boundaries could become stable, but resting places for signs, 
held for deployment in different times and places. Certainly they had
introduced an element of indeterminacy in the meeting, and the PPO was
getting visibly aggravated when Kambobe and others tried to get him to
recognize Munyama as ‘a forest’. In a quite punitive voice he said: ‘Look,
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we didn’t come here to have a debate about what a forest is; this is not a
court, we are giving you a chance to get titles, that’s it’.
At this, the PPO nodded toward Chief Liteta IV, encouraging him to 
intervene. While the meeting had thus far held few surprises, it took a new
turn when Chief Liteta IV spoke up: ‘My predecessor was wrong in letting 
people settle here’, he avowed. ‘It was never his land to give; you have to 
work with the government’. Then and there, Chief Liteta IV rendered the
headmen’s historical claim to Munyama illegitimate. During the meeting
itself, no one had dared to confront Chief Liteta IV. Immediately after the
meeting, however, many of the forest inhabitants speculated that Chief Liteta 
IV had had no choice, that he could be removed from the throne if he openly
opposed the government. Some recalled the story of when Chief Liteta III,
his predecessor, had lingered after a meeting to tell the people to plant mango
trees and replace their thatched roofs with iron sheets. They believed that the
current chief was in a similar situation, and that instead of openly exercising
his institutional authority, he would reinvent the tactics of more covert action
(Boundary Story #3). But when Chief Liteta IV left the meeting without
further addressing them, most came to believed that he had been become a
‘puppet chief’, bought off by the District Council (a view that was reinforced
by the fact that he traveled in the same car as the district secretary) to support
the government, with his monthly state allowance representing an illicit form
of wealth grounded in his denial of historical rights.
This latter belief was reinforced by the fact that their chief had arrived to
the meeting clad in jeans and a sweatshirt rather than in his royal garb. When
Chief Liteta IV first entered the classroom, this had immediately stirred
confusion, with people whispering about his appearance: ‘Where is our
chief?’ and ‘he looks nothing like our chief’ were some of the interjections I
scribbled down in my notebook. These statements were uttered not in the
sense of people failing to recognize their chief in plain clothing, but in
surprise that he didn’t exhibit chiefly officialdom. When Chief Liteta IV
unexpectedly disavowed claims based on historical prerogatives, a new layer
of meaning was added to these statements, signaling that the potentially
renegotiated boundaries between state and chiefdom had been visible on his
body from the very onset of the meeting. When I asked Chief Liteta IV about
this a week later (one of the more awkward questions I’ve asked during my
fieldwork), he disclosed that he had, in fact, been told by the DS that ‘it is




           
    
   
  
   
       
  
   
 
   






           
  
    
      
         
   
   
    
 
    
   
        





   
not, the configuration of state-chiefdom boundaries had been rescaled onto 
the body of the chief, structuring the ways his authority became tangled up
in state rule on the day of the meeting. In many ways, the situation echoed
indirect rule’s public performance of an orchestrated alliance of chiefly and
state authority.
Following Chief Liteta IV’s lodgment in the meeting, the atmosphere in
the room was dim. The DS, who had been quiet up to this point, suggested
that the headmen ‘maybe could become village chairmen’, thus renouncing
their chiefly titles while still retaining a position of authority. Before anyone
had a chance to respond, the PPO announced that he needed to travel back to 
Kabwe, and that the meeting was over. In a last effort, headman Kambobe 
addressed everyone in the room: ‘Don’t you see, we will lose our land; do
you think that you can keep your land if the government moves in? No, they
will sell your land to people from town and you will have nowhere to go’.
These words marked an abrupt end to the meeting, as the PPO, DS and Chief
Liteta IV were already on their way out the door. 
6.3 Epilogue
What actually occurred during the meeting? This is not an easy question to
answer. For Chiwala, the meeting had been a coup, an attempt at replacing a 
chiefly administrative regime with the governing principles of the state. The
story of the camel that I recited in the introduction to this thesis was told by
Chiwala on the evening of the meeting. It describes a camel cunningly
probing its way into an Arab’s tent during a trek across a desert. The Arab is
kind enough to invite the camel in, but then find himself displaced from his 
own abode. ‘The state is a camel’, Chiwala asserted. As a metaphor for state
governance, the story speaks to colonization more generally, but also to the
engineered alliance of chiefly and state authority during the meeting. For
Chiwala, the difference is negligible: ‘Ever since the white masters came 
here, it’s the same; first they come and say this is a forest and you must leave,
then they come and say this is State Land and you must pay. What can they
say next time? That this will be a mine?’ In this, Chiwala directly addressed
the intersections of state power and the management of ‘natures’, territory
and displacement. 
Yet the meeting, and the history in which it was embedded, also trouble




   
   
   
    
  
   
   
    
  




   
   





       
  
    
 






   
     
‘overwrites’ local knowledge and power (per Scott 1998; cf. Harris 2017). 
For me, the classroom is a conceptual place through which stately and chiefly
forms of authority have been reinvented and struggled over since at least the
1940s. The meeting, in this optic, should not be seen as taking place on 
predefined ground (desert/forest) between fixed points of difference
(Arab/headmen and camel/state); rather, the meeting (as all boundary events
before) was an opening for the renegotiation and rearticulation of what the 
categories of state, forest and chiefdom are. In Munyama, the ‘content’ of
these categories has never been pre-given; they are ultimately storied and
practiced, always a product of action and reaction, events, accidents or
attempts to govern that rework the boundaries that make up the forest’s
‘constitution’, and consequently who can control and use the forest lands.
The meeting provides a detailed account of how such negations play out on
the ground, how contemporary struggles pivot on how past struggles gain
traction, in turn bringing into view the contested geographies upon which 
state and chiefdom take form.
Yet the meeting certainly opened up new terrains of struggle, principally 
those of private property and the potential shifting allegiance of Chief Liteta
IV. When I met the PPO for a separate interview after the meeting, he
avowed that ‘the people will calm down … it’s always like this in this
country. Apparently, those people have history there; they even had some
old documents, you have seen, I’m sure. We don’t want to evict those people
… they will be given land for a small fee’. The PPO explained that the
Ministry of Lands would provide funding and surveying support while the
provincial government in Kabwe would take responsibility for cadastral
mapping. The first step, however, was a ‘social survey’, which was to be
done by Chisamba District Council. The purpose of the ‘social survey’ was
to map out how much land each household in Munyama cultivated and how
many heads of cattle each household had in its possession, in order to
estimate how much land each household was entitled to in a future titling 
process. The land’s ‘objective qualities’, I was told, would define what land 
was suitable for residence, cultivation, grazing. ‘Agro-ecological’ and
‘economic’ criteria would determine the size of holdings and the number of
livestock allowed. ‘Planned land use’, the PPO argued, would prevent
‘random settlement,’ which is an obstacle to ‘good governance’. At the time
of writing this, however, the ‘social surveyors’ are yet to be deployed.
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Also the question of whether the forest headmen have lost the patronage
of the chieftainship remains open. In my conversation with Chief Liteta IV,
he remained elusive, often resolutely declining to speak about Munyama
Forest. Yet the headmen still have in their possession the ‘books’, signaling 
a continued ambiguity of the chieftainship. ‘Yes, my headmen still have
them, maybe I will collect them, maybe not, let’s see’, was all he was willing 
to say. Chiwala believes that Chief Liteta IV needs ‘controlling’ and to be
reminded of his ‘forefathers’ and their ‘cause’. In the meantime, the wider
forest population is in the midst of erecting sturdier houses and breaking new
land to signal expansive use, and the headmen are in the process of crafting
their own land certificates, adding yet another symbol of political legiti-
mation to their repertoire – perhaps in an effort to bolster their legitimacy 
amid fears of shifting loyalties.
6.4 Chapter conclusion
This chapter is about a piece of earth that exists in both stately and chiefly 
registers of social, political and ecological life. I have laid bare the overlays
and frictions of these layers in an effort to better understand how land is
struggled over and to contribute, thereby, to a reimagining of political
authority in rural Zambia that captures the interplay between different natures, 
polities and histories, and the forms of inclusions and exclusions that emerge
within. I have shown how people have been collapsed into nature, erased from
nature, written themselves back into the landscape through chiefly autho-
rization and spiritual sanction, been constituted and reconstituted as racialized
state subjects and have sought state recognition through documentary 
practices – throughout time articulating and rearticulating their relationships
to the resources and authorities of the forest. The forest headmen and
inhabitants have continually tested the limits of state governance, in turn
provoking new attempts to govern, iteratively reconfiguring the landscape,
chiefly control and the possibilities for people to use the forest lands.
In concluding this chapter, I wish to underline three insights emerging from
my analysis. First, Munyama Forest bears a striking resemblance to the
‘imperial debris’, as defined by Stoler (2008: 193), caught up in ‘the evasive
space of imperial formations past and present as well as the perceptions and
practices by which people are forced to reckon with features of those formation 
















   
     
   
    
 
 
         
 
   
  
   
    
    
 
   
     
  




effects of imperialism, that I have discussed here are not only those that were 
created through the imperial projects of traditional colonial powers. Other
effects have arisen from the reinvention or extension of colonial-era imperial
practices and imaginaries by a postcolonial administration, making its control
over territorial formations within the nation-state appear commonsensical (cf.
Peluso 2011). What I have shown, however, is that the boundaries that mark 
out Munyama Forest as a particular place (whether a Protected Forest Area,
National Forest or State Land) are anything but commonsensical; the boundary
stories I have told make Munyama into not one place, but multiple places – a 
heterotopia, ‘juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that
are in themselves incompatible’ (Foucault 1986: 25). If what determines the
constitutive elements of Munyama Forest is an effect of these multiple histo-
ries, practices and imaginaries, then it becomes vividly clear how taking the 
forest as commonsensical conceals and reinforces the relations of power that
are constitutive of, and internalized within, its historical forms of legibility.
Second, the relationship between ‘state’ and ‘chiefdom’ is not simply
some dialectic between expansion and resistance evolving with linear time,
but is, rather, complicated by a series of discontinuous strategies and
practices that proceed from multiple temporalities and spatialities; they
mingle and engender hybrid formations that ultimately blur and refuse the
distinction between them. Even if the boundaries between state, forest and
chiefdom began as inchoate differences, of Chief Liteta III being unable to 
protect ‘valuable tree species’ from ‘encroaching tribesmen’ (see Boundary
Story #1), these divisions did not reflect any ‘out there’ reality, but rather the
crucial boundary work that imbued state, forest and chiefdom with particular
meanings and distinctions (e.g. that a ‘traditional Chief’ is unable to
understand the ‘principles of forestry’) that lay the ground for subsequent
struggles. The making of state, forest and chiefdom, my analysis suggests, is 
contingent upon the continuous reproduction and recognition of a myriad of
such distinctions – creating an ‘illusion of two separate worlds’, as van 
Binsbergen (1987: 47) writes. Such ‘illusions’, my analysis shows, have 
powerful material effects: they set up systems of social closure, exclusion
and control, comprising the formation and delimitation of a field of
government, the making and unmaking of spaces of political intervention 
and the determination and contestation of what is nature and society, lawful
and unlawful, permissible and impermissible, modern and traditional. At any 
particular moment in time, the forest operates like a container into which
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peoples can be placed or cast out, yet such effects were always contested,
fragile and preliminary in their achievement. The boundaries of the forest
were always, and continue to be, inchoate – always forming as new critiques 
and rearticulations are made. As such, state-forest-chiefdom boundaries
never mark definite exteriors but distinctions within social orders, yet
distinctions that reproduce the governing relationships in between.
Third, a focus on boundaries shifts analytical attention away from state,
forest and chiefdom as predefined entities with a fixed set of relations in
between, and towards the boundary struggles through which both state and
chiefdom exert authority to govern, and through which they emerge as
standing separate from each other. Yet, it is not simply that ‘nature’ provides
a panorama for the performance of political authority, or a discursive 
medium through which ideas of cultural difference operate, but also that the
physical properties of the landscape – and how they are invoked, maneuvered 
and spirited – open and foreclose spaces for political action and enactments
of difference (cf. Nightingale 2018; Harris 2017). Munyama Forest is a place 
where political authorities come into being due to their entanglement with
socio-natural land. Attending to these dynamics is crucial for broadening our
understanding of politics – that an ancestral spirit ‘can rain on government’
is not an empirical oddity, but fundamental for understanding how the forest
is struggled over. Failure to attend to these more hidden ecologies means that
we risk naturalizing colonial epistemologies, further sidelining the boundary















    





        







      7. Empirical Chapter III: The Survey Beacon
Property becoming otherwise: state, affect and 
materiality in Mulonga village
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I probed how a material space claimed by both stately
and chiefly forms of authority intertwined different forms of rule, both
materially and discursively. In this chapter I shift analytical attention to how
private property is materialized on customary land. Empirically, the analysis
is placed in Mulonga village, about a half day’s travel from Munyama Forest
(in the dry season). Conceptually, the analysis moves from material space 
onto material objects to probe how the emplacement of survey beacons and
material encounters are fundamentally imbricated in the ways state power is
mapped onto the landscape – not as a secure achievement, but as a critical
moment of political contestation.
Mulonga village, autumn 2016
Peter dwells in the eastern bend of Mulonga village. During cropping season,
he starts the day at the break of dawn, making the trip to his maize fields to
work his land. When the sun approaches its summit, he walks back home to
cure his back pains in the shadows of his abode, only to return to the fields
when the sun is less daunting to his labor. It was during this time, Peter
recounts, that a white pickup truck pulled up, stirring him awake during his
midday slumber. He awoke to unfamiliar voices in the homestead, and when 
he came outside, two men were in the process of mixing cement in a plastic 
bucket, while a third mounted a tripod by the cocking hut. Confused by the
spectacle unfolding in front of him, he inquired who the men were, where they 
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had come from and what they were doing. The men explained that they were
surveyors sent by the Ministry of Lands in Lusaka to demarcate the land.
‘We’re only following instructions’, one of the surveyors said, waving a map
in his hand. ‘We only put beacons where the map tells us’, another surveyor
echoed. If Peter wanted to ‘complain’, the surveyors continued, he had to go 
elsewhere, to the Ministry of Lands in Lusaka, where the map had been drawn
up, embodying the surveyors with an inviolability rooted in their association
with a distant, and for Peter, more diffuse, authority of the state. Much like
documents, the surveyors signaled the ‘double signs of the state’s distance and 
its penetration into the life of the everyday’ (Das and Poole 2004: 15). Too 
uneasy and confused to intervene, Peter simply observed how they put beacon
after beacon in his land. One was placed on the doorstep to his sleeping hut,
while Peter, without saying a word, stood aside. The contours of a new private
property regime were materializing on the land, rendering in concrete
emergent relations of state authority and new spatialities of exclusion.
In this chapter, I narrate material encounters between people in Mulonga,
the white pickup truck, survey beacons and the bureaucratic sites that they
are attached to, in order to probe how ‘the state’ emerges in certain moments
and at particular sites, socially, materially and affectively, to write on the
ground new relations of rule between state and citizens. The analysis maps 
onto a growing body of research that probes the intimate relations between
property making and state formation (e.g. Bridge 2014; Lund 2016; Sikor
and Lund 2009; Vandekerckhove 2011). Yet, while most of these accounts
privilege conceptions of state and property as socio-legal constructs, I shall
bring the ‘stuff of property’, cement and rebar, into critical view, probing
how it becomes entwined with the expectations and emotions of citizens to
produce new forms of defiance, subjugation and alienation. As I will show,
if we are to fully understand how private property and authority come into 
being in particular sites, we must venture beyond the socio-legal relationality
of property and probe its actual and conflictual territorialization, to where its
very materiality works as a prism of state power.
After the surveyors had departed from Peter’s homestead, he called me 
over, where a few neighbors had already gathered. Chipepo, Peter’s neighbor
to the south, was quick to propose that the surveyors had been drunk, that
someone had seen them drinking by their pickup truck. If they were drunk,
someone else commented, maybe they had misplaced the beacons, ‘putting




         
  
       
  
    
   
   
    
  
    
   
  
       
   
       
     
  
 
         
 
        
    
  
    
  
         





    
   
map’, Peter retorted. My initial instinct was to take Peter’s rebuttal to mean 
that the map was not only a projection of a bureaucratic image of Mulonga 
but an inscription device that had disembedded the land from lived relations,
rendered it abstract and appropriable, and edited Peter out of the landscape
(see e.g. Harley 1988; Peluso 1995). However, such insights seem
intriguingly fractional once rescaled onto the land where surveyors – the 
inscriptors of property – encounter people that enact alternative tenurial
realities. Here, affective encounters and the arrangement of things are as
important as making representations on paper, and this is so, I claim, for one
simple reason: on the ground, private property doesn’t preexist its material
enactment. Not only did the beacons have an instructive visibility, 
spatializing this emergent geography of exclusion, but the very fact that we
could walk along these lines rendered private property and its grid of
exclusion painfully corporeal. Each beacon had a serial number inscribed on
the top, E152, E153, E154, allowing us to trace the spatial contours of the 
property grid. We proceeded from the beacon sitting on the doorstep to the
sleeping hut and followed their trail through the garden and out into the
fallow lands behind the farmstead. ‘Here’s another one!’, someone called
out, and we all gathered to take a closer look at the beacon, E155, trying to
decipher the survey lines. Following footprints and tire tracks we found
another seven beacons before we gave up. The survey line seemed to be
cutting his homestead in half, with the cooking hut and a small storage hut
located spatially ‘outside’ the grid formed by the boundary stones. When we
were wandering the bush that day, scouting for beacons and tracing survey 
lines, people and things started to ‘resonate’ (Laszczkowski and Reeves,
2015), as expressed in this conversation between Peter and Chipepo:
Chipepo: Maybe we can dig them up? … If you leave them there, the grader
will come.
Peter: Yes, maybe. But if we remove them, the police might come, the
Ministry [of Lands] will know it was me…
Chipepo: How could they come if you remove some stone on your land? You 
do that before every rain! [jokingly]
Peter: … This is not just some stone, it’s a government stone. [not finding
Chipepo’s joke amusing]
Chipepo: It’s still a stone. [followed by silence]
Peter: It’s soft. [gently pushing his shoe into the wet cement]
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While Chipepo’s comment trivialized the boundary stones, stirring laughter,
Peter’s remark was an affirmation of his subjection to them, generating a 
string of silent hums. Yet both Chipepo and Peter articulate clearly the idea
that beacons exert some form of ‘stateness’, able to rearrange, affect and
discipline. Yet the beacons were ‘soft’: perhaps they could be remolded? The
stories that swirled around the beacons, I argue, must be recognized as an
element of property under construction. They embody a critique of things as
they are as well as a version of things as they could be. My point here is
straightforward, if yet interim: if we understand private property as a socio-
material achievement, this moment was an interposition in its becoming,
entangling materiality, emotion and cultural imageries of authority. As such,
surveyors do not simply ‘carry’ private property over geographical space;
rather, we must probe the localized material encounters that forge the
relations that bring private property into social existence in spaces of
everyday life. This chapter shows how the emplacement of beacons, erection
of fences and other ‘material implements’ are fundamentally imbricated in
the ways state power is mapped onto the landscape – not as a secure
achievement, but as a critical moment of political contestation. In what
follows I elaborate a theoretical frame that allows us to do just that.
7.2 Conceptual interlude: state, affect, materiality
To date, the materiality of property has remained on the margins of social
analysis, with a few notable exceptions exploring how fences and survey
lines endow spaces with particular valences and political (im)possibilities
that discipline social life (Blomley 2003, 2007, 2010, 2016; Given 2004;
Harris 1993; Mitchell 2002). Blomley (2016: 597) illustrates the power
exerted by property’s materiality with a boundary fence: ‘The person who 
encounters the boundary fence needs not know anything about the person
who owns the land behind it … All he needs to know is that it does not belong
to him’ (see also Smith 2014; Given 2004). This is what a boundary fence
conveys; it exercises power not only by prohibiting movement but also by
transforming border crossers into trespassers, subjecting them to property
law, upheld by the judiciary, enforced by the police, sanctioned by ‘the state’
etc. A fence is what it does: it enrolls people in a network of disciplinary
power, materially, discursively and affectively. The material making of
property is thus an exercise of power in and of itself, in so far as power can
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be seen as the ability to ‘police’ (Meehan et al. 2013: 2) the appearance and
circulation of bundled objects, connected to institutions of (state) authority,
forming a territorialized grid of disciplinary property relations. In his
writings on British Columbia, Harris (1993: 67) notes that this grid
…defined where people could go and could not go as well as their rights to
land use, and it backed up these rights, as need be, with sovereign power …
the land system itself became powerfully regulative. Survey lines and fences
were pervasive forms of disciplinary power backed by a property owner,
backed by law, and requiring little official supervision.
Private property here emerges as a socio-material achievement, with fences
and survey lines constituting the political as a field that is regulating
conditions of possibility, conjoining materiality, discursivity and
disciplinary rule. The materialities of property carry, in other words, political
potential (cf. Rose 1994). In this chapter I build on these insights, seeing the
material practices of property making as enactments or performances of state 
power, yet I also wish introduce a conceptual caveat to this thinking,
suggesting that the political potential embodied in the materiality of private
property is only just that, a potential (however potent it might be), and that
its ‘discharge’ remains crucially contingent upon the emotions and
imaginations elicited in the ‘resonances between people and things’
(Laszczkowski and Reeves 2015). The materialities of property, I shall
argue, are not simply outcomes of property making, happening elsewhere, 
they are not ordained after, so as to render visible what is already there on 
paper; rather, they are tangled up in the very becoming of property: private
property doesn’t preexist its performance (cf. Blomley 2013), and, as such,
can become otherwise. 
In critical geography, materiality is now taken seriously as a pivot for 
political inquiry (Ahlborg and Nightingale 2018; Harris 2012, 2017; Meehan,
2014; Nightingale 2018; Shaw and Meehan 2013; Valdivia 2008). ‘Once an
object is unleashed in the world’, Shaw and Meehan (2013: 218) write, ‘it
produces and reproduces a localised order of appearance that can interrupt, and
even master, the very “intentions” humans may have engineered.’ Braun and 
Whatmore (2010: xxi–xxii) call this a ‘margin of indeterminacy’ that 
‘temporalize, opening us to a future that we cannot fully appropriate’, which 
brings about ‘new assemblages and generates new spatial relations that at once 




     
       
       
  
      
 
     
   
 
  
   
 
 
    
 
   
   
 
   
  
          
          
  
           
  
 




    
  
  
   
  
given moment.’ Things are not just simultaneously material and meaningful;
they are also ‘eventful’ (Braun and Whatmore 2010: xxi). That is, what spatial
and social relations they engender – what power they exert – remain crucially
contingent upon how they are encultured by those who encounter them. The
materialization of private property is, in this view, an open political moment, 
an attempt to ‘persuade’, to use Rose’s (1994) terminology. 
From here, then, the materialities of property, in this case survey beacons, 
become visible as much more than spatial markers of property; they must be 
‘defined by their affects or their capacity to act and be acted upon’ (Bryant,
2011: 274). In this view, the making of private property is profoundly
uncertain; it marks an open political moment, a performance, rather than
something adjudicated in advance. This is because the materialities of pro-
perty are always encountered by particular people in particular contexts, and
what power they exert, how they are bundled together, and hence what
effects they produce in those contexts are never separable from the contin-
gencies of the encounter. I contend that it is this ‘margin of indeterminacy’
(Braun and Whatmore 2010: xxi–xxii), or what I shall call the ‘possibility of
the otherwise’, that makes state formation fundamentally provisional, 
prompting renewed analytical attention to the material making of property
as a critical site for state formation and political contestation.
My hope is that ethnographic attention to the looming possibilities of the
‘otherwise’ exposes the political toil – deployments, adjustments, rede-
ployments, readjustments – that goes into making the stuff of property ‘block
the contingencies of the world’ (Meehan 2013: 8) but also the bureaucratic
anxiety that the ever-present ‘otherwise’ incites. These are the forms, I will
show, that modern land law reform take in the rural fabric of the everyday, 
offering important insights into how states not only ‘come into being’
through the ‘assertion of control over territory, resources, and people’
(Neumann 2004: 185; see also Scott 1998), but also through subtle
dispositions of ‘things’, perfunctory politics and affective encounters. 
Within anthropology, work on the state has long accentuated how state
rule remains dependent upon the multiple ways that practices of government
elicit emotions; indeed, the production and circulation of affect and emotion
are key vectors for state power (Stoler 2004; Kapferer 1988; Navaro-Yashin 
2007; Nuijten 2004). Gupta (2012), for instance, building on ethnographic
work in India, has shown how stories and tales of corruption are saturated




    
    
    
     
 
      
 
      
    
     
   





   
     
  
 
        
 
  
    
  
  








constructing the state amid failed development practice (see also Beyers
2015). That the state produces powerful emotions signals that affect is not
epiphenomenal to the political, ‘a smokescreen of rule … a ruse masking the 
dispassionate calculations that preoccupy states’ (Stoler 2004: 6); rather,
affect is the ‘substance of politics’ (ibid), setting the conditions of possibility
for action and critique. In short, without affect in view it is difficult to
understand how and why the state ‘should so powerfully shape … political 
and moral imaginations’ (Spencer 2007: 99). At the core, understanding
affect as a current of state power – and hence a constitutive condition of state
formation – places the analysis of the state firmly in embodied, affective
‘resonances’ within and between persons and things (Laszczkowski and
Reeves 2015). This conceptual move, Stewart (2007: 2) notes, involves a
shift in focus away from social structures, or ‘fixed conditions of possibility’, 
and toward ‘lines of potential’ (ibid: 11) – an attention to emergent rather
than established relations. Holding affect in view thus pushes the
ethnographer to find ways to trail the uncertain, never quite realized or only
momentarily realized.
Building on the theoretical insights assembled above, I set out to explore
survey beacons as state power materialized, territorialized relations of rule,
inserted into people’s land and therefore into people’s lives, but also as objects
with highly indeterminate, even eventful, abilities to affect and arrange. I wish
to stress the ways in which the material and affective force of the state emerges,
not in relation to the state’s presence or absence, but rather in relation to the
shifting movement between the two. Analytically I conceive of the 
demarcation of Mulonga as productive of such movements. The land became
a space of affective encounters and pervasive uncertainty that transfigured into
subordination and upheaval as well as defiance and resistance. As such, my
argument ties the embodied and political together, linking localized material
practice – the emplacement of boundary stones – and wider geographies of
‘state making’, unveiling seemingly mundane encounters as engendering
social change, disciplining citizen life, redefining what is legal and illegal,
permissible and impermissible: that is, the very practices and performances 
that bring private property into being (or not) in particular sites, and therefore
simultaneously bring ‘the state’ into political actuality.
Situating the analysis here troubles tales of a passive rural peasantry
subjected to sovereign law, revealing instead how an inventive and ingenious
citizenry reappropriates and redeploys state materialities, and how an equally
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inventive and ingenious bureaucracy struggles to make them perform the 
political work assigned to them. These iterative moments are foundational
for understanding how both state and citizens co-constitute each other’s 
existence and capacities through property making (and unmaking), and how
agrarian change positions people and cultivators, as well as administrators,
with variable capacities for action within shifting state-citizen relations.
7.3 Private property materialized
7.3.1 The arrival of the surveyors
I first arrived in Mulonga in 2016 and settled in with Chipepo, Thabo and
their two sons, who were living on a small farmstead comprised of a few
thatched mud-and-wattle sleeping huts and a larger cooking hut. Mulonga
village sits along a dirt road a couple of hours’ walk from Chibombo
township, in Chibombo District, Central Province. Land use is administered
by Headman Wilford and his village council, vested with regulatory powers
by Chief Liteta IV of Lenje Chiefdom. Wilford and his council control access
to common pastures, subdivide and allocate plots when new families are born
out of old ones and settle land disputes in the village court. Rights in land are
demarcated with trees, hilltops, rock formations and other environmental
imprints.
Yet boundaries between neighbors are not lines of division but sites of
interaction, negotiation, and sometimes conflict. Most farmers adjust
boundaries before cultivation according to labor power, or lend seed or oxen
for tilling across borders in return for labor at the time of harvest. Hedging 
is not allowed unless communal consensus is reached. Cross-border land use,
thus, cultivates both fields and friendships, and social relations of production
entangle working subjects, sites of labor and rights in land. Most villagers 
provide for their own subsistence. The average household has a vegetable
garden flowing outward from a few mud-and-wattle huts and a larger maize
field located no more than an hour’s hike from the homestead. Around most
homesteads there are chickens pecking about, and some villagers rear goats
and cows for milk and meat. Wood for fuel and construction is cut from the
surrounding bush. Mulonga pub, an open hut located next to the village court, 
is a joint meeting place for people on their way home from the fields in the
late afternoon. Here, women sell home-brewed munkoyo – a fermented drink





     
    
      
  
  




      
    
     
  
   
 
         
       
     
   
  
    









   
    
discussions traversing national politics, cultivation practices, labor arrange-
ments and romantic involvements. For those who can afford them, bicycles
reduce the time spent traveling between hamlet, maize field and Chibombo 
township, where people go to purchase salt, sugar, airtime, soap, cooking oil;
to charge their cell phones; or to play pool at the local inn. When making this
trip, one notices a change in the property landscape; around the township,
Euclidian divides, fences, electric wiring, barbed wire and ‘private property
– no trespassing!’ signs tell passersby that they have entered the governing 
grids of State Land.
My stay in Mulonga was founded on an interest in the way the boundary 
between State Land and chiefly territory was manifest on the landscape and
in people’s movements and imaginaries. I had also heard that the township
was expanding outward, but little did I know that Mulonga village was to be
targeted for government appropriation, even less so that it was being done
without the villagers themselves being aware of it. It was about three weeks 
into my stay when I sighted a tripod standing alone in the bush. When I came
closer, I noticed a white pickup truck parked a stone’s throw away. Next to
the truck stood five men; two of them unloaded surveying apparatus, a spade,
a bag of cement and a plastic bucket from the truck, while the others were 
laughing and jostling about to the sound of Kalindula music spreading across
the landscape, where a handful of curious people stood, watching the men 
from a distance. I spotted Chipepo among the spectators and made my way 
over to ask him what was going on. ‘They just came and started to put those
beacons in the ground’, he explained. Chipepo followed behind, but at a
distance, when I made my way over to the surveyors, where I was greeted by
Chief Surveyor Sylvester Nkandu. At first, he was reluctant to tell us about
their work, referring to ‘orders’ and ‘instructions’ from ‘Lands’, short for
Ministry of Lands in Lusaka. After sedulous inquiry, however, he lowered
his voice and said, ‘this whole area has been taken by the government’, but,
he added, ‘you have to talk to Lands. I really can’t talk about it … I’m only 
hired for beaconing’. How the land for demarcation had been identified,
Sylvester didn’t know. ‘I just got the map from Lands this morning’, he
averred. Chipepo, who had been quiet up to this point, now spoke: ‘I want to
know what land is on that map.’ His request was met with an uncomfortable
silence and an awkward goodbye. 
News about the arrival of the white pickup truck traveled rapidly across
Mulonga. At the pub later that afternoon, people asked themselves who 
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these people were, where they had come from, and if the government was
grabbing their land. ‘What if they return tomorrow? Where will they put
those beacons then? … I don’t like this, we have to keep our eyes open’,
Chipepo remarked. ‘Yes, if that vehicle enters into our land, things will be
very bad’, someone commented. The white pickup truck entering Mulonga
that day came to represent a tangible threat, its movement eliciting
suspicion and vigilance, emotion and action. Over the following three
weeks or so, the white pickup truck was often seen moving along the main
road running through Mulonga. On occasion, villagers spotted it traversing 
the bush, sightings which they reiterated at the pub in the afternoons. I, too,
observed the movement of the truck as it crisscrossed Mulonga, leaving a
trail of cement beacons in its wake.
Over the following couple of days, many villagers discovered beacons 
implanted in fields and farmsteads. Among them was Peter. Peter’s rights in
the land are the product of labor, arbitration and collective memorialization,
which enmesh the geography of Mulonga within social relations of power
and production, patchily manifested in the materiality of rural life:
homesteads, fields, fallows, pastures and orchards. Within this landscape, he
holds rights in neighbors’ trees and their produce, independent of the land on
which they stand, and irrigation rights independent of either. For Peter, these
relational spaces now appeared to be overlaid by straight survey lines that
delineated Euclidian spaces of private property, producing divisions in the
socio-material fabric of neighborly associations that hitherto had brought
rights, practices and persons into being in particular ways. As such, the 
demarcation radically repoliticized practices on the land: seeding, gleaning 
and grazing over these survey lines would now be construed as squatting,
theft and trespass, legal categories put to work to protect bounded property
from the beasts and bodies of its spatial outside. 
‘So now we can’t grow vegetables here next year’, Peter remarked when
the survey lines became legible, ‘and my cattle, where will I find grazing
land when people come and settle here? There will be no land for them when
they put up their fences.’ Here, Peter spoke of the inherent logic of private
property: it produces the very ‘outside’ from which its ‘inside’ then is
guaranteed legal protection. It engenders, in other words, the effects that it
names (see Blomley 2003, 2007, 2010, 2016 on the divisive effects
property). In my reading, it was the production of such effects that Peter had









    
  






        











    
   
            
  
      




bearing subject to a potential perpetrator of someone else’s entitlement, with
the beacons being arti-factualized symbols of state appropriation.
Others spoke of a different kind of encounter. Megai first sighted the
white pickup truck when it was coming around the bend leading up to her
garden. Desperate to defend her rights, she decided to confront the men, but
when the surveyors noticed her approach, they began to walk back toward
the truck. When she realized that they were trying to get away from her,
Megai picked up her pace, and eventually she was running towards them. 
The surveyors ran, in turn, quickly jumping into the truck, speeding away
from her into the bush. After inspecting her land, she found that beacons had
been placed in a line, marking what she believed to be a new road leading
straight through her garden. When recounting the event, Megai ridiculed the
surveyors: ‘They were afraid of an old woman like me. Can you believe it? 
I felt like a grandmother going after the children with a stick’, she said
laughing. She was proud of her intimidating appearance, scaring off agents
of the state ‘as little boys’, as she put it, demonstrating an embodied joy of
material resistance. ‘I will not leave my house before that vehicle has left the
village’, she said firmly.
In both Peter’s and Megai’s experiences, emotion and materiality had
shaped the way privatization incited action and emotion, albeit in different
ways. As Müller (2015: 36) writes, ‘affect and emotion are the tertium quid
of the social and the material, making the socio-material hold together or fall
apart.’ Above all, Peter’s and Megai’s experiences fit uneasily into narratives
of landscapes written into state modernization efforts. ‘State making’
emerges instead as a much more ambiguous project, with power being 
inserted into the most intimate spaces of the everyday (Painter 2006), yet
irresolute and perfunctory in its effects and affects; the beacons now sitting
in their land engendered a form of betweenness, or liminality, an open
political moment with ‘lines of potential’ extending in multiple directions.
My interim argument here, then, is that we must probe more carefully how
equivocation and renunciation – and not only coercion and assertion – are 
imbricated in the recursive production of state and property (cf. Bridge
2014). And, subsequently, how these moments contain a ‘margin of
indeterminacy’, ‘possibilities of the otherwise’: perhaps uprooting the
beacons would keep the grader away, as Chipepo had told Peter. Before
probing such dynamics in more detail, however, I first trace the survey lines
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into the offices of the state administration to map out the bureaucratic field
from which the beacons had sprung. 
7.3.2 Bureaucratic encounters and the politics of negligence
From an administrative optic, the beacons sitting on Peter’s and Megai’s land
were the material crystallization of a procedural arrangement between a host
of institutional sites: Headman Wilford, Chief Liteta IV, Chibombo District
Council, Kabwe Provincial Government and the Ministry of Lands in
Lusaka. The term people used to describe this assemblage of rule was 
ubuteko, literally meaning ‘that which governs’. It can be translated vari-
ously as ‘state’ or ‘government’, thus indicating an expansive notion of state
power and government. From what I have understood from numerous
conversions, it is best understood as an intimate repository of state power; it
can refer to government only, but also to an individual bureaucrat or place of
officialdom. 
For Peter, the only ‘contact zone’ (Harris 2012: 29) with ubuteko was
the lowest level in the statutory administrative hierarchy: the District
Council in Chibombo township, two hours’ walk to the east. When arriving 
at the District Council the following morning, however, he was denied a
meeting with the council secretary. Without an appointment, it was
explained to him, there could be no meeting, and the meeting had to be
scheduled by the office clerk, but she was nowhere to be found. Someone
in the halls of the District Council asked him if he had any ‘papers’ verifying
his claim to the land that he had found beacons in. Without a documented
entitlement, this someone said, he could be ‘anybody’ (in my understanding,
‘anybody’ should here be read as ‘without legal status’). When he couldn’t
provide any papers, he was instructed to ‘go back home’, to be ‘patient’ and
‘wait’ for the field officer, a certain Mr. Mulombe. In many ways, Peter’s
inability to make an appeal seemed to be underwritten by a latent violence
of colonialism, which made documented property a prerequisite for
effective citizenship. He was, in short, alienated by the very project that the
state employs to legitimate its rule.
I also tried to unravel how the beacons ended up on Peter’s land. The
following morning, I visited both Headman Wilford and Chief Liteta IV. 
Headman Wilford, a reserved man in his sixties, was on most days to be
found at home. As he did every time we met, he offered me a seat under the
mango tree next to his house, where his daughter served us tea. While sipping
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his brew, Wilford explained that he had been instructed by Chief Liteta IV
to ‘release some land for the government’. He had directed the field officer
of the District Council, Mr. Mulombe, to a stretch of unallocated land that he
believed was suitable for government appropriation. Yet we both knew, from
observing the movement of the pickup truck, that beaconing had been done
beyond that land; it appeared that Wilford’s presiding had been overruled.
Why this was, he didn’t know. Thus, the politico-legal terms of the
demarcation were illegible from the very locus of change, even, it appeared,
for the village sovereign. When I arrived at Chief Liteta IV’s palace, I was 
greeted by a drowsy kapaso who had been standing guard at the gate the
whole night. These visits were often clothed in courtly conduct, but this time
I was shown into the living room, a place reserved for family, where beers 
and a tray of egg sandwiches awaited us. Chief Liteta IV appeared to be
equally confounded by the demarcation:
All I know is that the district has received some land from my headman [i.e.
Wilford]; I have instructed him in this so my people can stay where they are,
but then I hear my people are chased. … These people in the district, they
don’t respect our rules, if they want something, they just take.
It was not the first time that I heard Chief Liteta IV projecting responsibility
onto the District Council. I telephoned Mr. Mulombe, but he did not pick up
his phone, so I decided to try my luck at his office, but the guards at the gate
told me that he was out and not expected to be back anytime soon. Instead I 
met with the district secretary who received me in her office. As in all
government offices across the country, a framed portrait of President Edgar
Lungu ornamented the wall behind the desk, radiating paternal power and
authoritative intimacy into the state establishment. She explained that the
township could no longer sustain its growing population on its land and that
it needed to be expanded ‘into traditional land’. Mulonga was to be ‘opened
up’, new roads built and old ones broadened, land subdivided into discrete
parcels and sold as plots of private property. With funding and surveying
support from the Ministry of Lands, a stretch of land had been identified, but,
she was quick to add, ‘we only demarcate land that has been approved by the
chief … he has asked the farmers if they are willing to sell some of their land




      
    
 
     
 
    
  
    
  
    
    
  
    
   
       
    
   
    
   
  
     
    
   
 





   
 
   
     
   
   
 
Me: Could you tell me how the land was identified, the procedures
leading up to the point when you had a map over the individual
plots to be demarcated?
DS: That was a negotiation between Mr. Mulombe and the chief … We
have permission from the chief, he even signed a document.
Me: How were the farmers identified, those who were willing to sell
some of their land?
DS: The headman showed Mr. Mulombe, then he took the information
to Ministry of Lands …
Me: What kind of information was that? I mean, was it names of
people, or was it coordinates, or some kind of map?
DS: I think coordinates …
Me: … I heard that there’s been some problems with the map, that some
people that didn’t sell any land have found beacons on their land.
DS: You see, that’s not possible, we have very strict procedures …
maybe they complain only to get some money …
Me: How do you mean?
DS: I mean that there are no records of what land belongs to what
person in the villages, so all of a sudden, people can say that this
and that land belongs to them … They can invent rights overnight
and then claim compensation, no one would know. It’s a problem
in many places …
Me: Ok, but what are those procedures, ensuring that no one is losing 
part of their land or anything like that?
DS: Like I said, it was a negotiation, and those who didn’t want to sell
will not be affected … It’s the chief that decides, and he has
approved…
Much could be said about this dialogue, but I would like to stress two points
in particular. First, that people ‘invented’ infringements reflected my 
experience in Mulonga poorly. What such suggestions do, I claim, is to
reproduce a conception of a statutory property regime subjected to 
obstruction by ungovernable inhabitants at its frontier. As Peter’s experience
suggests, such conceptions are inscribed in state-citizen encounters; that he
was told that he could be ‘anybody’ when failing to provide any ‘papers’
signals a suspicion, or at least negligence, toward people outside the circuits




    
     
     
    
     
 
 
   
      
   
  
    
  
    
     
  
           
         
        
         
  
   
    
     
  
    
  
    
 
  
    
                                                     
      
  
and chiefly territory continues to structure people’s abilities to exercise rights 
across it in their encounters with ‘the state’.
Second, the key to the demarcation seemed to be what the district secretary
referred to as a ‘negotiation’ between Mr. Mulombe and Chief Liteta IV. 
Chief Liteta IV would later refute the claim that he had been part of any
negotiation. Mr. Mulombe, on the other hand, maintained that he had the
chief’s ‘approval’, although he adeptly evaded any questions pertaining to its
content. In this way, administrative responsibility was persistently displaced 
onto other institutional sites. Also, the Ministry of Lands, to which Peter had
been referred by the surveyors, soon turned out to be a bureaucratic cul-de-
sac. My informants within the ministry told me that all ‘Lands’ had done was
to provide ‘technical support’. The map had been drawn up by the provincial
planner in the regional capital, Kabwe, and not by the Ministry of Lands, 
which had only ‘approved’ it, ‘confirmed’ that there were no overlapping
‘legal claims’, and later forwarded it to their ‘licensed surveyors’.15 However,
when I met with the provincial planner in Kabwe, he explained that his
cartographic contribution was merely ‘mechanical’. When the coordinates
reach his office, all he does is to ‘plot them on a map’ which he then
‘forwards’ to ‘Lands’ for ‘approval’. The responsibility to ‘confirm that the
land is vacant’, he told me, lies with the District Council. At this point, he did
know that the GPS that Mr. Mulombe had used to pick the coordinates had an
error margin of 15 meters. This information was disclosed to me by Mr. 
Mulombe’s successor, displacing responsibility onto technology. Figuratively 
speaking, as the beacons traveled along the institutional chain, at each link 
being imbued with political substance, sometimes outside the circuits of legal
procedure, their material crystallization in Mulonga no longer mirrored any
institutional uniformity, let alone state sovereignty; rather, they carried with 
them the unruly and largely illegible politics of their making.
Where did the beacons come from? The answer seems to be ‘from
elsewhere’. What ‘the state’ came to be was bound up in this ambiguity;
while the beacons served as painful reminders of state incursion, the futile
efforts to get in contact with the liable bureaucracy produced strong feelings
of state negligence. For some, ubuteko became synonymous with Mr.
Mulombe, who came to embody the responsibility for the demarcation in its
entirety, now rumored to be the willful act of a single sovereign officer. That
15 An entitlement to customary land is, in this optic, not a ‘legal claim’. What the Ministry of Lands had








   
   
  
   





   





   
          
 
     
 
    
  
  
     
  
    
    
 
    
   
was the reason, people in Mulonga speculated, for his ‘disappearance’.
Others, however, believed that he didn’t exist, that he was a mirage put up
by the District Council in an effort to deflect criticism. When I visited Peter
later in the afternoon, he asked me: ‘What am I supposed to do? How can I
go to Lands? … Should I find transport only to get chased from that place
also? … Wherever I go, they say go somewhere else.’ In his experience,
ubuteko (‘that which governs’) was always somewhere he was not,
dissolving itself of any attempt at interaction. These ‘social lives’ (Ssorin-
Chaikow 2003) of the state are vital to track, because they structure people’s 
conditions of possibility in profound ways, open and foreclose spaces of
resistance, and shape what is actualized on the ground. 
7.3.3 Material resistance, elusive politics and changing tactics of
government
Three days had passed since the surveyors arrived, and I was having a
conversation with Thabo when I received a text message: ‘Bad news. Jacob
says beacons have been placed near the well. Going there now. Michael’.
Michael dwells not far from Peter and Thandi, separated only by a strip of
fallow land where goats roam freely during the bright hours of the day. In
the corner of this land sits their well, providing a source of water during the
dry season for a small garden where his wife Gloria grows green peppers,
okra and tomatoes. When I arrived, a few people had already gathered. As 
we had done on Peter’s land, we went to inspect his grounds, finding some
twenty beacons covering a large part of their maize fields. Adam, Michael’s 
brother-in-law, was the first to speak up:
Adam: You should uproot them … this land belongs to you, if you leave them
there, someone will come and settle here.
Peter: I think we should wait. We cannot stand against ubuteko. If we destroy
them, they might bring the police here, and then it’s only more
problems for us.
Michael: We can’t just sit here and wait until someone comes and builds a house
on my land; then it will be too late.
Peter: I don’t like this, I will go to the district again … we can go together,
all of us. If we start off early tomorrow, maybe we can find Mr.
Mulombe.
Michael: Nobody has seen this Mr. Mulombe … If we wait, it will be too late.
Everyone here knows this is our land, it is our right to defend it…
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Adam: I think, yes, if we remove them, we can’t be chased… How will they
know where to build? … How can we remove them? Those beacons
are like stone. Can we dig? Or use the pick?
Michael: I think pick maybe.
As this discussion shows, beacons are not merely outcomes of the making of
private property but importantly are implicated in the process that produces
social relations around them; they kindled fear, forethought, even paranoia, 
but also resistance. Indeed, survey beacons are not simply inert relics of
Lockean liberalism; they embody, engender and animate the power exercised
by those who govern their emplacement (see Harris 1993) in ways that make
their meaning and materiality a site of contentious politics. Imagining that
uprooting the beacons would undermine any claims made by arriving 
settlers, Michael collected his pick and hoe and headed toward the field. The 
concrete scattered as he drove the pick through the beacons. Afraid to face 
eventual repercussions, Michael instructed his son, Paul, to hoe a deep hole
in the bush and bury the concrete therein, covering the disturbed ground with 
some brushwood. In this way, the land surfaced as a space through which 




      






   
   
  
   
  
  
     
  
Image 2 and 3. Beacon on the path between Michaels’s house and his maize fields (left)
and outside Pepe’s house (right). Photos by the author.
Insofar as the state is constituted by a networked assemblage of institutions
and their practices, Michael had unearthed some of its material nodes. These
struggles, I want to stress, were not fought in the courtroom or some other
discursive-legal terrain, but in the geography of everyday life. Put
differently, Michael’s ability to act upon ‘the state’ was rooted in the very
materiality of property, and not in the terms of its legal underpinnings (of
which he had no knowledge). Wielding the pick and hoe became, in this
context, political work. In fact, they were the only political tools that he had
access to, given the impossibility of locating someone who could be held
accountable. Still, the force of his strikes was political even in a strictly legal 
sense, for Zambian land law stipulates that emplacing survey beacons – and 
maintaining them ‘in proper order and repair’ – is a legal qualification for




    
   
    
  
   
 
   
  
    
     
   
    
    
        
    
   
  
   
    
  
    
    
         




   
  
   
   
  
   
Survey Act, Part V). This turns material space into a political turf upon which
both land users and law users imprint and enact entitlements to resources.
Previous scholarship is of course right in that property is never more certain
than its recognition allows (see Lund 2002). What my analysis shows, 
however, is that property is only as robust as its material construction.
Over the following days I listened to several stories of people across
Mulonga who had demolished stonework found in their land. Some had
even scooped up wet cement after the surveyors moved out of sight, covertly 
‘unmaking’ property (and giving children something to sculpt small
figurines with). All shared experiences similar to Peter’s: the District
Council was unresponsive when people called or visited and referred them
to Mr. Mulombe, who wasn’t in his office and didn’t pick up his phone. I,
too, had failed to meet Mr. Mulombe. He had canceled two appointments
on me, and when I finally ran into him at the District Council, which I had
the habit of visiting when I passed through Chibombo township, he told me
that he would not speak to me unless I had an interview sanctioned by the
district secretary. I telephoned the secretary who, in turn, telephoned Mr.
Mulombe, letting him know that she authorized him to talk to me. Twice I
waited outside his office without him showing up to a scheduled meeting.
His name kept circulating in odd ways, however. While sitting in a room 
adjacent to the office of the district secretary one day, I overheard a
telephone conversation between the office clerk and someone. This was
what I managed to scribble down in my notebook:
… there is no need to worry … Mr. Mulombe will come and see you any day
now, just wait for him … maybe tomorrow, or the next day … there is no need
to come here, do you have Mr. Mulombe’s number? … try calling him again
…
I wondered if it was someone from Mulonga calling. The seeming 
impossibility of pinning down Mr. Mulombe imbued him with a mythicized
presence. He had an office with his name on it, but he was rarely in; he had
a telephone number, but he rarely picked up when people called; he made
promises to come out to Mulonga, but he never showed. The situation in 
Mulonga came to ‘bear the double signs of the state’s distance and its 
penetration into the life of the everyday’ (Das and Poole, 2004: 15). The
simultaneity of actuality and elusiveness was important for how the state





   
    
   
 
   
 
  
    
 
       
   
    
     
  
  
   
 
       
  
  
       
    
    
  
   
    
 
   
 
    
    
    
     
  
avoidance, forms of resistance and changing tactics of government, appeals
made but never recognized. I found that, for most people, the decision to
demolish stonework was warranted by the inability to act upon anything 
other than the beacons themselves. Mulilo, a young farmer staying along the
main road in Mulonga, explained that ‘we cannot fight ubuteko, but we can
remove the stones … when they come, they will find nothing there. How can
they give land with nothing there? They can’t.’
Text box 2: Colonial connectivities
The demolition of survey beacons is not a new occurrence in Zambia. On 3 December 1928,
surveyor Mr. J.E.S. Bradford sat down in front of his typewriter to compose a letter to the
Survey Department in Livingstone. In his correspondence, he describes his discovery of
shattered remains of a seven-and-a-half-inch beacon near the Geodetic Station in
Chifukunyu. A few weeks later, he writes, he went to work at a Geodetic station near Chinsali,
and also here, he found stonework broken down. ‘It will be a great loss’, he notes, ‘if all trace
is lost of some of the stations by the action of the natives in breaking down the beacons’. The
Survey Department in Livingstone reacted sharply to Mr. Bradford’s letter. On 18 December
1928, the director of Surveys (whose name is indecipherable) forwarded Bradford’s report to
the Department of Native Affairs, with an attached a comment: ‘The damaging of beacons …
even when the same have been set in blocks of concrete, is a constant source of trouble and 
expense to this department, and, unless the delinquents are severely dealt with, the practice
will never cease.’ On 27 December, he sent yet another letter, as if to clarify the gravity of
the situation: ‘[what is required is] more vigilance by the Police and District Officers, who are
in a position to impress upon the native the “Holiness of a Landmark”, and until this is done
it is unlikely that improvement will take place’. Referring to the two beacons that Mr. Bradford
mentioned in his report, the director of Surveys further noted that ‘it is obvious that the
beacons were deliberately broken down, and it is most unlikely that a European would do
this’. What needs to be done, he asserted, ‘will be to impress the native with more respect of
the age old law “Remove not thy neighbour’s landmark’”.
National Archives of Zambia. RC/1168: Survey beacons, destruction of
Others adopted alternative strategies of resistance. As the form of property
that hitherto had regulated people’s access to the land was based on oral
agreements and collective memorialization of what tree, hilltop or rock 
formation marked the boundaries of a usufruct right, the concern revolved 
around the fact that the beacons, and the property relations they represented,
seemed to undercut these current rights. Significant here was the fact that the
emergent property grid had been produced by maps, prism poles and cement,




   
    
 
  
    
 
        
          
 
 
   
  
  










    
  
   
      
 
     
   
     
 
   
founded upon two different systems of inscription. Instead of destabilizing 
the emergent property grid, some people, therefore, started to fortify their
own claims. This was done not by invoking authority – by backing up their
claims with institutional influence – but by more firmly imprinting one’s
material presence on the land, thus adopting the performance register of the 
state law. Lisa, a widowed farmer having a smallholding together with her
sister, illustrates this form of resistance quite well. Fresh in the wake of the
white pickup truck’s arrival, Lisa hoed a trench near her house. Her son
traveled from Kabwe to help her mix mud, clay and straw, turning soil and 
fiber into molded bricks laid out to dry in the sun. Lisa became a fixture at
the site, clearing undergrowth, leveling ground, and assembling bricks. Less
important than erecting a brick house, however, was to inscribe her presence
on the land, thinking that a brick building would fortify her claim and thereby
undermine the new property grid. And Lisa was not alone. Around Mulonga, 
foundations for brick houses started to appear. Those who could afford to
replaced thatched roofs with iron sheets, others transplanted young fruit trees
to more strategic locations, rearranging homesteads and landscapes, making
calculated claims to certain domains. Put differently, the villagers tried to
‘outperform’ the private property regime.
Government tactics were adjusted accordingly. Sylvester, the chief
surveyor, had given me his telephone number, and when I called him a few
weeks later, he agreed to meet with me in Lusaka. We talked for a good while
before he leaned in and lowered his voice, saying that it is not rare for the 
‘Lands’ to ‘keep people uninformed’ to avoid conflict. As reports came in
about people uprooting beacons, Sylvester explained, orders had come to 
‘plant beacons strategically, so people couldn’t tell the boundaries’. The
surveyors started to place only some beacons, essentially making the 
emerging survey lines unintelligible to the unruly observer. Sylvester
suggested, in other words, that rendering visible the intentions of government
made it vulnerable to obstruction. Thus, state practice and the resistance it
engendered evolved in tandem, with the means of resistance altering the
tactics of government. While his disclosure says a great deal about the 
strategies of government, people in Mulonga were already remarkably aware 
of this. It was not long before people were speculating about the locations of
the beacons, which beacon was connected to the next, and whether they
marked a road or allotment, and soon people also speculated that there were 
gaps in between beacons, reinforcing the imagination of the state as a
175
 
   
 





     
      
  
  





   
















      
cunning agent trying to insert a new social order by surreptitious maneuvers.
If anything, this only increased frustration and incited further resistance.
Some, especially young men, went out in small groups during night to 
demolish beacons outlining the new road network. The shattered remains
from these beacons were not buried but piled up at the roadside for open
display in an act of mockery, redeployed as a communicative counterclaim.
What we see here is that the achievement of private property – however
potent and persuasive it might be – remains crucially contingent upon the
socio-material relations it becomes embedded within. As Ahlborg and 
Nightingale (2018: 390) note, objects work as ‘scripts’ which ‘regulate
human behavior by encouraging, allowing or forbidding certain types of
uses, with social, material and discursive consequences.’ Yet, the script ‘is
rewritten as it is played out … again and again in the ongoing encounters
between humans and things’. In Mulonga, the inhabitants reappropriated the 
space organized by techniques of property production and enacted alternative
futures through material practices on the land. Through forms of defiance
and makeshift creativity, mimicry and acts of mockery, both villagers and
bureaucrats relayed and ruptured the currents of power in ways that changed 
what was to be actualized on the ground. In this way, both state and citizen 
co-constituted each other’s existence and capacities through the material
artefacts of property.
7.3.4 Encountering Mr. Mulombe and the material imprints of
stateness
The beaconing of Mulonga would continue to create new spaces of politics
and rearrange the patterns of state-citizen interactions. Alongside the
demolishment of beacons, Peter continued his efforts to find Mr. Mulombe.
His existence still was a subject of debate, but Peter eventually tracked him
down to a house on the outskirts of Chibombo township. He assembled a
small group of villagers that decided to pay him a visit. They came to his 
house at daybreak, and Mr. Mulombe answered the door in a robe, newly
awakened. Peter stated the purpose of their visit, explaining that he had found
beacons in his land, and he wanted them removed. Mr. Mulombe responded 
with antipathy: ‘What are you doing at my house? … I will not tolerate you
coming here’, Peter recounted him yelling. Then Mr. Mulombe closed the
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door and went inside.16 In my interpretation, Peter had, by entering into Mr.
Mulombe’s personal space, contested the social boundaries that uphold the
distinction between the governed and those who do the governing. The
blurring of these boundaries was something that Mr. Mulombe would not
‘tolerate’ (cf. Gupta 1995). The following day Mr. Mulombe would drive out
to Mulonga and inscribe these boundaries in cement.
I couldn’t uncover exactly how, but Mr. Mulombe had found out that
beacons had been demolished. Rumors had it that the surveyors had
discovered pieces of concrete in the bush, which they reported to the Ministry
of Lands, which in turn notified Mr. Mulombe. Regardless of how, the
destruction of stonework had reverberated through the bureaucracy, 
producing concern in the state administration, prompting Mr. Mulombe to 
take action. One of the villagers that he visited was Michael, who had
demolished some twenty beacons on his land. Mr. Mulombe was, Michael
explained, ‘furious’, and ‘threatening to report’ Michael to the police. ‘I will
not tolerate vandalism and theft’, he had yelled, referring to the missing iron 
pins. When Michael protested, claiming that it was his land, Mr. Mulombe
had rebutted: ‘It doesn’t matter, landmarks are sacred … they are state 
property’. After this brief exchange of sentiment, Mr. Mulombe jumped into
his jeep and drove away. What Mr. Mulombe did here was to imprint in the
beacons a sacredness, or a quality of stateness, discursively entrenching their
legal location in the private property regime. In this particular context, the
beacons needed a discursive readjustment to perform the political work
assigned to them. Or so Mr. Mulombe assumed, at least.
Yet again, the beacons emerged as a site of disciplinary politics.
Remarkably, Mr. Mulombe had not opposed Michael’s objection that it was
‘his land’. This, according to Mr. Mulombe, ‘didn’t matter’. What did matter
was rather that ‘the state’ has exclusive property in beacons, which then 
enables private property in land. Michael, Mr. Mulombe had asserted, was
subordinated to this legalistic logic, and any resistance to this logic signaled
violence upon the state, making him liable to punishment, irrespective of 
what land belonged to whom. In this way, Mr. Mulombe brought Michael
into the fold of the legal apparatus of the state, simply by ascribing symbolic-
legal meaning to boundary stones. And indeed, the beacons started to 
perform new political work. Michael was subdued and highly discomforted,
16 I was invited to come along, and I followed the group into Chibombo township but decided to wait by














   
 







       





   
 
     
  
        
          
foreseeing his eviction. He even instructed his son to unearth the iron pins
that lay buried in his maize fields and return them to Mr. Mulombe. For
others, however, the legal imprint exposed a susceptibility to further
obstruction. Consequently, people kept uprooting beacons, assembling
bricks, rethatching roofs and transplanting trees, strategically positioning 
themselves in the landscape. In this light, beacons emerge as elastic objects
that can serve quite opposing ends. 
The demarcation of Mulonga had simultaneously reproduced and blurred 
the boundaries between the state and its social surround (cf. Mitchell 1991;
Gupta 1995). Peter’s inability to get in contact with Mr. Mulombe had
brought him to his house, and Michael’s decision to uproot the beacons had 
summoned Mr. Mulombe to his farmstead. These emoted encounters – first 
with an angered and undressed man at his house, and later an infuriated man
threatening to report Michael to the police – had profoundly disrupted the
usual patterns of bureaucratic interaction and had transformed Mr. Mulombe
from a distanced governor to an affective enactment of state rule.
Mr. Mulombe had avoided me since the pickup truck entered Mulonga.
Eventually, however, I ran into him at the District Council. He briefly
explained that it was the headman that had identified the land for
demarcation, and that everyone whose land had been demarcated had given
their consent and would receive appropriate compensation. He firmly denied 
that people had filed any complaints, effectively shutting down our
discussion. Eventually we spoke in hypothetical terms:
Me: What would happen if people removed beacons?
Mr. Mulombe: Nothing would happen. We would put new ones.
They just mark coordinates.
Mr. Mulombe said, in other words, that the property grid had survived the
demolishment of its material nodes. It’s tempting to suggest that remote
sensing had vested the state with remote control, ‘unleashing a new
geography of state power’ (Meehan et al. 2013: 4). Yet, it is equally true that
the beacons had enabled villagers to provoke state processes from home.
Beacons, in this view, are ambiguous objects, producing both subjection to
state power and the means to disable that power.
This material elasticity would have lasting effects. It took about three 
months before the earthmover arrived in Mulonga, clearing lanes in the bush,
forming a network of roads so that new property owners could access their
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plots by car. But it was not many days before the project came to a staggering
halt. The funding from ‘Lands’ had run out, my informant told me. When I
returned six months later, the bush had overgrown the roads, demolished
beacons lay scattered across Mulonga, and Mr. Mulombe and the district 
secretary had been transferred (as per routine) to other districts. Their
successors are still waiting for additional funds to cover the replacement of
the uprooted beacons at the time of writing this. Indeed, private property is
not made in government offices, but in the geography of the everyday, where
property can become ‘otherwise’, or not at all.
7.4 Chapter conclusion
Private property is a major route of state power. Yet this chapter has
suggested that private property is a precarious socio-material achievement,
its ability to arrange, affect and dispossess crucially bound up in its material
architecture: beacons, fences and survey lines. State power travels through
these materialities, lending them abilities to perform important political 
work: to exclude, regulate and discipline. Yet their scripted effects are never
certain; once exposed to a creative citizenry they become susceptible to
alteration, alternative interpretation and enrolled in a new life of associations
that has the potential to subvert, even revert, the conduits of state power. This 
conceptual move unveils the making of property as an open political
moment, a performance, rather than adjudicated in advance.
These processes have been analyzed through a case study of property 
making in the village of Mulonga, into which a group of surveyors
unexpectedly entered to demarcate the land – emplacing cement survey
beacons marking the contours of a new private property regime. The 
villagers discovered these beacons implanted in fields and farmlands, sitting
uncomfortably juxtaposed with the landmarks delineating their ‘customary’
rights. Through an ethnography of material encounters, I have shown how
villagers reappropriated the land structured by property’s exclusionary logic, 
effectively reworking its outcome. Demolition of stonework, material
mimicry and mockery were all practices that citizens deployed in attempts to
subvert the conduits of state power and limit the possibilities for private
property to fully materialize on the land. Practices of government were
amended accordingly, with redeployments of new matter and perfunctory 




       
       
  




   
  
       











   
 
   
  
   
understand how both state and citizens co-constitute each other’s existence
and capacities in a material field of politics. So, while property (and ‘the
state’) is only as certain as its recognition, this chapter shows that property
is only as robust as its material construction.
As a landscape written into state modernization efforts, Mulonga fits
uneasily into grand narratives of state territorialization. State governance,
this chapter suggests, is much more ambiguous in its effects and affects.
Seemingly ‘failed’ attempts to govern are not necessarily associated with
‘weak’ institutional capacity, but rather bound up in how state power is
routed and rerouted. Here, a performative/affective understanding of state 
and property reveals that there are always possibilities of ‘things becoming
otherwise’ (Povinelli 2004); once they enter the world, they can be picked
apart, buried, unearthed or ‘outperformed’. An empirical shift away from
how private property is legally legitimated (which was largely invisible to
the inhabitants of Mulonga) and toward a more careful engagement with the
materiality of property troubles tales of a passive rural peasantry subjected
to sovereign law, revealing instead how an inventive and ingenious citizenry
redeploys state materialities, and how an equally inventive and ingenious
bureaucracy struggles to make them perform the political work assigned to 
them. Ethnographic attention to these moments shows that affect becomes
inseparable from processes of state formation; property making incites
anxiety and despair, but also embodied joys of material resistance, which
shape what is actualized on the ground. These processes are foundational for
understanding how reforms toward private property position people with
variable capacities for action within shifting state-citizen relations. State and








    
 
   
     
 
      
      
       
  
     
   
   
   
      
   
   
 
  
   
   
      8. Empirical Chapter IV: The Title Deed
Fickle abstractions: the material politics of land titling in
Lenje Chiefdom
8.1 Introduction
While previous chapters hinted at the many ways that law’s boundaries
stretch and tear in projects of land’s making, I now take this up specifically
as the focus of my analysis. There is now a large literature probing the ways
that bureaucratic practices – reading, writing, lettering, filing, producing and
circulating documents – are constitutive of the state (e.g. Hull 2012; Mathur
2015; Hetherington 2011). What has attracted less attention, however, is how
law is taken up and reworked once it escapes the domain of its authors, and
consequently how the state becomes reconstituted at the ‘limits’ of the law.
This chapter shows not only how property law is reworked, but also how the
materiality of the land to which the law refers becomes the means through 
which this happens. Moreover, it shows that, contrary to Lockean ideals of 
land’s abstraction from materiality, property law refuses reification of the
real. My ambition is to ‘mess up’ the stringency that is often attributed to
state law, revealing instead, in all its murkiness and ambiguity, property
law’s movement through and beyond the statutory administration, and how
it opens up new terrains of struggle and inventive politics once it enters into
social situations in particular places on chiefly terrain.
Kangwa village, Chibombo District, August 2017
‘You see that land there, that was on paper before’, headman Kangwa said.
‘What do you mean before’, I asked, considering that there is no provision
in the law to ‘undo’ privatization of customary land. ‘Yes, before there was
181
 
        
 
 
   
     
   
   
      
   
 
           
  
    
  
     
   
  
   
    
     
   
 
  
   
     
           
    
  
   
  
     
   
 
    
    
paper, but we decided to take it away’, he replied. At the time of this
conversation, we were looking at a stretch of land located on the outskirts of
the village, five hectares, I was told. As we approached, a tomato orchard
and a sparsely planted field of maize came into view. ‘So, the land is not
private property anymore?’, I asked. ‘Exactly’, Kangwa exclaimed, ‘the
person who was there before was not using the land. We took the paper away 
so many people can use land’. What headman Kanga referred to as ‘took the
paper away’ had involved an organized occupation; that is, he had sent a
group of young men onto the disputed land with orders to remove all
boundary stones and to plant crops and build shelters. He continued: ‘If that
person returns, what can he say? The land is already planted, so how could
he also plant? … We allowed that person to go to the government to put the
land on paper, and now we don’t allow [it] anymore.’
8.2 Land titling in Zambia
Ever since Zambia was proclaimed a protectorate of the United Kingdom,
the marginal position of the peasant population has been maintained, and
not only through the violence of coercive movement, but also through 
exclusion from legal privileges, especially the recognition of their
landholdings through land titles, or what most farmers simply refer to as
‘paper’. As laid out in the previous chapters, this has created two different
sets of property law, which bring with them different political assumptions
and ways of relating to the land. On chiefly territory, property is governed
by the idea that rights are a progressive result of human labor and 
habitation, with security of tenure emerging through the spatial integration 
of practices and resources. On State Land, property rights emerge as an
effect of legal recognition according to an abstract code. Of course,
different forms of written contracts and legal agreements shape use and
access on customary lands as well, ranging from notes jotted down on 
pages torn from spiral notebooks to more detailed accords transcribed onto
documents using a typewriter. Yet the title deed, emblazoned with the
official seal of the Republic of Zambia as a symbol of state recognition and
enforcement of rights, separates State Land and customary land into two
different legal spheres.
With the passing of the Land’s Act of 1995, however, the frontiers of




    
 
    
  
    
  
          
   
 
   
 
    
  
   
  
     
  
 
   
   
  
       
 
      
     
    
     
 
      
 
     




means for the conversion of the former (customary land) into the latter (State
Land), with the principle clause in the Act allowing for individual tenants
holding customary rights in land to convert their landholdings into private
property (State Land). Put somewhat differently, the Act provides for
individual landholders to become political agents in a land law reform aimed 
at incorporating land and land users into the modern body politic (Malambo
2013; Ng’ombe et al. 2014; Sitko et al. 2014). In effect, such conversions 
create pockets of titled land within areas otherwise governed by chiefly
authority and on which the Ministry of Lands will now be in a position to 
adjudicate ownership rights over land in an enduring relationship (legally 
recognized as state leaseholds with automatic renewal every 99 years).
Machina and Sorensen (2011: 255) have concluded that ever since the Act
was passed in Parliament, ‘customary land can be said to be treated as a
“pool” from which people access land for conversion to leasehold, with tenure
rights of customary landholders being inferior to the tenure rights of
leaseholders’ (see also Brown 2005; Sitko and Jane 2014). But these
narratives obscure the ways that titled land is entangled in social, political and
material relations within which it becomes embedded. Indeed, the distinction
between untitled and titled land, and the conversion of the former into the
latter, is charged with contingency and uncertainty, producing amalgams of
property and political authority that defy such categorizations. 
As land targeted for conversion is transferred from the domain of chiefly
authority to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Lands, the applicant first needs
the consent of both the headman and the chief, after which the application is
forwarded to the District Council, Provincial Government and the Ministry
of Lands, in that order (Brown 2005). The conversion process thus entwines
different instances of authority, each with its own situated logic, and while
the procedures of conversion are carefully codified in law, my research 
points to how the process is collapsed into myriad personal, political and
material relations that create a complex landscape of legal ambiguity on 
which chiefly power and authority repeatedly trouble bureaucratic attempts
to make land law reform work. The title deed is, in short, a powerful
‘boundary negotiation artifact’ (Lee 2005) that attracts the attention of a
plurality of political actors asserting rights in land and authority to govern by
acting on and through the title deed.
This chapter offers an anthropological foray into the politics of land 




      
   
  
   
       
    
   
  
  





   
 
    










         
  
  
   
the material and institutional landscape of Lenje Chiefdom and beyond. In
the first part of the chapter, I explore the politics of gaining a title deed by
tracing out how the application for title (and the applicant) travel through 
headmen’s homesteads, the chief’s court, district councils and the Ministry
of Lands. At each of these sites, I will show how the application escapes its 
formalized scripts and becomes a site of negotiation and struggle, thereby
opening up new spaces for contestation of the very rights that the title deed
is meant to define. Subsequently, I explore the politics of maintaining a title 
deed. Once the title deed is finally issued and ‘lands’ in a particular place 
within an area that is otherwise controlled by chiefly authority, it becomes
subject to new forms of evaluation; here, the title deed is conditional rather
than absolute, and in contravention of the tenets of statutory law, it gets
tangled up with alternative articulations of rights that, in turn, allow headman 
to reappropriate this titled land and reincorporate it into the chiefdom. Lastly, 
I will dwell on the materiality of title deed itself, and in particular on how its
paper-y existence opens new arenas for the contestation of the very rights
defined in the title deed. 
My analysis contributes to grounded readings of state making through 
land titling, capturing the interplay between abstract rights and the
materiality of land and paper and the plurality of political authorities that
compete over the right to govern. It reveals, through all its twists and turns,
law’s movement through and beyond the bureaucratic field, and how its
artifacts open up new terrains of struggle and inventive politics. Rather than
contributing to some linear change toward land as commodity, I will show
that land titling multiplies the arenas through which different authorities can 
claim rights to govern – despite, beyond and as an effect of government
efforts to ‘fix’ land rights onto ‘paper’.
8.3 The politics of gaining a title deed
8.3.1 The headmen and the chief
Throughout my fieldwork in Lenje Chiefdom, people have referred to the
title deed as a symbol of ownership reserved for the elite. It represents wealth
and status. For that reason, when I first started interviewing farmers, finding
people who had experience with land titling posed a significant challenge. I
often heard stories of people who held title, and I paid a visit to almost all of
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them. But these stories mostly turned out to be false – I simply had been 
directed to the most majestic homestead in a particular area on the
assumption that grand housing signaled private ownership. I soon learned
that most farmers were unaware of the possibility of conversion, and even 
fewer had the resources required to engage in the process of conversion or
the ability to master the conventions of bureaucratic documentation that it
required: with each step of the process there are payments to be made and
administrative hurdles to overcome. 
Over the course of my fieldwork, however, I did manage to interview about
twenty farmers across the chiefdom who had attempted to acquire a title deed
through conversion (see Appendix 2). Many of their attempts were blocked by 
a headman or Chief Liteta IV. In Lenje Chiefdom, this can happen either by
the headman’s own ruling or at the chief’s court. An applicant for conversion
must first approach his or her headman, who, in turn, makes a decision about
whether to call on the chief’s land allocation committee, which is assigned to
inspect the land in question and talk to neighboring tenants to ensure that there
are no contending claims. Depending on the committee’s verdict, the case is
then dismissed or approved for referral to the chief’s court. At the court, a
hearing awaits. For the applicant, the objective of the hearing is to attain Chief
Liteta IV’s signature on what is known as ‘Form A’ (which the applicant must
purchase at the District Council). It is when Form A is signed that the case
enters into statutory administration.
Jack, a man I befriended in Kaonde village in Chibombo district, once
approached his headman to ask for permission to acquire title through 
conversion. After a few days, the headman came to Jack’s house, telling him
that ‘if you bring me five head of cattle, I can bring the committee here.’ This 
is not an uncommon story. Mulubwa, in Kapema village, told me that his
headman asked for half of Mulubwa’s harvest in return for his approval. In
many ways, Jack’s and Mulubwa’s stories mirror previous research that
describes how gifts, bribes and other inducements often determine chiefly
approval of land conversion, skewing the process toward the rural elite
(Brown 2005; Christensen 2011; Sitko and Jane 2014). Still, my fieldwork
presented me with a puzzle: many farmers did get approval from their
headman, despite not offering something in return; and at times, conversions
were even initiated by headmen. Why was that? 
I first started to understand the politics of chiefly approval when I
visited Mooya village. The headman, Boyd, took me on a walk across the
185
 
   
     
     
   
      
      
   
   
       
    
    
     
    
    
   
     
 
     
    
    
    
  
  
     
   
   
  
  
        
      
        
  
 
   
 
     
village, and while struggling to keep up with his busy stride, he pointed to 
different homesteads and announced his ruling: ‘This one there, maybe he
could get paper … You see this one, impossible … That one on the other
side there, maybe’. Somewhat confounded, I asked Boyd how he reached
his decisions. ‘Easy’, he said, ‘look at the roofs’. The quality of people’s
roofs – whether they were thatched or tiled, tarnished or not – headman 
Boyd reasoned, indicated the amount of labor the tenants had invested in
their farmstead. He explained: villagers who invest in their farmsteads
demonstrate a ‘moral character’ and a ‘will’ to work for the ‘betterment’ of
the village, which he can then ‘award’ with an approval to initiate the
process of conversion. Chief Liteta IV echoed Boyd’s explanation: ‘I tell
my headmen, if a person wants title, that person should show a will to
develop the village, otherwise don’t bother to come [to the chief’s court]’.
According to Chief Liteta IV, quality roofing is but one of many such 
symbols of a ‘will to develop’: size of harvest, number of cattle and garden 
yield are all products of the application of labor and investment. In the
village next to Boyd’s, there is one house connected to the electric grid.
The tenant, Curtis, managed, through personal contacts at Zambia
Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO), to connect his farmstead to the
grid, which, Curtis’s headman explained to me, benefitted the village at
large, with people being able to charge their cellphones and the like at his
house. As a result, the chief awarded Curtis with a signature on Form A. 
According to Curtis, he did not pay either his headman nor Chief Liteta IV: 
‘No, no, it was like a gift of appreciation’, Curtis said. Thus, while wealth
often corresponds with chiefly approval, it is not what determines it.
Yet Chief Liteta IV finds himself in a precarious position. He is 
continuously pushed by district officers to ‘release more land for
conversion’, as he put it to me. At the same time, he is wary of the fact that
his authority is bound up in the land, and that his continued ability to regulate
access to and use of the land are qualifications for the legitimacy of the
chiefdom as a political body (see Lund 2002 on the relation between property 
and authority). Chief Liteta IV’s solution to this conundrum is incisive. What
is allowed to be put on title, according the Chief Liteta IV, is not the land 
itself, but the human intervention on the land: clearings, structures, wells and 
gardens etc. For Chief Liteta IV, thus, a conversion is not regarded as
someone transferring from one legal community to another, or ‘entering into’





      
 
  
    
 
     
    
   
  
 
   
   
        
 
   
  
  
    
   
     
       
     
    
   
 
  
   
     
     
     
   
      
   
  
   
you see’, he mused in one of our conversations. Yet he acknowledged that
the tenant might shift his or her loyalties once the land is converted. In many 
ways, this is exactly what Chief Liteta IV and his headmen are trying to 
regulate by evaluating whether a tenant displays what headman Boyd called
‘moral character’.
The hearing at the chief’s court performs an important function in this
regard. A court hearing entails the assembly of agents of the chiefdom on the 
appointed date and time, in the right place, in appropriate dress and in 
possession of the correct documents. Central to this performance of
officialdom is applicant’s demonstration of awareness and respect for the
chiefdom, including courtly conduct, proper speech and gesture and
appropriate address of the members of the court, such as addressing Chief
Liteta IV as His Royal Highness. After passing this initial test, the applicant
is asked to account for his or her ‘accomplishments’ and ‘contributions’ to
the chiefdom, which often revolve around what the applicant has not done:
‘I have not stolen’, ‘I have not trespassed’ etc. In short, the hearing at the
chief’s court is part of evaluating the loyalty and moral character of the 
applicant, and only those who are believed to be devoted to the betterment
of their village and chiefdom at large receive a signature on Form A.
More often than not, a signature on Form A corresponds to social and 
economic status. Indeed, whether someone has attained a signature on
Form A often correlates with the conditions of the house in which he or she 
lives, but not always. There are many cases of wealthier villagers being
denied conversion at the chief’s court, simply because Chief Liteta IV and 
his council believe that the tenant has not demonstrated any interest in the 
‘development’ of the village and chiefdom. One of Chief Liteta IV’s 
advisors explained: ‘You cannot just show up with money and think you 
can buy [a signature on Form A] … Sometimes money is good, it can be
used for development, but sometimes it is bad if the person is greedy …
Greedy people should not get title because they see only to themselves.’
Thus the line between rich and poor is interlaced with other mechanisms 
that determine chiefly approval, as reflected in cases of capital-poor
farmers being granted the chief’s approval. One example is Rosa, in Mooya
village, who tutors children whose parents cannot afford to pay for their
school fees. Rosa never approached her headman to ask for an approval of
conversion. Instead, she was summoned to the chief’s court where she was
told that a conversion had already been approved by the chief. The next
187
 
   
  
  
    
   
       
  
 
   
  
   




         
    
           
 





     
   
   
   
      
   
  
      
  
   
day, she paid a visit to the District Council to purchase Form A, which the
chief signed the following week. ‘See, stamped and everything’, she said,
showing me the form. 
Rosa has no plans to continue with the conversion process, however:
‘How could I afford [to]? No, I cannot, but this [Form A] is also good … if
someone comes, I can show this because the chief has signed’, she said. Rosa
here pointed to how Form A is also a form of ‘paper’, and a quite peculiar
one. It is issued by a statutory institution and comes bundled with a quality
of stateness, yet it is appropriated by Chief Liteta IV who certainly knows
that the signing of these forms rarely materializes in a title deed (see below). 
In many ways, Form A has a political life of its own: it both reinforces a 
sense of entitlement on the ground and endows Chief Liteta IV with land-
regulating powers, somewhat ironically facilitated by a statutory law aimed
at gradually replacing the land-governing authority of chiefs. Indeed, as
Lund (2008: 155) writes, ‘laws, regulations and policies do not determine
access and use of resources as such, but erect a structure of opportunities for
the negotiation of these rights.’ The negotiations around form A take place 
in an space both inside and outside state law: inside because the form is 
issued by a statutory institution, allowing people to claim rights with
reference to state law, and outside because the form is not recognized as a 
certification of rights outside chiefly territory. Nevertheless, Form A vests 
chiefly property rights with a state-like quality (cf. Emmenegger 2020), even 
if the application of conversation never materializes in a title deed.
Land titling has opened up new political arenas for the negotiation of
rights and authority. At the very outset of the conversion process, the title
deed is remolded to function as a product of good morals and the application
of labor, troubling the distinction between rights reified into abstract 
contracts and rights as extending from people’s bodies onto the land. Form
A sits in between these conceptions, allowing Chief Liteta IV and his
headmen to retain control over land and land use. Indeed, Chief Liteta IV
and his headmen have appropriated state law and redeployed it in the
maintenance of their authority. Thus, while officers at the Ministry of Lands
continue to argue that for Zambia to become fully modern it must create
institutions that supersede the material and allow for governance to be
conducted on the level of nationally recognized representations of ownership
rights, on the ground other ways of relating to land and property continue to




      
      
      
     
     
       
     
    
   
    
             
  
    
   
  
          
     
   
   
  
      
    
        
    
    
      
      
     
   
      
    
    




8.3.2 The statutory administration 
Chiefly approval is only the first stage in a long and winding conversion
process. Once a signature has been obtained from Chief Liteta IV on Form
A, the applicant must hire a team of licensed surveyors to draw up a site
plan for the lot (a significant cost, for most), rendering the land a
cartographic artefact legible also to a remote observer in ways that open up
for action and evaluation at a distance (see Blomley 2003; Li 2004). More
specifically, the land is brought into the ambit of the District Council
which, after receiving the site plan along with Form A, calls the applicant
in front of the District Land Planning Committee (DLPC). Once there, the
applicant is asked describe the ‘purpose’ of the conversion and lay out his
or her ‘development plan’ for the land in question, as a DLPC member of
Chibombo District described to me. Here, we also find an element of
evaluation of the applicant’s intentions, in effect hindering people from
claiming title to land without doing much with it, which often implies some
form of commercialization.
At this particular point in the life span of the application, new actors and 
interests assemble. I shall illustrate this with the story of Mr. Kalaka, an
ex-officer at the Chibombo District Council who now works as a ‘private
advisor’ to applicants of conversion throughout the chiefdom. Mr. Kalaka
installs small business ventures on the applicants’ land – bird traps, brick-
burning furnaces, milk plants, woodworking stations and the like – so that
the site plan will feature some kind of enterprise, in turn increasing the
likelihood that the DLPC will find that there is sufficient reason for the
land to be put on title. He makes the land ‘ready for conversion’, as he put
it to me. Yet Mr. Kalaka’s involvement does not stop there; he effectively 
writes himself into the land of those whose names are on the application,
regardless of its success. This is done in the form of a separate contract,
written so as to make Mr. Kalaka the owner of whatever business venture
he sets up — and sometimes the venture becomes profitable, which usually
earns the support of the village headman. In Ngala village, for example, he
owns a milk plant that sits on a piece of land that used to belong to a man 
named Edgar, whose application was denied because the size of the lot was
too small to merit conversion, according the DLPC. The headman in Ngala
applauds the initiative: ‘People come from many villages to leave milk. It
is development, everyone wants development’, he said. Mr. Kalaka’s
‘advising’, however, is not uncontroversial. Headman Boyd, who is
189
 
     
    
   
     
       
        
   
    
   
  
   
      
   
     
     
      
    
     
   
    
    
   
     
      
  
     
   
   
  
     
    
   
   
     
    
   
     
familiar with Mr. Kalaka, would never let him into Mooya village because
he believes Mr. Kalaka ‘goes around like he is government and tricks 
people for land.’
Indeed, Mr Kalaka occupies an ambiguous position. He is a private
business man, yet as an ex-officer he also maintains some of the trappings
of state-like officialdom. Before we were formally introduced, I had 
encountered him several times. He is often found in or around different
District Councils in Lenje Chiefdom, where he maintains a network of
business relations. He mingles with visitors, directs people to the right
office, delivers messages from those who populate waiting rooms to those
who sit behind closed doors – all while distributing his business card, on
which he figures under the title of ‘government professional’. While the
example of Mr. Kalaka is somewhat anecdotal, it nevertheless points to
how the processes of conversion open up local lands to new actors and
interests situated in the betweenness of private and public, formal and
informal, legal and illegal, state and non-state. Land titling reproduces the
shadows of the state, a space wherein actors like Mr. Kalaka thrive. As Sud
(2019: 17) writes: land ‘spills over, past the formal authority of the state,
not as an aberration but because the spilled-over state and spilled-over land 
co-produce each other’. The title deed, as it wends its way through various
institutional sites, reproduces contestation of chiefly land across myriad
sites, rather than simply abstracting land from chiefly territory.  
Out of the twenty applicants for conversion in Lenje Chiefdom that I
interviewed, three passed the hearing in front of the DLPC. For those whose
application is approved here, another survey awaits. This time, the District
Council sends out its own field officer to the land in question to confirm 
that the headman and his council have indeed been consulted and to
corroborate that ‘other persons’ interests have not been affected by the 
approval of the application’, as stated in the Lands Act (Cap. 184, Section 
4). These findings are then presented to a ‘full council’, a joint meeting 
with all councilors present, which then approves or rejects the application. 
If approved, the district secretary refers the case to the Provincial
Government in Kabwe, where the provincial land officer reviews the file
for errors, with the most common error being that the site plan is not up to
standard, which often is a result of it having been drawn up by surveyors
lacking a license issued by the Department of Surveys (in such an event,
the case is referred back to the District Council where the process starts 
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over). The provincial land officer then dispatches the file to the Ministry of
Lands in Lusaka, an institution to which only the astute and assiduous
applicants get their cases forwarded.
One of my informants once told me that ‘going through the headman,
chief and council is easy, in one month you can be done, but when it comes
to the Ministry of Lands, ay ay ay, you have to push, push, push, otherwise
your file is just left sitting in some corner’. While greatly overstating the
ease with which one can pass through the more local institutions, he pointed
to the commonly known fact that once the application enters into the ambit
of the Ministry of Lands, the pace by which paperwork moves slows down
considerably. Mr. Mulenga, a farmer that I befriended in Chama village,
has had his application sitting at the Ministry of Lands for twenty-two
months, and over the past year he has traveled to the Ministry nine times:
to sign a document, to provide a receipt for payment made and in efforts to
convince an officer to give priority to his application. Mr. Mulenga
explained:
You go into the office and you have to tell the person sitting there ‘I know my
document has been sitting here for ten months and it’s too long’, and you 
stand there until he finds them, and look at him when he processes. Here I
made a mistake the first time: I left the office without seeing him moving it
to the next [office]. So I had to come back and take the document from his
office and carry it personally to the next. It’s a joke.
Thus, one needs to know the precise location of the case file, exactly what
office to go to in order to push one’s paper-work through, and then be able
to master the conventions of bureaucratic engagement so as to not be thrown
out by the police stationed on each floor of the Ministry. On two occasions I
witnessed visitors agitated to such a degree that police officers had to drag 
them out of offices. One of those persons told me that his file had been
‘misplaced’. At that time, he had spent what he usually earns in three months
on different fees, surveys and travels to the Ministry. When I talked to him,
he was on the verge of bursting into tears, telling me how his application had 
‘gone missing’ and that no one seemed the least bit interested in trying to
find it. How frequently files ‘go missing’ is a question that most officers that 
I interviewed shy away from. Once during an interview at the Ministry, an
office clerk rushed in, telling her senior colleague that a client had requested






   
  
   
  
  
   
  
  




   
           
  
    
 
    
   
 
    
 
      
          
   
   
       
  
          
  
   
     
     
– the only problem was that the file had gone missing from her cabinet. The
senior officer nervously looked in my direction and then hushed the clerk to 
silence. It was apparent that missing files were not something that I was
meant to hear about. 
‘After a while, you just give up’, someone told me outside the Ministry
one day. ‘Imagine if you come from Kasama and arrive at this place, you can
do nothing’, he said. The reference to Kasama was meant to depict a person
coming from rural Zambia into the buzzing life of the capital’s Ministry, not
knowing how to even start interacting with officers inside. For some, titling
is even a test of manhood: ‘You just have to push until people get tired of
you. If anything is so tedious that people just give up, it’s titling. But those
that actually go through with it, we call them men’ (not surprisingly, said by
a man who had recently acquired his title).
The Ministry itself is a place vibrant with life. People from across the 
country mingle in the waiting rooms, hallways, corridors and in the parking 
lot outside, where people sit in the shadows cast by large four-wheel drives 
– all seeking a channel into the machinations of the Ministry. Mr. Mulenga 
from Lenje Chiefdom usually counts on staying at the Ministry for three days
every time he visits: ‘The first day I come in the afternoon so everyone is
already very busy … The second day I go in [to the Ministry] early in the
morning to knock on as many doors as possible, and when I have found the
right office, I tell the people inside to put my papers on the top … The third
day I go back into that office to make sure that my file is not there [i.e. that
the file has been processed].’ Mr. Mulenga, like many others, sleeps on a
mattress outside the compound gates at night, in order to be first into the
Ministry in the morning. 
What I want to draw attention to here, however, is not so much these
spectacles of stateness in and of themselves, but how such spectacles create
a space for creative politics, and how the pervasive uncertainty around the
Ministry opens up space for negotiations of the rights defined in the title
deed. For the Ministry, like the District Council, is a place where the 
boundaries between official and unofficial, public and private, and state
and non-state blur. At the Ministry, the myriad encounters that take place
are not only between ‘state’ and ‘citizen’, but also among a whole range of
‘go-betweens’. These men (it is always men) sit in makeshift cubicles
outside the official compound, with signs that say things like ‘Land titling
service’ or ‘We know where your file is’. For a fee, these men locate
192
 
     
 
    
   
  
   
      
    
   
    
     
     
   
   
  
  
    
    
   
        
    
     
     
     
  








   
          
missing files, carry paperwork to officers inside, or shuttle files and
information from the inside to those waiting outside. Sometimes an 
applicant for conversion will never see the officials who sit inside
government offices; all their interactions with the ‘state’ happen in through 
these ‘go-betweens’ who act as ‘essential lubricants’ (Berenschot 2011),
bridging the distance between the state and the public. Yet they are not
‘outside’ the state. People call them ‘sirs’ or ‘officers’, terms of deference,
and in many ways these outsider-insiders who work in the ‘shadows’ of the
state are the state (see Sud 2019; cf. Das and Poole 2004; Harris-White
2003). In many cases, it is by the hand of these go-between ‘officers’ that
land entering into the realm of the Ministry of Lands comes out as
registered property on the other side; they become part of a ‘stretched-out
state’ (Sud 2019: 18), making state governance work in the everyday.
At the same time, these go-betweens engage in more than mere
mediation. A clear example is given by an applicant for conversion from
Chafung in eastern Zambia, who brokered a deal with a go-between
‘officer’ from the same area. In exchange for locating and pushing forward
his file, a separate contract was written that allowed the son of the go-
between to dig for gravel on the land to which the title referred (the son of
the broker ran a gravel trade in Chafung, and he got access to the lands he
needed for his venture through his father’s talent for pushing paperwork
through the Ministry of Lands). As such, the permeable boundaries of state
institutions contribute to the shaping of property relations on the ground, 
making the rights defined in the title deed a site of negotiation also outside
the ambit of statutory land law.
The process of land conversion dislodges land from its localized
existence, making it subject to new actors and interests. At both the District
Council and the Ministry of Lands, the title deed becomes a site of contin-
gency, opportunity and control, drawing different authorities, resources and
interests into relations with each other. Far from establishing a more uniform
property regime across the nation-space, land titling creates spaces for the 
renegotiation of rights across scales – despite and beyond its codification in
law. State making and land titling are, in this analysis, linked not so much in
the sense of creating a popular recognition of state institutions as land
regulating authorities (Lund 2002), but more in the sense of land titling





    
 
   
 
   
         
 
 
    
   
  
  
   
 
      
   
    
  
    
   
    
            
     
   
 
     
      
    
   
   
    
regulating authority of the state is questioned, ridiculed, challenged and 
taken over by quasi-state and quasi-legal actors.
Still, many seek ‘papers’ for the land they farm, for approaching a money-
lender, and for protection against capricious appropriation by chiefs,
headmen or government institutions, which explains the continuous strugg-
les that take place around the Ministry. Yet, contrary to what one might
assume, contestations over what the title deed is and what forms of rights it
defines continue even after the title deed has been issued. In the following
section I discuss how the title deed – once it has been issued – travels back
into Lenje Chiefdom, where it becomes re-embedded within the social and
material relations of chiefly territory.
8.4 The politics of maintaining a title deed
In Zambia, gaining a title deed is one thing, but maintaining it is quite
another. All title deeds are signed personally by the Commissioner of Lands, 
appointed by the Minister of Lands, symbolically signaling that the land is
bestowed upon the title holder by the absolute authority of the state. Yet there
is a clause hidden away in the fine print, stating that if the title holder fails to
put the land to productive use within thirty months of its issuance, the title is
annulled. While I have never heard of a case where this statute has been
enforced, it nevertheless signals a peculiar fact: in the subtext of the title deed
we find the same logic that underpins customary rights, namely, that people’s
rights in land remain contingent upon productive use and the application of
labor. According to the officers I spoke to, this is to serve as an impediment
to land speculation, yet they all submit that there are no resources to control
land use once the title deed has been issued. ‘It’s just a symbol like that, if
we would go and chase those people who sit on title but [are] not developing 
the land, that would be all we did’, a senior officer told me. What these 
officers don’t know, however, is that such resources do exist, and they are
actively deployed by chiefs and headmen. 
According to Chief Liteta IV, as set out above, what is legally put on
title is not the land itself, but human intervention on the land: clearings,
structures, wells, gardens and the like. Chief Liteta IV and his headmen, 
thus, retain the right to also adjust usufruct rights on titled land. How idle
land can be used for grazing by other villagers, what trees can be harvested 
by what person, what livestock can pass through where and when – these 
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are questions not settled by the title deed itself, but ones that continue to be
subject to negotiations among neighboring villagers. The transfer, selling 
or leasing of a titled plot located within a village can also sometimes 
become a matter of negotiation between the title holder, the headman and 
his council. For Chief Liteta IV, the title deed is a privilege that the 
chiefdom can bestow upon people, not a right accorded by government.17 
Yet the headmen and Chief Liteta IV all tell of contestations emerging
when a title holder opposes collective meddling. Still, because the title holder
remains embedded in the spatial and social fabric of the chiefdom, and the
fact the it was Chief Liteta IV who originally signed off on the conversion,
the title holder often faces different kinds of ostracism if not conforming to 
village politics. In rare cases the title holder is forced out altogether, or
‘chased’ in the Zambian vernacular, through occupation or squatting on his
or her estate. This is most common in cases where someone has converted a
stretch of land, but then leaves the land idle for future speculation, letting
tilled fields grow over, wells fill in and huts fall apart, which then become
signs of ‘false use’, as Chief Liteta IV put it. Occupation or squatting often 
occurs through a group of men, who move into a disputed plot and begin to
build shelters, plant crops, erect a fence or replace the roof on the main 
building, all to signal ‘better use’ than the person whose name is on the title.18 
Often, the cement survey beacons that mark the perimeters of the titled plot
are also removed (see Chapter 7).
Chiefly occupation is a form a strategic illegality, one that emplaces
claims to property on the land. Following Roy (2017: A4), I use
‘emplacement’ here purposely, drawing together two meanings associated
with the term: ‘the process or state of setting something in place’ and ‘a
platform or defended position where a gun is places for firing’. My point,
thus, is that the specifically placed and relational nature of occupation as
emplacement has the potential to unsettle the dissociative nature of private
property, and it can be read as a chiefly critique of the abstraction of rights
from their material base (cf. Roy 2017). Headman Kangwa of Kanga village, 
who features in the introduction to this chapter, explained such an occupation
17 Chiefly politics can differ a great deal between chiefdoms. Thus, other chiefs in other chiefdoms may
very well have entirely different views on land titling.
18 People with personal contacts within the state administration can sometimes bypass the chief and
acquire a title directly from the Ministry of Lands (see Brown 2005: 102). According to Chief Liteta IV,




   
    
   
  






        
   
     
  
  
       
  
  
   
   
    
    
   
  
   
        
         
    
   
               
  
  





     
as a practice of ‘returning the land’ to the chiefdom. According to Kangwa, 
there is little a title holder can do once the land has been re-occupied: ‘If that
person returns, what can he say? The land is already planted so how could
he plant also? … We allowed that person to go to the government to put the
land on paper, and now we don’t allow [it] anymore.’
Text box 3: Chief’s land certification 
As I write this, Chief Liteta IV is in the process of crafting his own ‘land certificates’, which are to
work as substitutes for the title deed. The development of chiefly certification is still in its infancy,
but Chief Liteta IV showed me a rough prototype. It featured a textual description of landmarks
marking out an estate, detailing what resources within its boundaries are subject to someone
else’s use. It bore the official seal of the chiefdom as well has Chief Liteta IV’s signature.
According to Chief Liteta IV, each headman (together with the village council) would be
responsible for distributing such certificates within their respective jurisdictional fold, in exchange 
for a ‘minor administrative fee’. While land acquired through chiefly certification is not subject to
cadastral registration, it clearly resembles state-like forms of titling. Yet there are discussions
within the chief’s council of hiring surveyors to do GPS mapping, making the certificate ‘more
official’, as one of the councilors avowed.
Officials at the Ministry of Lands are aware of that chiefs across the country are exploring 
various ways of doing land certification. I encountered officials who are writing off chiefly land
certification as short-lived peculiarities of a dying system of chiefly control as well as officials
who take land certification as a serious concern for state governance, and especially so if the 
certification includes some form of cadastral mapping by licensed surveyors. ‘We don’t want
people coming here with documents like that’, as one officer said, ‘in the end, all land belongs
to the president, and we [the Ministry of Lands] administer the land on behalf of the president.
Only we can certify … Those documents [chief’s certificates] are only trouble’. The officer
displayed what Gregory (1994) has called ‘cartographic anxiety’: chiefly production and
allocation of cadastral sites would ground rights that chiefs have no legal authority to grant.
Any official grid of intelligibility that proceeds from outside the Ministry of Lands, the officer
reasoned, would unsettle the authority of the state.
At the time of writing this, chiefly certification had not yet been launched in Lenje Chiefdom.
Here, however, my point is simply to draw attention to the myriad ways stately and chiefly
practices intermingle and permeate each other, and how their intertwinement continues to
create new spaces of struggle and authority.
During my fieldwork in Lenje Chiefdom, I was unable to identify any title
holder who had been ‘chased’. But Curtis, who connected his house to the
electric grid, told me a story about his uncle loosing access to a stretch of
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titled land through occupation. The land had lain fallow for some years
while he was working in the mines in the north, and when he returned, he
found that someone had built a house and planted maize on the lot. In an
attempt to reclaim the land, he summoned Chief Liteta IV and the field
officer from Chibombo District Council to the estate, but both agreed that
if those occupying the land had planted the maize and built a house, his
title deed held little traction. Thus when the title is disputed, other signs of
property (a fence, a house, a field of maize) can stand in for it, or even
override it. The curious fact in Curtis’s story is that this seems to apply for
agents of both state and chiefdom. In my interviews with state officials, 
opinions were split on this point. Some submit that the title deed is
unconditional; others are far more ambiguous in their attitude, especially
at the district level. As an officer at Chisamaba District Council explained:
If someone enters into titled land without the permission of the owner, that’s
a crime, its squatting, but let’s say the owner goes away [and] other people
start building and planting and whatnot, why did he get a title in the first
place? Can he just call on the police and evict those people? No, you need to
evaluate case by case and see what’s right.
Thus, while the title deed might be the epitome of a durable claim, it is only
as potent as the person working the land to which it refers, and even if
bestowed upon people by the president of the republic, as stated in the title
deed, it does not hang on the ruling of judges and lawyers in faraway offices, 
but on the materiality of chiefly lands and the social relations they harbor.
8.5 Materiality of paper
An investment of labor is not the only factor determining the durability of
the title deed. During my research, I was repeatedly told that the rights
defined in the title deed, in and of themselves, meant little, for the paper
that those rights were inscribed on could easily be lost or taken away. I
interviewed two farmers, for example, who had once held titles but had lost
the physical evidence of them, either in fires or break-ins, which they 
considered the equivalent of losing the titles altogether (cf. Hetherington
2009). One of those is Mr. Kilaka, who lost a title that he had inherited 
from his late father in a fire in 2014. He told me that he might still hold
rights in the form of private property, but he was so uncertain about this
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that he didn’t even want to ask anyone ‘official’ for confirmation, for fear
that he would be legally reprimanded by the government for failing to 
protect his title deed from fire. Indeed, getting one’s hands on a duplicate
is cumbersome. In cases where the title holder loses the physical evidence
of the title, he or she must make a written application to the Registrar of
Land in Lusaka, including with it a ‘detailed account of the circumstances 
under which the certificate of title was lost or destroyed’ and ‘corroborative
evidence that a diligent search was done without success’. The applicant
must also publish a ‘notice of intention’ to apply for a new copy of the title
deed in a newspaper (Lubumbe 2017: 70). When issued, the new title deed
will then bear the mark of ‘duplicate’ on it. 
It is not accidental, then, that title deeds are not only achieved with pride
but are also maintained with great care. They remain locked away in chests 
and cabinets, and most people are hesitant to display their title deed openly, 
not wanting to expose it to the uncertainties of the world outside. John, a
title holder who lives an hour’s walk from Chibombo township told me that
the first thing he did when he got notice that his title had been issued was
to replace the roof of his house, from thatch, which burns easily, to iron
sheets, which are more resistant to both rain and fire. As he stated matter-
of-factly: ‘What if there’s a fire? Then I lose both my house and the title’.
Indeed, title deeds are preserved and protected in the same way as the roof
of the house in which it is stored: both are important elements in the
production of private property. Thus, to dismiss paper as mere bits of
official matter, or its capacity to create ‘paper truths’ (Tarlo 2000), would
be to omit the political work done by paper. In particular, a more careful
exploration of ‘paper’ reverses the tenets of hegemonic conventions in land
management. For officers at the Ministry of Lands, the title is an abstract
representation that makes private property possible. It is the beginning of
private property, and anything less is a feeble form of ownership. For the
rural farmer in Lenje Chiefdom, titles are a fragile end point of property,
held together by material and social processes that require continuous
maintenance. 
That the title transfigures to become conditional upon materiality of land 
and paper creates possibilities for chiefly contestation of the rights defined 
in the title deed (as shown in the previous section) and also new spaces for
exclusion of the rural poor. Indeed, poverty here does double duty: it is both 







    
 
     
    
    
            
    
    
  
   




   
    
    
  
    
    






   
  
  
   
from maintaining it. For just as rights in land require investment and an 
application of labor, so too does the maintenance of physical paper, such as
the construction of an iron-sheet roof to make the house less vulnerable to
rain and fire.
That the title deed retains elements of being an effect of land use – tilling
a field, digging a well, building a house and keeping its roof in good repair
– shows just how transitory the notion of private property remains in Lenje
Chiefdom. Indeed, land titling does not ‘fix’ certain conceptions of land
and property, but intertwines with chiefly authority to create an ambiguous
legal space where a plurality of actors and interests coincide. As it wends 
its way through the chief’s court, District Council, the Ministry of Lands
and finally ‘lands’ in a particular place, the title deed continuously creates 
new terrains of struggle, political opportunities, exclusions and enactment
of chiefly and stately authority – with state-chiefdom boundaries being
vividly open to the play of contingent politics: good morals, state-like
‘officers’, go-betweens, chiefly occupation and the materiality of things.
8.6 Chapter conclusion
In the mid-1990s, at the time of Zambian liberalization, the government
avowed its ‘will to improve’ (Li 2007) by pledging to ‘institutionalize a 
modern … land law code intended to ensure the fundamental right to 
private ownership of land’ (cited in Roth et al. 1995: 33) Bureaucrats, land 
officers and development professionals asserted that for Zambia to become
fully modern, it must create institutions that supersede the material and
provide for governance to be conducted at the level of nationally 
recognized representations of ownership rights. Only by improving
documentation, it was argued, can Zambian agriculture really flourish. The
concomitant opening of the property frontier in 1995 had as its goal the
founding of a new modern nation, to be built slowly by providing for
farmers to convert their landholdings into titled property. This was a
system, they believed, by which people would work their way into the land 
market and national body politic. Yet despite government attempts to
institutionalize land and its use, both ‘nature’ and human institutions




      





     
    
  
    
   
   
 
     
    
  
  
    
  
 
   
   
  
  









This chapter has situated an anthropological critique of land titling, 
showing how the bureaucratic practices that go into composing the title deed
are charged with contingency and uncertainty. The title deed is not made
mechanically despite the oft-repeated machine of the state apparatus, and
rather than contributing to some linear change toward land as commodity,
the title deed weaves its way through multiple institutions, and at each site 
takes on new meanings and associations. Exploring state-chiefdom
boundaries through the politics of land titling reveals myriad sites where the
negotiation of rights and legitimate authority takes place.
In the first instance, the application for title is reworked into an instrument
of chiefly control. By rendering chiefly approval a product of ‘good morals’,
the application is reappropriated and redeployed in the maintenance of the
chiefdom as a political body. When the application travels into the statutory
administration, it becomes a mechanism by which state-like ‘officers’ write
themselves into the land of others, and, once issued, the title deed refuses to
disassociate itself from its paper-y existence and the materiality of land. On
the ground, the title deed becomes conditional rather than absolute, and in 
contravention of formalized scripts, becomes entangled with the materiality
of things and alternative articulations of rights, which in turn allow headman 
to reappropriate and reincorporate titled land into the chiefdom.
While this chapter necessarily presented localized glimpses of highly
diverse processes, these glimpses reveal the multiple ways that stately and
chiefly power intertwine. As my analysis showed, land titling it is not
question of state authority somehow ‘superseding’ or ‘replacing’ chiefly
forms of authority; on the contrary, land titling multiplies the arenas through 
which various authorities can claim rights to govern – despite, beyond and
as an effect of efforts to ‘fix’ land rights on ‘paper’. The ‘failure’ of state
governance is, in this regard, as productive of political innovation as its






    
  
        
  
    





   
  
          
   
     
      
  
  




    
  9. At the limits of state governance
Appropriations of chiefly lands and reforms toward private property continue
across the African continent, demarcating forests and conservation
concessions and converting a dizzying array of land tenure, tenancy and
shelter claims into parcels of cadastral property legible to the apparatus of
government. It would be easy to take these processes as radical
reconfigurations of the modality of power and authority, leading to the
expungement of local rights and claims to land. It is certainly true that the
people are deprived of rights and driven off their land (Andreasson 2006),
but it is equally true, as I have shown, that these struggles are messy and do
not always play out the way we think. Land’s material emplacement usually
means that people on the ground have some say, if not through institutional
arrangements, then through acts of subversion, alteration, noncompliance or
force (Li 2014). My persistent argument has been that we need to take 
seriously the fissures, failures and unforeseen events of ‘state making’ so
they do not appear as ‘noise’ or ‘irregularities’ to otherwise effective
performances of government. This is not to suggest that material land is an
even playing field; rather, it is to suggest that we need to take seriously the
rural poor as political protagonists, fully capable of contestation and debate. 
I thus opened this thesis with the question: What are the ‘limits’ of state
governance in rural Zambia? The question is deceptively simple, yet it hides 
a complex relationship between attempts at governing and the everyday
resistance of people on the ground – a relationship that has been a central
concern for my analysis. I operationalized my inquiry through two sub-
questions:
I. How are new state territorializations shaped by the materiality of










    
     










    
   




      
   
   
   
   
  
   
   
    
   
  
II. What political work do artifacts of statutory land governance –
survey beacons, official uniforms, title deeds etc. – perform in the 
opaque reality of the everyday?
These questions firmly place the analysis in the ‘messy actuality’ of everyday
life, where practices of government became enmeshed with insubordinate 
citizens, unruly lands, and other enactments of being and moving with the
land. Through my exploration I wanted to further an understanding of how
everyday contingencies shape land struggles and state making in rural
Zambia. I adopted a broad theoretical repertoire, reflective of the ‘messy
actuality’ of the field, and I crisscrossed between the material-ecological
properties of land, a plurality of political authorities, uneven territorial
productions and the circulation of bureaucratic artifacts, material
performances of officialdom and colonial-historical sediments of racial
exclusion. I structured the analysis around four ‘agrarian events’, each
centered on a ‘boundary object’ sitting in between stately and chiefly spaces
of rule: (I) bodies in imperial space, (II) a forest claimed by both stately and 
chiefly forms of authority, (III) cement survey beacons as state power
materialized, and (IV) the title deed and its paper-y quality. Each of these
objects are analytical locations that link the empirical and the conceptual,
folding the study of state making into concrete places and encounters. 
At the foundation of this thinking lies a poststructural reading of
boundaries, signaling a ‘methodological readiness’ to explore relations of
power, authority, exclusion and control, but also instances of resistance,
transgressions, failures and fissures (Butler 1997; Douglas 1966; Povinelli
2014; Foucault 1980; McClintock 1995). Each of my boundary objects
draws on a methodology that works to summon up a theoretical imperative
to make visible the often hidden, invisible and ‘backstage’ work that
continuously thwarts state governance and reinjects elements of eventuality
and uncertainty into processes of ‘state making’. Focusing on these
contingencies, I argued, offers important clues to how marginalized peoples
resist and subvert change, what practices (including the miniscule and
quotidian) manipulate the mechanisms of dispossession and finally, what
‘ways of being’ form the counterpart to the processes that organize the
establishment of new agrarian orders. 
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In this concluding chapter I draw out my contributions and situate them
within a wider field of study. In particular, I shall argue for increased
analytical attention to the material and historical contingences of state
making. This not only serves to recover the agency of marginalized peoples;
conceptually, it shows how a focus on resistance and subversion is not a
distraction to our understanding of state making, but rather gives important
clues to how the state gets made. In short, it is in moments of fracture that
the normally invisible operation of state power becomes visible. Each of my 
case-study chapters provides insights into these dynamics from different
scales of analysis, both spatial and temporal. To ground my conclusions, I
shall, therefore, first revisit my empirical chapters to pull out what they tell
us about how everyday contingencies contribute to an understanding of state
making. In the latter half on this chapter, I bring these insights together to
think through some of the wider implications and, in particular, what it
entails to honor people’s localized contestation and critique as meaningful
political action.
9.1 At the limits of colonial control
The first empirical chapter lends insights into two entwined dynamics
important for my argument: (i) how peoples subjected to colonial power
continuously resisted, subverted and tested the limits of colonial governance,
and (ii) how such practices were not merely distractions to the administrative 
regime, but were constitutive of the (colonial settler) state. These dynamics 
reappear throughout this thesis, in various dictions and guises, but are
perhaps most clearly demonstrated in relation to my analysis of bodies in
imperial space. I here want to retrace my steps to ground and underline the 
wider implications of these insights.
The colonial settler state is often analyzed as a quite rigidly bordered
construct, with boundaries separating white from black, civilized from
savage, urban modernity from rural domesticity – categories mapped onto
discrete geographies policed through everyday administration (Roberts
1976; Gould 1997). Mamdani’s (1996) charting of the spatial and cultural
schematization of chiefly power inaugurated by the institution of indirect
rule, for example, has been pivotal for our understanding of the colonial
settler state. This is a powerful template for understanding colonial spatial
power, and in many ways, my analysis supports this view, yet at the scale of
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the body: from BSAC villagization efforts in the 1910s and the tribalization
in the 1920s, to the inmigration to mining towns in the 1930s, I showed how
colonial territorializations worked through the mapping of colonized bodies
as different. Native bodies were cast as ‘dirty’, ‘diseased’ and ‘unmanly’;
chiefs’ bodies were fitted into colonial costumes so as to make them distinct
from their social surrounds; and women’s bodies were reduced to sites of
social reproduction – constructs which tied particular bodies to particular
places with particular characteristics. Indirect rule was a project both 
intimate and geopolitical (cf. Stoler 2010), with the body being an important
site on which the boundaries of the settler state was mapped.
On the other hand, my reading of colonial territory points to the limits of
an analysis that pivots on ideal templates of space and authority, and 
especially how it hides from view the creative measures taken by people to
disentangle themselves from spatial formations of colonial power. As I
showed, the bodies that colonial power produced (the sedentary villager, the
tribalized native, the domesticated woman) repeatedly refused or ignored the
appellations assigned to them by government and, in doing so, became
disorderly bodies (the non-villager, the de-tribalized native, the ‘unattached’
woman). In many ways, these ‘counter-bodies’ are more important for
understanding the effects of colonial power than those who remained ‘in 
place’. For they show how colonial truths and legal decrees deployed to
secure boundaries (racial and gendered imaginaries, territorial inscriptions,
bodily restrictions) also contained the seeds of their failure to determine what
bodies ought to belong and where. In other words, resistance and insub-
ordination to colonial power – which in my analytic flows from people’s
bodies onto the landscape and into the body politic – operated through (not
despite) people’s subject-positions of colonial difference.
Here I also wish to point to another aspect of this argument, namely, how
it speaks to scholarship that posits domains of cultural and political life that 
somehow remained protected from the incursions of colonialism (or
modernity) and seeks to find in these spaces resources for anticolonial
politics (Scott 1985; Chatterjee 1993). While this work has been important
for showing that colonial power is uneven and partial, such studies often 
assume the existence of separate spaces (public/private, colonial/precolonial,
modern/premodern) between which subjects consciously moved, taking on
different identities at different sites (cf. Bhabha 1994). My analysis, in










      
   
    
 
    
  
 
     
   
      
 









   
      
 
     
     
 
   
  
   
 
places somehow sealed off from outside power. Instead, ruptures in colonial
power occur in people’s entwinements with relations of governance and in 
people’s attempts to outwit them, redeploy them or reappropriate them as
their own. Room for resistance emerged through (not from outside) spatial
modes of colonial power.
The larger contribution made here, thus, is that the making of the colonial
state is inseparable from practices of resistance, subversion and
insubordination. In conceptual terms, this dynamic is captured if we combine
two strands of theory: (i) that the colonial state was contingent upon the
construction and displacement of the marginal Other (Mamdani 1996) and
(ii) that disorder, as Douglas (1966: 35) insightfully argued, is an inevitable
‘by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as
ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements’. In this view, then, order
and disorder are not competing processes; conceptually we need to think of
them as relationally constituting the state and its emergent boundaries. In
more empirical terms we see this, for example, in the citemene ban of 1906,
which was intended to lead to more orderly settlement patterns. Yet, rather
than contributing to sedentarization, the citemene ban reinforced masculinist
subjectivities around practicing citemene as resistance (see also Moore and
Vaughan 1994). In short, room for resistance was not an aberrant outgrowth 
of an ordering colonial polity but was woven into its very foundation, with a
colonial government claiming to produce spatial and social order in the very 
act through which it reproduced the conditions for the contestation of that
ordering (new margins, new positions of resistance). 
Ironically, however, my analysis also shows how resistance reinforced
unequal relations of power. Native bodies that built temporary shelters
(mitanda) in the forest were cast as different in psyche and phenotype 
because they escaped the confines of the ‘proper village’. The ‘primitive 
native’, as one officer commented, ‘ravages the forests’ rather than cultivates
enclosed fields. In the forest, ‘his already dark skin’ turns ‘almost grey in the
ashes’ and takes on ‘ghost-like features’ (BS1 A 7/7/9 Letter to the Secretary
of Native Affairs). Likewise, women leaving rural areas to settle in town
were branded as prostitutes and forced into kitchens and marital relations as
a result of their struggles to secure access to town. As such, race and gender
were not ready-made rubrics to be written onto the landscape; rather, their
particularities materialized through people’s involved activity, in the specific
relational context of people’s practical engagement with their material
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surroundings and in their efforts to move out of relations of colonial
domination (cf. Nightingale 2011). Colonial subjectivities then, need to be
conceptualized, at least in part, as products of the ‘failures’ ‘fissures’ and
‘limits’ of colonial power.
What becomes clear here is that failures of government should by no
means be taken as ‘state failures’ (see Hagman and Péclard 2010). Quite the
opposite. As I have shown throughout this thesis, they are precisely the
moments wherein the state is made. Recognizing that such ‘productive’
failures permeate the history of Northern Rhodesia is a testament to how
administrative efforts to bring ‘out of place’ bodies ‘into place’ was a central
aspect of the making of the colonial settler state and subjectivities, with ‘out
of place bodies’ continuously testing the limits of colonial rule, in turn 
provoking new attempts to govern, iteratively reconfiguring practices and
rule and the people they sought to contain. These movements are not
distractions to our understanding of state making; they are state making, a
process that intertwines attempts to govern and control, material space and
imageries of race, tribe and gender.
9.2 At the limits of the state there is… a chiefdom?
Chapter 6 probes another dimension of state making, equally important to an
understanding of the limits of state governance as generative of struggle and 
politics – namely, how the materiality of terrain grounds struggles over
environmental resources and continuously opens up possibilities for
subversion and alternative forms of claim-making. This insight emerges from
a historical reading of Munyama Forest, a space that sits in between ‘state’
and ‘chiefdom’. By tracing out the ‘layers’ of the forest, I brought into view
(some of) the historical and material terrains within which claims to land, 
legitimate authority and rightful presence are being contested in the forest
today. This chapter draws attention to and accentuates the need for critical
analysis of material and historical terrain; even if formal-jurisdictional limits
of ‘state’ and ‘chiefdom’ are inscribed onto maps and encoded in law, treating
them as commonsensical both disguises and reproduces unequal relations of
power that are constitutive of, and internalized within, their colonial-historical 
forms of legibility.
As such, my contribution is principally empirical. Yet my reading of the
forest also provided an opportunity to think through the boundaries between
206
 
       








     
    
  
 
          
  
    
   
     
  
       
 
   
   
     




   
   
       
    




state and chiefdom, and how their relations are reworked amid struggles over
environmental resources. In many respects, my analysis is analogous to
Africanist work that underlines the ‘creativity’ and ‘reinvention’ of
customary authority (e.g. van Binsbergen 1987, 2003) and scholarship that
probes the myriad ‘negotiations’ between different bodies of authority
through struggles over the legitimate right to control, tax and regulate access
to resources (e.g. Hoffmann, Vlassenroot and Marchais 2017). Yet I
proposed a broader analytic around a ‘state-forest-chiefdom’ boundary logic
to capture how political authorities are relationally variable vis-à-vis a 
material landscape that continuously opens and forecloses spaces for such
‘negotiations’ (Nightingale 2018). This opened up a space for analytical
insights into how ‘nature’ is a powerful terrain not only for the assertion of
stately officialdom, but also for resistance, subversion and alternative 
articulations of rights, territory and authority. Here, I will again retrace my
steps to anchor my contributions.
Material and conceptual ‘nature’ has been fundamental for the kind of
boundary struggles that delineates who can control and use the forest lands. 
The conflict started with the discovery of ‘valuable tree species’ in the 1940s
– a stately assertion that came bundled with administrative concerns over
‘encroaching tribesmen’. Even amid the displacement, however, Chief Liteta
III laid critical groundwork for subsequent struggle by encouraging people
to use the forest. People erected temporary shelters that could be easily
abandoned and planted the strategic crop cassava, which melds with the
forest cover, in efforts to outmaneuver the forest patrols. Chief Liteta III
offered shelter to those who were expelled, thereby bolstering his legitimacy.
In the postcolonial forestry administration, ecological imaginaries of pristine
nature reemerged and formed an epistemology that posited the forest as a
place outside modernity, occupied by a primitive people that do not belong
– epistemic erasures that evolved into struggles that set civility against
barbarity. Following violent clashes, an origin story around the ancestral
spirit of Natota – who, in some versions of oral history, was killed by
foresters – was rekindled. When eviction troops were deployed, rain 
conjured by Natota, as the forest inhabitants asserted, cascaded down steep
slopes, thwarting the inroad for government vehicles. What emerges from







   
    
     
   
  
   
  
       
     
   
    
   
  
       





    
 
       
    
 
 
    
   
 
   
  
  
        
   
Echoing what I argued in Chapter 5, government ‘failures’ to control
nature and citizenry are powerfully productive of new forms of politics and
enactments of chiefly oppositional authority (cf. Neumann 2004). State and
chiefdom are, in this sense, co-extensive with each other and the political
ecologies of the forest. Still, just as bodily resistance against colonial control 
produced gendered and racial stereotypes, the forest works as a terrain for
the production of social difference, yet at another scale.
My analysis shows how attempts to govern the forest have, at least since 
the 1940s, linked up constructs of difference – modern-traditional, nature-
culture, primitive-civilized – perpetuated them and, crucially, transformed 
them into political resources deployed to legitimize certain claims and render
others illegitimate. These processes fold colonial relations into the
boundaries that posit ‘state’ and ‘chiefdom’ in opposition to each other. It is
opposition and competing claims that (re)produce and perpetuate particular
qualities of stateness and chiefly-ness, and provide for these categories to
take on cultural and political meanings independent of each other (cf. van
Binsbergen 1987). In short, state and chiefdom are not predetermined
categories with predefined relations and registers of rule; they emerge in and
through forest struggles, reshaping who has the authority to govern, who 
belongs and who are the subjects of exclusion.
In this optic, the struggle over the forest is not some historical zero-sum 
game between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ (Barnett 2010). Instead, my analysis 
resonates with work that emphasizes the importance of distinguishing
different authorities by their practices rather than by their statutory form:
legal/illegal, formal/informal, state/non-state etc. (e.g. Lund 2006; Hagmann
and Péclard 2010). Such binaries continue to inform critical work on
governance across Africa, but their boundaries are, as my analysis clearly
shows, variable and porous. Retaining them conceptually leads to awkward 
assumptions that obscure how governance works in practice. For example,
the forest headmen skillfully navigated the state administration to obtain
written endorsements from faraway bureaucrats in order to pressure more
local state agents to recognize their settlements. In an effort to bring the forest
into the administrative fold of the chiefdom, Chief Liteta III reinvented
Munyama as a ‘Chief’s Forest’, mimicking the forestry practices of the
statutory administration. Later, he provided the forest headmen with ‘books’
(ibuku), introduced by the colonial regime as a measure of control and 
taxation, turning the tools of colonial power against itself. Later still, this
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relationship was reversed, with the district secretary informing Chief Liteta
IV to come in plain clothes to an assembly in the forest – echoing indirect
rule’s public performance of an orchestrated alliance of chiefly and stately
authority – undermining his claims of chiefly independence. 
Stately and chiefly symbols of power and political legitimation insinuate 
themselves into each other, crisscrossing between overt assertions and covert
tactics, blurring boundaries of legal/illegal, formal/informal, state/non-state.
Indeed, what is governance and what is resistance is here a matter of
perspective. Thus, exploring state governance as some expanding frontier of
‘state territory’ into a forestland, resisted in various ways by ‘local
communities’, is simply not sufficient (cf. Byrne et al. 2016). Practices of
governance and resistance involve the continuous co-production of stately
and chiefly authority at a variety of sites and through a range of tactics and
territorialization moves, constituting a plurality of political, ecological and
spiritual spaces. Where these spaces intersect, struggles over their different
boundaries give meaning to the categories of state, forest and chiefdom. It is
in this sense that forest struggles are foundational to state making. They
reveal the messy and complex practices through which different authorities 
come into being, how certain peoples are posited in a space ‘outside’
modernity and how rights are asserted and articulated on a highly unstable
political landscape – at the scale of the body (Chapter 5) and at the scale of
the landscape (Chapter 6).
Making colonial connections is not designed to ‘settle scores’ but rather
to recognize that these are unfinished histories. The forest example shows
how imageries of nature and the primitive native remain available for joint 
rediscovery and redeployment in postcolonial space. Yet, rubrics such as
‘colonial legacy’ offer little help; a ‘legacy’ makes no distinction between
what holds and what lies dormant, between a weak and a tenacious trace, and
thus instills ‘overconfidence in the knowledge that colonial history matters,
far more than it animates an analytic vocabulary for deciphering how it does
so’ (Stoler 2008: 196). I make no claim to have crafted such vocabulary, by
my analysis points to how sediments of previous power remain
consequential, how agrarian conflicts pivot on the ways past struggles gain 
traction, in turn bringing into clear light (some of) the uneven, layered, and
contested geographies upon which the ‘modern’ Zambian state takes form.
As the provincial planner in Kabwe told me in a conversion about the
situation Munyama Forest: ‘It’s always like this in this country.’ While 
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probably an exaggeration, his statement serves to underline the importance
of historical analysis, without which we would be unable to understand the
dynamics that drive land struggles in contemporary Zambia.
9.3 At the limits of the law: property and its artifacts
Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis offer yet another set of insights, crucial to
my ambition to capture the practices by which people deflect and subvert
state projects by means of a multitude of ‘tactics’ articulated in the details 
of everyday life. Both are centered on the apparatus of private property,
and they sit in productive tensions with previous research on the
‘negotiability’ of property and political authority (Lund 2016; Sikor and
Lund 2009; Vandekerckhove 2011). While this work has opened up fertile
fields of analysis, most of these accounts privilege conceptions of state and
property as socio-legal constructs. Instead, I shifted analytical attention to
how the insistent materiality of boundary stones, paper and physical
environments is continuously recorded in the social and institutional
organization around land and property. At its core, by placing analytical
attention on the land itself – its location, occupation and material imprints
– we see how projects of property making (beaconing and titling) are never
contained by statutory regulatory norms. By extension, a new set of insights
emerge around how property and its artifacts are continuously deflected,
reappropriated and redeployed by people on the ground. If we don’t take
seriously these practices, I argue, we limit the possibility for engaging with 
marginalized peoples as political actors. Revisiting my ethnography drives
this point home.
In chapter 7, I proposed a more careful conceptualization of the material
field of property politics to understand how both state and citizens co-
constitute each other’s existence and capacities through iterative moments of
material action and reaction. My analysis showed how villagers picked apart
boundary stones and buried them in the bush, or piled them up at the roadside
for open spectacle; transplanted fruit trees to more strategic locations; and
erected sturdier houses to solidify their material presence on the land. As
such, people laid claims to land, not by invoking authority – by backing up
their claims with institutional influence – but by acting upon the materiality 
of land and property. Previous scholarship is of course right in that property
is never more stable than its recognition admits (per Lund 2002). But what
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is to become, as Porter (2014: 12) asks, of ‘those who cannot prove their
worth across the thresholds of recognition?’ The people in Mulonga village 
who found beacons in their land have no easy ‘ins’ into the ambit of
officialdom; any effort to make their voices heard in the corridors of the
district council were replete with statist obstructions, doorkeepers and legal
deferral, and neither chief nor headman held any institutional leverage. It is
not accidental, then, that the material landscape become a field of struggle.
My argument is that a focus on the materiality of property serves to open
up a material field of politics through which resistance can be articulated.
Recognizing that driving a pick through a beacon is political work has
important implications; it suggests that if we reduce property to how it is
legally legitimated (which was largely invisible to the inhabitants of Mulonga), 
we limit the possibilities for honoring material action as a meaningful political
enactment that destabilizes the state property regime. At its core, my analysis
shows how the rural poor are not passive in the face of dispossession, but fully
capable of contestation and critique also in the absence of an institutional
authority that can be drawn upon for political support.
My ambition to open up the debate on property politics continues in 
Chapter 8, which probes the political work done by the titled deed once it
escapes the domain of its solicitors and becomes enmeshed with the land to
which it refers. As I showed, the title deed has not ‘fixed’ a certain 
conception of land rights, nor has it eclipsed or occluded chiefly power. At 
the very onset of the titling process, Chief Liteta IV and his headmen
appropriate the title deed and redeploy it to maintain their authority. Indeed, 
as the title deed is reworked from being a legal contract in the abstract to
being contingent upon the materiality of the land to which it refers, it is no
longer contained within liberalism’s compass of property – it escapes the
tenets of statutory law. What emerges then, is a reversal of tenets of
hegemonic conventions in land management; for neoliberals and other
followers of Soto (2000) the title makes private property possible and 
anything less is a feeble form of tenure (Per Locke). For the farmer in Lenje
Chiefdom, the title deed is the end point of property, held together by 
material and social processes that require continuous maintenance – with 
local bureaucrats ambiguously in between. In effect, this opens up for
chiefly-orchestrated occupation of titled land, reincorporating private estates
into the chiefdom – despite there being no ‘legal’ provision to do so. Once 
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we rescale our analyses onto material ground, we start to see how liberal land
law reform crumbles around the edges.
Legal pluralists have charted out the ways that different legal systems
overlap and rub up against each other (see von Benda-Beckmann and Turner
2018 for a recent contribution), yet the focus tends to be on ‘the legal’ in the
abstract. My analysis shows how conceptions of abstract rights become 
tangled up in very real materialities (cf. Hetherington 2009). For example,
that title holders feel the need to protect the title deed from rain and fire
creates a politics around housing and roofing, making the abstract and the
material impossible to disentangle. Thus, to restrict oneself to highlighting
the capacity of title deeds and other documents to create ‘paper truths’ (Tarlo
2000) would be to underestimate the political work done by paper. This view
is further supported in Chapter 6, where I explored how the social position 
(class, if you will) of a document’s holder is inscribed onto the document in 
the form of stains, faded writing or torn corners, which in turn can render
invalid the entitlement defined in the document – essentially hampering
people living under harsh conditions to engage with the state as legal
subjects. Material poverty and deprivation spill onto one’s body and into the
materiality of home and land, which then are taken as signs of legal
inferiority, in turn shaping people’s possibilities of entering into ‘contracts’
with the state. Rights, property and authority, and their attendant exclusions,
are not purely social or legal products – their making is inseparable from the
insistent materiality of nature, cement and paper, and studying them through 
abstract relations of recognition is not sufficient. 
Taken together, my inquiries into property making ask for a more careful
attention to how the materiality of land, property and paper opens up new
fields of struggle through which alternative politics can be articulated
through physical acts. My point is simply that these acts stretch the analysis 
of property into a material terrain of politics, and that this terrain, in many 
cases, is the principal – and sometimes only – political arena available to
those for whom state recognition is a luxury, unaffordable or unattainable.
Analytical attention to this terrain shows how material practices embody a
critique of the placelessness of private property (as well as a version of
property as it should be) and often makes such critiques more visceral and 
palpable than struggles for recognition ever could. Yet the critique is rarely, 
if ever, aimed at private ownership in and of itself; rather, it is as a critique 
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of a conception of property rights that excludes the rural poor from the
processes of its making.
9.4 Conclusion
This thesis has been written in a context of agrarian struggles across the
African continent. Practices, institutions and laws that expunge local rights
and claims are variously set in motion to create the enabling conditions for
the reassertion of state control (Kelly and Peluso 2015). As I laid out in my 
introductory chapter, some scholars have cautioned against privileging
contingency and negotiability, arguing that attention to ‘small acts’ of
subversion might conceal structural forms of oppression and inequality and 
eclipse a more long-term logic of dispossession (Peters 2004; cf. Bhandar
2018). This thesis has presented glimpses of highly diverse, uneven and
dynamic processes, yet glimpses, I argue, that point to the importance of
recognizing that people on the ground have their own strategies, tactics and
tricks to navigate contested lands. Incorporating these everyday navigations
into our analyses, I have shown, serves to both throw into relief structural 
forms of inequality and makes visible their failure to close down possibilities
for subversion and alternative enactments of rights and authority.
One of the principal contributions of this thesis is having made those
connections, so that acts of subversion do not appear as anomalies to some
predetermined outcome. In many ways, acts of subversion are what
determines the outcome: out of place bodies unsettled colonial admini-
stration but at the same time created racial and gendered particularities that
refracted colonial governance; violent clashes following the enclosure of
Munyama engendered a landscape on which spirits ‘rain on government’; the
demolition of survey stones and chiefly appropriations of statutory law create
new enactments of property and authority. Indeed, engaging with the ‘limits’,
‘failures’ and ‘messy actualities’ of rule in practice is not an appendage to
the study of state governance – it is principal to it.
Of course, my analysis rests on observations from particular analytical
locations, each contingent upon empirical, methodological and theoretical
choices. It is a particular ‘way of seeing’. Yet, I argue, it is precisely from a 
reading of such located nodes of power, or ‘boundary objects’, that the limits
of state governance and the creativity of local peoples become visible; such
a reading replaces the notion that state governance represents the rationa-
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lization of power with a very different picture – one in which the efforts to 
govern are shot through with contingency. From this perspective we do not
lose a sense of the friction that impedes or defers state power.
It is also here that this thesis makes a wider contribution to the debates on
agrarian struggles. Much of this thesis has been concerned with situating a 
critique of a history that rests on the abstraction of land from its particular
material and social contexts. As such, I join a choir of critical voices that
charts out the array of struggles and exclusions that agrarian change triggers.
Yet as Borras and Franco (2013: 1723–24) have noted, in most research on
land struggles there is a ‘strong tendency to assume a priori, rather than to
demonstrate, what the reactions of affected groups of people are or would
be.’ I have considered ‘local reactions’ in some detail and, above all,
rendered them political, and argued why we should take them seriously as 
such. I shall conclude this thesis with an elaboration on this point.
I shall say, first, that I do not equate resistance and ‘small acts’ (Peters
2014) with some form of ‘weapons of the weak’ deployed by peasants
against ‘external’ orderly forces (Scott 1985). Indeed, smallholders do 
deploy covert tactics, but so do state surveyors, bureaucrats and field
officers, ranging from sabotage, feigned ignorance and dissimulation. Once
we rescale our analysis of state making onto the ground, we see how both
citizens and bureaucrats continually exploit indeterminacies in ways that
shape what is actualized on the ground. This is not to suggest that larger-
scale politics do not matter. They matter a great deal. Yet by placing the 
analysis on the ground, we avoid attributing to state governance a coherence
that it does not have and, in turn, see how acts of subversion are not
anomalies to otherwise effective performances of government, but are
themselves decidedly critical political enactments.
Here we must hold two thoughts in view simultaneously. We must both 
acknowledge historical and structural inequality (per Peters 2014) and reject
teleological assumptions – inevitable outcomes or foretold futures deter-
mined by the past or government visions of the present. Without doing so,
we risk wiping out the fact that the land struggles that occur across Africa
are not pre-scripted by government strategies or global capital, but can be
articulated otherwise. Politics, as Povinelli (2014) writes, is the ‘adventure
of the otherwise as it becomes (or does not)’. Indeed, governance is the act
of acting upon that which retains the possibility of acting otherwise (people
moving ‘out of place’, headmen reclaiming forest lands, villagers uprooting
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boundary stones etc.). In many ways, the otherwise is otherwise because it
has been actively produced as ‘other’ through practices of state government:
villagization, forest enclosure, land privatization etc. If we fail to take
seriously the otherwise – however miniscule or quotidian – as a legitimate
political claim, we fail to recognize some people as legitimate political 
protagonists, fully capable of contestation and critique.
Of course, we must not forget that ‘customary lands’ are also entrenched
with uneven power relations and ‘inter-group’ inequalities, often working to 
the disadvantage of women (Chigbu 2019; Whitehead and Tsikata 2017),
and the reader must keep these variations in view. In this thesis, however,
my primary concern has steered me elsewhere, to the ways people position
themselves against ‘outer-group’ processes, and to the ways ‘customary 
lands’ have always been insecurely held by those rendered ‘outside’ –
outside the grid of colonial modernity, outside circuits of statutory land law.
On the ground, of course, ‘inter-group’ inequalities interweave with these
broader dynamics in ways that make ‘the customary’ and ‘the statutory’
impossible to hold separate. The continued use of the terms ‘customary’ or
‘traditional’ is, rather, a ‘discourse that upholds, rather than undermines,
social, economic and political inequality’ (Whitehead and Tsikata 2017:
103). In pure juridical terms, both Mulonga village and Munyama Forest are 
now located on State Land, yet they are occupied by people who, in a stately 
administrative view, stand in the way of, rather than contribute to, the 
promises of the future. Local relations of class and gender entangle with
these imageries. In Munyama, for instance, most women rely on ‘open lands’
for their livelihoods (especially for the collection of mushrooms and 
munkoyo roots), and a privatization of the forest lands would certainly lead
to a situation where women would need to fight harder and strategize more
carefully to maintain access to land. This strategizing is already underway.
At the time of writing this, groups of women are putting pressure on their
headmen to set aside land exclusively for the use of women, with the hope
that this land will be recorded in the ‘social survey’ that the District Council
is to administer in Munyama. In this case, women’s positioning is enabled
by stately intervention. What I hope has become clear in my analysis, then,
is that struggles ‘internal’ to ‘customary lands’ are inseparable from broader
cartographies of discursive and legal power; stately and chiefly admini-





    
       
    
    
   
   
      
    
    





   
 






    
     
  
   
  
   
 
  
   
   
 
       
uncertainties and points of fracture that variously enable and disable 
contestation and critique across scales. 
While I have not spoken to the decolonization literature directly (see Icaza
and Vazquez 2017 for a recent intervention), creating hope for more
inclusive postcolonial lands makes it all the more urgent to probe how
marginalized peoples assert their rights within highly unequal relations of
power, and what practices thwart the processes that organize the
establishment of new agrarian orders – not because recovering marginalized
voices somehow allows people to move out of unequal relations of power,
but because it provides a grammar for the articulation of the terms of people’s
existence within such relationships. This includes, in my view, an analytical 
appreciation for the hidden, invisible and ‘more-than-human’ arenas of
politics – spirited ecologies, breakable stone and brittle paper – without 
which we would be unable to understand the myriad ways that land becomes
struggled over, and how new exclusions take form (cf. Thierault 2017). Not
engaging with them risks reinforcing problematic assumptions about ‘tenure
modernization’ as some cure-all template for ‘development’, and in turn 
writing off various types of resistance as mere diversions toward a pre-
defined modernity and further sidelining the dynamics that underpin land
struggles. Failure to attend to these artifacts means that we may miss crucial
material-ecological relations and management dynamics. More 
fundamentally still, I contend, engaging with them is crucial for broadening
our understandings of land politics.  
Political and critical analyses require that we trace people’s practices –
citemene cultivation, planting cassava in a forest reserve, uprooting
boundary stones, squatting on titled land – back to their political found-
ations, and articulate them as political so they can enter into our frames of
analyses as meaningful actions. Without doing so, we risk erasing from land
struggles the politics animated by the practices of people on the ground, the
common sense they disturb and the critique avidly coalesced around them. It
is against this background that I read Sennet’s (1970) advise to ‘make use of
disorder’, Levin’s (1989) emphasis on ‘productive incoherence’, and
Derrida’s (1996: 84) claim that ‘chaos is at once a risk and a chance’:
[C]haos and instability, which is fundamental, founding and irreducible, is at
once naturally the worst against which we struggle with law, rules,
conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but at the same time it is a




   
 
   
   




      
           
  
     
    




    
 
   
  
   
   
  
   
 
    
 




   
   
there would be no need for politics, and it is to the extent that stability is not 
natural, essential or substantial, that politics exists … Chaos is at once a risk
and a chance.
Practices of government produce new natures, spaces of control and forms
of oppressions, yet they are always ‘chaotic’ in the sense of providing a
‘chance’ for alternative articulations of politics. In this thesis, I took an 
historical-ethnographic stance that enabled me to explore the ‘chaos’ of state 
governance in critical encounters and conjunctures where multiple powers
coincide, how critical practices emerged, in turn provoking new attempts to
govern. It shows how state making and agrarian struggles are intimately
linked, with the state emerging as an effect of processes of inclusion and
exclusion (per Mitchell 1991), yet an effect constantly destabilized at myriad
sites: citemene fields, road checkpoints, spiritual dwellings, chiefly attire,
survey beacons, the thresholds to government offices, stamps and signatures, 
bad roads and heavy rainfall. State power is trafficked through these
everyday sites; they provide, in short, critical means for people to engage
with the state.
There is a methodological dimension to this argument as well. Boundaries
provide a way of thinking about power as a terrain of contending forces that
can never achieve a genuine stability – a terrain of evershifting relationships.
However stable a boundary seems, there is always some space for
contestation, whether this is achieved or articulated. The value of this
approach, thus, is that it focuses attention both on the question of how
particular power relations are produced and maintained and on the points of
potential fracture where those structures of dominance are or might be
challenged. It allows us to ask critical questions about the effectiveness of
state power, without denying the reality of that power. What kind of threat
to state authority does a women chasing surveyors off her land pose, for
instance? For me, the study of state power cannot be separated from everyday 
lived realities. Abstract concepts, such as ‘the state’, have little meaning
outside these realities; here, ‘the state’ becomes discourse, and discourse 
always produces its own truth effects, which often hide from view the myriad 
social and material relations, struggles and injustices on the ground. 
The task of productive criticism, in this view, is not about unveiling some
historical or ideological force; it is about attending to how lands get
inhabited, labored on, struggled over and turned into objects of control. It








   
  
  
and political subjects and ways of relating to land cannot appear within 
hegemonic frames of policy and politics. It asks in what ways the material
and conceptual remaking of land might be complicit in forms of erasure and 
abjection of Other forms of politics. And it asks how these other forms of
politics can be made visible, and what possibilities they hold. On the ground, 
there are limits to what state governance can achieve, and making visible
these limits reminds us of that struggles over land are not determined in
advance, but remain open to the play of history, politics and the claims to 
self-determination that people make every day.
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  Popular science summary
The establishment of political control over land is a central part of state-building.
In Zambia, as in most countries in southern Africa, state-building remains an 
unsettled and contentious process, shaped by histories of colonial conquest, 
racial discrimination and mass evictions of poor farmers from their land. During 
colonial rule, white settlers seized control over the most attractive land while the
African population was forcibly relocated to ‘native reserves’ on marginal lands. 
The reserves were administered by what colonial administrators called ‘tribal
leaders’ – African chiefs and village headmen – who allocated land rights
according to local rules, outside the legal system of the colonial state. More than
half a century after independence, Zambia remains divided between areas
controlled by state institutions (state land) and areas controlled by local chiefs
(so-called customary land), the latter home to the majority of Zambia’s small-
scale farmers. At present, the Zambian government is gradually appropriating 
customary lands in efforts to make rural lands, its users and transactions
controllable by state authorities. Yet the extension of state control into rural areas
is a deeply politicized process that, in many cases, leads to new evictions of local
inhabitants, and ignites land conflicts and power struggles between state
authorities, farmers, chiefs and village headmen.
This thesis explores state-led efforts to appropriate land controlled by Lenje
Chiefdom in central Zambia with the aim to better understand land struggles and
state-building as two intimately related processes that create new political 
landscapes where state and chiefdom compete for political power and influence,
and where farmers struggle to assert their claims to land. By studying local acts
of resistance to state control, both past and present, the thesis offers clearer
insights into state-building as an uncertain process, shaped by creative farmers,
chiefs and village headmen who repeatedly challenge state rule, resist eviction
and reoccupy disputed lands. The thesis builds on archival research and long-
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term fieldwork in Lenje Chiefdom, and presents four case studies, each 
contributing to new understandings of the Zambian state, and its colonial history,
from different local perspectives.
The first case explores how the colonial regime ‘fixed’ a racialized African
population in villages on marginal lands. The analysis shows how the colonial
administration was resisted by local inhabitants, and how this resistance is
crucial for understanding the colonial state as an uncertain achievement,
constantly destabilized by acts of subversion and non-compliance. The second
case connects colonial rule and contemporary land politics by investigating a
conflict over a forest area, appropriated by the colonial state in the 1940s. By
showing how local inhabitants navigate the political and physical landscape to
reoccupy the forest after their eviction, this study develops an understanding of
how material terrain and colonial histories entwine to create incomplete state
control over the forest today. The third case examines the surveying and material
demarcation of village land. The analysis follows state surveyors’ placement of
boundary stones on village land and villagers’ efforts to discover and demolish
these stones, showing how marginalized farmers challenge state authority and
resist eviction through material practices on the land. The fourth case explores
the process of formal land titling. In theory, land titling means that the national 
government assumes the right to administer local land ownership, but this
analysis shows how the chief and his headmen reinvent the title deed as a
political tool for their own control.
Together, these four case studies show how marginalized peoples continually
test the limits of state governance on a landscape characterized by historical and
political inequalities. Through its grounded analysis, the thesis points to the
importance of recognizing that local peoples have their own strategies and tactics
to stake claims to home and land, which turn state-building into a conflict-ridden
process with insecure and unstable outcomes. Yet it is argued that local 
resistance against the state should not be seen as contributing to local ‘state
failures’. On the contrary, resistance reconstitutes the state in important ways,
creating both new forms of exclusion and possibilities for the reinvention of local 
land rights and political authority, in new combinations of state politics and local
practices. The thesis concludes by calling for greater attention to local interests
in contemporary land politics, and the necessity to understand acts of resistance 











   






        
 
  
   
       






Att etablera politisk kontroll över mark är en viktig del i statsbildning. Den
zambiska statsbildningen, likt den i många andra länder i södra Afrika,  har
formats genom en historia av kolonial ockupation, rasdiskriminering och
massfördrivningar av fattiga småbrukare från deras mark. Spår av historiska
orättvisor finns kvar än i dag, och statliga institutioner och deras legitimitet är
fortsatt omstridda i delar av landet. Under koloniseringen av Zambia tog vita
bosättare kontrollen över den mest attraktiva marken, medan den afrikanska
befolkningen tvångsförflyttades till reservat på perifera marker. Reservaten
övervakades av vad koloniala administratörer kallade ’stamledare’ – afrikanska
kungar och byäldstar – som fördelade markrättigheter enligt lokala regler,
utanför kolonialstatens rättssystem. Mer än ett halvt sekel efter självständigheten
kvarstår uppdelning mellan de områden som styrs av statliga institutioner (statlig
mark) och de områden som styrs av kungar och byäldstar (traditionell mark). En
majoritet av Zambias småbrukare bor på traditionell mark. Den zambiska
regeringen exproprierar nu gradvis traditionell mark i syfte att öppna upp mer
mark för statlig kontroll. Det är en djupt politiserad process som, i många fall,
leder till nya tvångsförflyttningar av småbrukare, och nya marktvister och 
maktkamper mellan statliga myndigheter, småbrukare, kungar och byäldstar.
Den här avhandlingen undersöker den statligt ledda exproprieringen av
markområden som kontrolleras av kungadömet Lenje i centrala Zambia i syfte
att öka förståelsen för hur marktvister och statsbildning är två intimt förknippade
processer som skapar nya former av social exkludering och politisk 
maktutövning. Fram träder nya politiska landskap där stat och kungadöme
rivaliserar om politiskt inflytande. Genom att studera lokala motstånds-
handlingar, både historiska och samtida, bidrar studien till en förståelse för
statsbildning som en oviss process, ständigt utmanad av småbrukare, kungar och









   
 
 





     
 
 





   
  
 












och återockuperar omtvistade marker. Från ett lokalt perspektiv är statsbildning
en osäker process, öppen för alternativa former av social och politisk
organisering som ständigt förändrar utfallen av statligt styre.
Avhandlingen bygger på arkivforskning och fältarbete i kungadömet Lenje.
Den utgår från fyra fallstudier som alla bidrar till ny förståelse av den Zambiska
staten, och dess koloniala historia, från olika lokala perspektiv. Den första
fallstudien undersöker hur kolonialmakten ’fixerade’ en rasifierad afrikansk
befolkning i byar på perifera markområden. Genom att synliggöra hur
lokalbefolkningen ständigt trotsade den kolonial regimen skapar den här studien
en förståelse för hur motståndshandlingar var en viktig del i bildningen av 
kolonialstaten och dess maktapparat. Den andra fallstudien knyter samman
kolonialt styre och samtida politik genom att undersöka en markkonflikt över ett
skogsområde som exproprierades av kolonialmakten på 1940-talet. Fallstudien
kartlägger hur koloniala historier av förtryck och den fysiska skogsterrängen
bidrar till en bräcklig statlig kontroll över skogen, och visar hur invånarna
navigerar både det politiska och fysiska landskapet för att återockupera skogen 
under efterkolonial tid. Den tredje fallstudien undersöker den statliga
uppmätningen av mark som brukas av lokalbefolkningen. Genom att följa hur
lantmätare placerar ut nya gränsmarkörer på den aktuella marken, och hur bybor
upptäcker och demolerar dem, synliggör analysen hur marginaliserade
småbrukare utmanar statlig myndighetsutövning och avvärjer avhysning. Den
fjärde fallstudien fokuserar på lanseringen av nationella lagfartsbevis
(äganderättshandlingar) för mark som tidigare administrerats genom lokala
regler. I teorin innebär detta att den statliga förvaltningen övertar rätten att
reglera markägande, men fallstudien visar hur den lokala kungen omtolkar
lagfarterna och använder dem som politiska verktyg för sin egen maktutövning.
Sammantaget visar de fyra fallstudierna hur statsbildning i Zambia är en 
konfliktfylld process vars utfall varken är säkra eller stabila. Genom att analysera
statsbildning från flera lokala perspektiv synliggörs komplexiteten i den samtida
markpolitiken, och hur marginaliserade invånare och byäldstar återkommande
testar gränserna för den statliga kontrollen för att kräva rättigheter till hem och
mark. Dessa motståndshandlingar bör inte ses som bidragande till statens lokala
’kollaps’, utan leder snarare till att staten omformas och skapar utrymme för nya
politiska maktordningar, i nya kombinationer av statlig markpolitik och lokala
praktiker. Avhandlingen argumenterar för att lokala motståndshandlingar bör





    




































   
 
 




   
 
 




   
 
    
 
 
   
 
 
   Appendix 1: Participant observation
Samples from the field
Event Number of times People present Time
Hearings at the Chief’s Court (Liteta) 7 hearings in total Chief Liteta,
chief’s advisors,
court clients
Nov. 2016 (1), Dec. 2016 
(1), Feb. 2017 (1), Sept.
2017 (2), May 2018 (2)
Arrival of the survey vehicle in 
Mulonga, and the subsequent
demarcation of village lands
1 occasion (over a 
three-week period)
Surveyors, villagers -
‘Official Meeting’ between Munyama 
inhabitants and state officials
(in Munyama Forest)
1 Provincial Planning Officer,
Chisamba District Secretary,
Chief Liteta, 10+ headmen,
50+ forest inhabitants
April. 2018
Village meetings 5 Occasions (2 in 
Mulonga and 3 in 
Chiwala)
Villagers, headman Nov. 2016 (2), March 
2017 (1), Nov. 2017 (1),
April 2018 (1)
Forage walks with a group of women 6 occasions.
Munyama Forest (4),
Mulonga (2)
Group of women Dec. 2016 (1), Jan. 2017
(1), March 2017 (2), Oct.
2017 (2)
Preparing citemene field for
cultivation (in Munyama and 
Mulonga)
4 occasions.
Munyama (3) and 
Mulonga (1)
Villagers (mainly men) -
Partaking in tilling, seeding,
ploughing etc. in Munyama and
Mulonga
50+ occasions Villagers -
Taking produce to local market
(Chisamba and Chibombo township)
6 occasion Villagers (mainly women) March 2017 (1), April
2018 (3), May 2018 (2)
Playing pool with Mulonga villagers
in Chibombo township
4 occasions Villagers -
District Land Planning Committee 
(DLPC) meeting at Chibombo 
District council
2 sessions in total Councilors April 2018 (1), May 2018 
(1)
‘After work’ with officers from the
Ministry of Lands, Lusaka
2 occasions State officials Jan. 2017 (1), Aug 2017
(1)
Observations at the Ministry of
Lands in Lusaka 
(‘step in-and-out ethnography’)
Approximately 15 days State officials, 



















































     



















  Appendix 2: List of interviews
Number of interviews /
Interviewee(s) interviewees Place Time
Chief Liteta IV of Lenje 
Chiefdom
5 interviews, and several
casual conversations
Chief’s palace, Liteta /
Chief’s court, Liteta /
Chibombo township
Nov. 2016 (1), Feb. 2017 
(1), Aug. 2017 (1), May
2018 (2)
Chief Liteta IV’s advisor 1 2 interview, and numerous
informal conversations
Chief’s palace, Liteta /
Chief’s court, Liteta /
Feb. 2017 (1), April 2018 
(1)
Chief Liteta IV’s advisor 2 1 interview, and numerous
informal conversations
Chibombo township Sept. 2017
Chief Liteta IV’s advisor 3 1 interview, and numerous
informal conversations
Chibombo township Sept. 2017
Chief Liteta IV’s advisor 4 1 interview, and numerous
informal conversations
Chief’s court, Liteta May 2018
Former advisor to Chief III of
Lenje Chiefdom
1 interview Landless corner / Chisamba Sept. 2017
Former ‘Chief’s Forester’ (Mr.
Kakoma)
2 interview Chisamba Aug. 2017 (1), April 2018 
(1)
Headman Wilford* 3 interviews, and numerous
casual conversations
Mulonga* village -
Headman Chiwala 3 interviews and numerous
casual conversations
Munyama Forest Dec. 2016 (1), Sept. 2017 
(1), May (1)
Headman Kambobe 1 interview and numerous
casual conversations
Munyama Forest Sept. 2017
Headman Boyd 2 interviews Mooya village Feb. 2017 (2)
Headman Kangwa* 1 interview Kangwa* village Aug. 2017





Residents in Munyama Forest
(all figuring under 
pseudonyms except Papilo)
11 in-depth interviews /
11 interviewees
(5 women, 6 men)
Munyama Forest Dec. 2016 (4), Jan 2017 
(4) Aug 2017 (2), April
2018 (1)
Residents in Mulonga* village 
(all figuring under 
pseudonyms)
9 in-depth interviews / 9 
interviewees






   





























































   
 
  
Number of interviews /
Interviewee(s) interviewees Place Time
Officers at the Department of
Lands, Ministry of Lands
9 interviews / 11 interviewees
(as well as numerous casual
conversations)
Lusaka Nov. 2016 (4), Feb. 2017 
(2), Sept. 2017 (2), May
2018 (3)
Officers at the Department of
Forestry, Ministry of Lands
2 interviews / 2 interviewees Lusaka May 2018 (2)
Former forestry officials at the
Department of Forestry,
Ministry of Lands (on civil
duty around 1994-1996)
3 interviews / 3 interviewees Lusaka May 2018 (3)
Officers at the Chisamba 5 interviews / 4 interviewees Chisamba township Jan 2017 (2), Sept 2017
District Council (District (as well as numerous casual (2), April 2018 (1)
Secretary, Field Officers, conversations)
Planners etc.)
Officers at the Chibombo 7 interviews / 5 interviewees Chibombo township Nov. 2016 (2), Jan. 2017
District Council (District (as well as numerous casual (1), Feb 2017 (1), Aug 
Secretary, Field Officers, conversations) 2018 (2), May 2018 (1)
Planners etc.)
Officers at the Provincial
Government (Planning 
Officers, Forestry Officers)
3 interviews / 3 interviewees Kabwe Feb 2016. (1) Sept. 2017 
(2)
‘Private advisor’ to applicants
of land conversions
(Mr. Kalaka*)
1 interview Chibombo township May 2018
Applicants of land conversion 
(unsuccessful)
17 interviews / 17 
interviewees
Across Lenje Chiefdom Jan 2017 (2), Aug 2017 
(1), Sept 2017 (2), April
2018 (5), May 2018 (7)
Applicants of conversion 
(successful)
3 interviews / 4 interviewees Across Lenje Chiefdom Aug 2017 (1), April 2018 
(1), May 2018 (1)
Title holders
(inherited or purchased)
5 interviews / 6 interviewees Across Lenje Chiefdom Dec. 2016 (1), Jan. 2017
(1), Sept. 2017 (1), May
2018 (2)
‘Land brokers’ and ‘go-
betweens’ at the Ministry of
Lands




     
 
  
   
   
 
  
    
  
     
    
   
   
   
  
  
    
    
    
    
   
   
 
     
   
 
   
   
   
  
  
Appendix 3: Documents from the National
Archives of Zambia 
Acc. 72/13: Native Courts of the Copperbelt, district’s commissioner’s office,
Mufilira, May 1939
BS1 A 7/7/9 Letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Aug. 1910
BS1 A 7/7/12 Letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Aug. 1910
BS1 A 9/6/3 Report on housing, Oct. 1906
BS1 B 5/8/3 TR Ndola, Feb. 1908
BS1 C 3/3/3 TR, Kempe, Aug. 1908
BS3 A 8/5/9 West Awemba Division Report, Sept. 1909
BS3 A 2/6/9 TR, Kaoma, June 1909
BS3 A 2/1/14, Memo from the Secretary of Native Affairs, Aug. 1910
CNP 1/5/2: Letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Feb. 1934
CNP 1/7/1: Letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Sept. 1940
CNP 2/11/2: Official dress for Chiefs, Dec. 1933
CNP 3/11/3: Letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Dec. 1933
CNP 4/4/1: Letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Dec. 1942
LOC 216: Letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, Sept. 1931
KSD 4/1, Vol. 2: Indaba at Chilonga, Feb. 1909
ML 1/1/6: Report to Member of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Feb. 1947
ML 1/6/12: Report to Member of Agriculture and Natural Resources, May 1946
ML 3/7/7: Letters to Chief Conservator of Forests, Ndola, June-Sept. 1946
ML 3/7/7: Lenje tribal council meeting, Chibombo, May 1946
ML 4/2/12: Government Notice No. 305 of 1947, The Forest Ordinance vol. III, cap 
105, Feb. 1947
ML 5/11/1: Government Notice No. 413: Protected Forest Area No. 62, Sept. 1947
ML 5/11/3: Report to DS Wallace, Member of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
Nov. 1947
SEC 2/786 Kasama: TR Nov. 1936
SEC 2/936, Kasempa Tour Reports, Tour Report no. 2, 1927 





   






   




SEC/1102 NR police inspector, Broken Hill to deputy commissioner of the police,
Lusaka, Nov. 1941
SEC2/1168: Governors’ Conference, June 1933
SEC2/1185: Natives on private estates, May 1932
SEC/1350 NR police inspector, Fort Jameson to deputy commissioner of the police,
Lusaka, Feb. 1949
ZA 2/4/1 Awemba: TR Nov. 1929
Other 
The Lands Act. Ch. 184 of The Laws of Zambia
The Land Survey Act. Ch. 188 of The Laws of Zambia
The Chiefs Act. Ch. 287 of The Laws of Zambia
Court Order, Kabwe Central Prison, June 3, 1994
Government memo, Chisamba District Council: Public Response to Munyama
Squatters, Nov. 4, 2014
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